The exercise of power is tied with resistance (Foucault, 1980d). The ambiguity of the discourse of devolution far from muting resistance actually catalysed resistance with calls for central government to confer unfettered autonomy on local government. The main opposition arose from two sources, the local authorities themselves represented by the New Zealand Local Government Association and the National Party, then in opposition. The two were opposed to local authorities acting as agents of the state to deliver services mandated by the centre with accountability and responsibility residing in the centre. The reforms vested responsibility on central government to define the outcomes and policy agenda while local authorities would be adjudged on the
•
achievement of these (Reid, 1999; Hoggett, 1991). Citing Hoggett (1991), Reid (1999) unfavourably described this relationship as a case of 11 decentralisation of production and centralisation of command". This form of government was resisted because it reflected a lack of trust in local government (Reid, 1999). The lack of trust however, is a characteristic of government in advanced liberal democracies where trust is limited to the ability to self-regulate in the pursuit of distant political ideals (Rose, 1996).
The existing local authorities acknowledged the need for reform to certain aspects of their regimes of practice through their membership of the New Zealand Local Government Association (see New Zealand Local Government Association, 1988), but sought reforms that would confer autonomy. Local government would be a government in its own right that derives its legitimacy from meeting the aspirations and needs of its local populations (Reid, 1999). This mode of governing would be made operable through a power of competence where local authorities could engage in virtually any activity they deemed fit without being fettered by central government (Boston, et al., 1996; New Zealand Local Government Association, 1988). Such authorities would engage in fostering local identity, advocacy, planning for local needs, development of local spaces and regulation, in addition to providing for local community cultural, recreational, physical and social needs (New Zealand Local Government Association, 1988) . The power of general competency was
to be conferred via the Local Government Act
2002.
The contestations between these discourses were played out in the debate on the Local Government Amendment Act (No.
2)
1989. While the government members presented local government reform as necessary and geared to making local government more efficient, opposition members of parliament saw them as part of government attempts to control local authorities. They were especially opposed to the Bill empowering the Local Government Commission (LGC) to determine the boundaries and functions of localauthorities. Though the LGC was obligated to consult with local authorities when reform was being considered, its role was viewed as usurping the autonomy of local authorities. Seeing this Bill as geared towards substantially limiting local authority autonomy, the opposition wondered: "One has to ask does the minister not trust local government? Does he not think that local government can get on with the job?". The reorganisation schemes, as already indicated avoided polling, thereby neutralising immediate resistance as had been the case with previous attempts at reform (Smith, 1999).
The opposition members and the Local Government Association envisioned a government where the local people would choose their own government and decide their own boundaries:
The principle of the Opposition is that local people should choose their own local government. The Bill does not include that provision. Local people should be able to vote for amalgamation, but that right is done away with. People in an area should have a say, but that right is done away with. The Minister said that one of the great features of the Bill is its accountability. Is the Local Government Commission accountable when its members are appointed by the Government, but not according to any criteria? Anyone can be appointed. Who is accountable? G. Carter, M.P., National Party MP, Hansard June 28, 1988)
The state's discourse of reform therefore generated a counter discourse from local authorities of "we can do it on our own". It is notable that local authorities were not opposed to reform as such but sought to be more actively involved in their own government. Representing the local authorities, the New Zealand Local Government Association expressed the position that local government is capable of reforming if given a free hand. The Association sought more comprehensive reforms that would include a definition of the function of local government and its funding. The members argued that local authorities had already demonstrated their ability to self-regulate, with a number of local authorities already undertaking substantial reforms even before this Bill was enacted:
It does not like forced amalgamation. Local authorities will get on with the job if they are given the opportunity to do so. They do not want to be ramrodded, or railroaded, or have amalgamation thrust on them. They will get on with the job
themselves, and do it well, because they have the ability to do so a. Carter, M.P., Hansard June 28, 1988)
The argument for autonomy was that such a local government would meet the needs of their local communities better. Such authorities would be able to know if they needed to carry out reforms and undertake such reforms themselves without being dictated by the central government through the LGC: As the opposition spokesman on local government I want local government to be stronger in the future, and to be able to determine its own issues. Reform should be brought about by local government itself. Local government should be able to decide what is best for itself in its own area; it should not have to do what the Government suggests in the terms of reference of the Local government Commission. Reform should be about making local government carry out its true function---looking after the interests of people in a local capacity (S. Lee, M.P., National Party MP, Hansard June 28, 1988).
