C (12) para formal constitución a la Comisión

The first move made towards the single bargaining procedure was the creation of a facilitation process to allow for a full exchange of information and views. The company, with the agreement of the unions, appointed an external third party expert to manage the facilitation process. A hotel in the centre of Dublin, away from the company, was selected as the ‘neutral’ venue for the discussions. When the facilitation got under way, it was immediately evident that a lot of work would be needed to ensure that the process was a success. The lack of trust between the two sides was palpable at the beginning. Moreover, the process was a challenge to the unions because it was one of the few times they were obliged to forge a common view on company-wide issues. Thus, the process got off to a hesitant start, but the facilitator did an enormous amount of behind-the-scenes work to soothe anxieties that existed on both sides. He was also able to craft an agenda that was widely acceptable. Without this initial work by the facilitator, the process may not have got over the first hurdle.

In the ensuing three–four weeks, an intensive round of meetings took place, about 8 in all, involving all the parties. The unions challenged management to provide full information about cost and reward structures as well as the company’s financial position. In response, management provided the unions with an unprecedented level of information on a broad range of topics. The company’s Finance Director made a presentation that contained so much sensitive information that trade union representatives were required to

sign a confidentiality agreement at the start of the session. Unions were also provided with a lot of information about the company’s ability to deliver pay increases. In effect, the company opened up the company’s books to the union during the facilitation process. These efforts by management to highlight the difficult commercial circumstances that the company was experiencing paid off as a new openness and candour developed between the two parties. Slowly but surely it appeared that union and management were now closer to being ‘on the same page’ with regard to the company’s predicament.

Yet an agreement with the unions on a consolidation plan for the organization proved elusive. Unions were extremely reluctant to enter an agreement that would in all likelihood involve their members making concessions. Union representatives were sensitive to the fact that no other agreement had been concluded in the financial services sector in the aftermath of the financial sector. They were aware that any agreement they entered into would be the benchmark for similar deals that needed to be done elsewhere in the industry. As a result, they were determined to get the best possible deal at IL&P. Moreover, the union representatives calculated that although their members were fearful for their jobs and pensions, they were also annoyed, if not angry, that they were being asked to make sacrifices to indemnify the wildly profligate actions of a handful of irresponsible property dealers and financiers. Thus, the union officials were in a precarious position: while they empathised with the difficult times faced by the management of IL&P, to retain their credibility with their members and with other employers as a negotiating force, their representatives had to adopt a hard bargaining stance throughout the facilitation process.

Ultimately, although the facilitation process led to high level information-sharing and a lot of positive interaction between the management and union teams, the gap between the two sides was simply too large to bridge. As a result, the facilitation process ended without any agreement being concluded. Although it could be said that the process aimed at securing agreement had broken down, the relationship between management and unions did not descend into acrimony: the facilitation process nurtured cool, dispassionate heads on both sides. Of course, both management and unions reflected

internally to assess whether they had followed faulty tactics during the course of the facilitation process, but this was done behind closed doors. For the company, although some positive things came out of the facilitation process, the bottom line was that it was still without an agreement on pay and working conditions. In the absence of any agreement, the company introduced a pay freeze for 2008 and made no profit-related pay bonuses as there were no profits to share. Management concluded that it would be best to avail of the services of the Labour Relations Commission (LRC) in its efforts to secure a deal with the unions. But it wanted some time to elapse before starting this third party process so that a better climate existed for the negotiations.

In early/mid 2009, management along with the unions decided to begin the LRC process. However, these talks did not prove successful. In the aftermath of this first round of facilitated talks and in an effort to prove beyond doubt the difficult financial circumstances facing ILP, the company decided to trigger the inability-to-pay clause of the national social partnership agreement, Towards 2016. An investigator was appointed to examine the financial state of the company. This assessment was conducted at a time when, if anything, the business conditions facing the company had worsened. Before the facilitator announced his decision, management and unions met once again and agreed to recommence the LRC talks. This decision to restart facilitated talks led to the inability-to- pay process being put on hold. The hope was that the LRC would be able to broker a deal between the company and the union. Although the ability-to-pay decision had formally been parked, it nevertheless acted as the ghost at the negotiations convened by the LRC. Knowing this decision lurked in the background, the unions decided to temper their demands. Moreover, LRC staff used the decision to encourage the unions not to pursue overly ambitious bargaining demands. In a sense, the inability-to-pay process was the lubricant that was needed to free up the stalled negotiations.

Yet the negotiations that the LRC managed to get going between management and union were anything but easy. Marathon sessions were needed to make slow progress through a long, complex agenda. Finally, after protracted exchanges and endless support from LRC staff, a deal was hammered out with which both sides were relatively satisfied. In terms