Resistance also took the form of questioning whether amalgamation would lead to bureaucracy and inefficiency: "1 question the principle that "bigger is better" in relation to amalgamation" 0. Kemp, M.P., Hansard, March 1988) and "It has not been proved that it is efficient to force the kind of amalgamation envisaged by the Government" (W. Kyd, M.P., Hansard, March 1988). It was expected that amalgamation would create distance between citizens and the centre therefore negating the democracy in the name of which it was being promoted.
There were some who saw the government as using the reforms to direct local authorities into conduct consistent with being a business. These felt that the reforms were part of the central government agenda of privatising local authorities. Responding to the Local Government Amendment Bill (No. 5)
years later when out of government, a Labour MP made the following comment:
It does not seem to me that this is all about accountability at all. I think it is about the normal kind of pressure that this government has wanted to place on local government in general to move towards not a businesslike model, but a business model (S. Maharey, M.P., 18 July 1996).
The central government was constrained to underplay the sovereign part of its intention to govern local authorities through these reforms. It instead sought to convey a conciliatory tone that would appease those seeing the danger of autonomy being eroded. The Minister of Local Government, The Honourable M. Bassett decided to lace his criticisms of the current form of local
government, with praise of how important local authorities were to providing local needs and being closer to local people than central government. He explained that the aim of reform was not the control of local authorities but merely enhancing local authority ability to provide responsive and effective service. The Honourable P. Woollaston, then Associate Minister assisting the Prime Minister asserted that this reform was a case of central government acceding to the wishes of local authorities for a long time (Hansard, 23 June 1988). R. Northey, M.P., saw these reforms as necessary to /I enable local authorities to be strong enough and effective enough to take over additional functions on behalf of their communities in a more effective way than at present" (June 23, 1988). The Minster stressed that the reform of local
government was necessary:
Many have been worried that the present reform would lessen the role and importance of local government in this country. I assure the house that that is not the opinion of the government, which sees the need for the overall well-being of their citizens in a more effective, efficient, and responsive manner . . . If there is a theme running through what I have said it is that the effectiveness and responsiveness of local government will not be improved unless reform is tackled simultaneously across several fronts. During the past 3[1/2] years the Government has set about making public sector institutions more efficient and more responsive to today's needs. The reform of local government is in keeping with those directions (The Honourable M. Bassett, Hansard, March 1988).
The Minister of Local Government emphasised that members of local authorities would be consulted on matters affecting local government. As already indicated, the LGC was not obliged to consider this advice. Consultation however, has governmental designs, for it is also a way of knowing, and knowledge is central to govemmentality. It seduces members to feel they exercised their freedom to choose, hence enrolling them in their own governmentality (Rose, 1996a; 1996b, 1993; Rose and Miller, 1992). By
promising continuing consultation this bill sought to enrol local authority members, so that when the reforms were underway, resistance would have been muted. Consultation enables central government to seek to control a distant domain, but by convincing populations of this domain that their input is valued, hence enrolling them to the process of their own governmentality.
The opposition to the new regime of practices of local government has been paralleled by reflection on this modality of governing within central and local government. Governmentality is reflexive government with the adoption of one modality of governing the culmination of its condemnation and the search for newer and better ones (Rose, 1996a; Rose and Miller 1992; Miller, 1991, 1990) . The Controller and Auditor General has been critical of public sector financial management reporting based on outputs and instead suggested one based on outcomes as have the managers of the various local authorities (Pallot, 2003). Research commissioned by the government concluded that the long term financial strategy and the funding policy have led to improvements in financial reporting, management and financial transparency. Strategic planning however, did not change the behaviour of local authorities or improve local democracy Gohnston, 2000). Nash however concludes that "While they (strategic plans) have not produced a strong participatory democratic process, they have enhanced accountability and public understanding of local government decision-making" (Nash, 1998, p. 7) . The march towards strategic performance management in local government continues with recent legislative changes that have imposed a regime of quadruple bottom line reporting on them through the Local Government Act 2002.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the local government reforms in New Zealand within the context of government in advanced liberal democracies (Flint, 2003;
Rose, 2000; 1996b; Isin, 2000). It analyses the rationalities, programmes and technologies (see Rose and Miller, 1992) underpinning these changes. The chapter shows that intertwined with sovereign mechanisms were others which sought to direct the conduct of population by enticing its members to exercise their freedom as customers but responsible to their communities. The exercise of their freedom through active involvement as democratic citizens and members of communities would achieve the political ideals of economy, efficiency, effectiveness and transparency. Since community does not exist in space, it had to be constituted through boundary rationalisation and through a moral discourse of community service and democratic citizenship.
Though conferred with autonomy, local authorities were subject to central controls. This control was enabled through regimes of accrual accounting and SPMS which enable local authority freedom without the state appearing to be too intrusive, thereby achieving control at a distance. The technologies of annual planning and LTFS were deployed to address perceived deficiencies in the government of local spaces. Through the technologies of legislation, the state was able to create a spiral of a rationalising or in their terms, modernising approach to the administration of local government.
The discourse around the reforming legislation of local government point to the contention of this thesis that the reforms were concerned with introducing a new mode of governing local authorities where government appeared to confer autonomy on local authorities, but was actually in control. This approach created an harmonious relationship where local authorities pursued their own governmentality while meeting specified political objectives. While Foucault sought to downplay the importance of the state in government, this thesis argues that the state is central, though not the only agent, to the government of local spaces. The calls for reform of local government did not emanate from the consumer but from the central government technocrats and technopols (Mayston, 1993, p. 86). The discourse of leaner, enterprising and more
innovative local authorities was in line with a neo-liberal agenda (cf. Clarke and Newman, 1997).
There are indications that there is little linkage between the programmes and action of SPMS, but then Foucaultians argue that this is endemic to governmentality (Rose and Miller, 1992; Miller, 1991; 1990). The concern here is therefore not with "what was promised and what was delivered" (McKinlay, 1994), but with the way in which political authorities in New Zealand sought to govern territory and population using certain rationalities and technologies. To this end, this study is cognisant that the strategisation of local government is ongoing, and that our understanding of it will continue to evolve. The next chapter examines the discursive formation of SPMS.
Chapter Six
The Discourse of Strategic Performance Measurement Systems and Government of the Public Sphere
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter explained how technologies of accounting and SPMS were promoted as mechanisms for implicating the local domain in New Zealand within the power relations of numerous centres. This chapter seeks to discuss how SPMS emerged as the " truth" for governing the public sphere in the advanced liberal democracies (cf. Knights and Morgan, 1991; 1990). SPMS were promoted as a rational and instrumental solution to uncertainty, the external environment and the future. This formation happened within the context of the new modalities of governing which emphasise the exercise of individual autonomy and membership of community as the most efficient approach to governing a sphere in a neo-liberal society. This analysis accords with Knights and Morgan's (1991) exhortation to researchers to examine ways in which strategy has come to occupy such a self-evident position of importance in diverse contexts including the public sphere. The chapter reviews the literature in an attempt to illuminate how strategy came to be linked with performance management systems in the public sector and attained the status of truth.
This chapter is organised as follows. The second section analyses the way performance measurement in the public sector has developed culminating in calls for its integration with strategic planning to form SPMS. The section examines SPMS within the context of the public sector in New Zealand and the UK. The third section describes some of the prominent SPMS adapted in public
sector organisations. This section notes that SPMS assume the existence of strategy, without attention to how this comes about. The section therefore attends to the development of strategic planning and management in the public sector. The fourth section provides an alternative reading of strategy that questions its self-evident usefulness and rationality. This section lays the foundation for the following chapters, which seek to illuminate how SPMS have been implicated within the triangle of governmentality as disciplinary technologies for the conduct of members20 of Future City Council. The fifth section concludes the chapter.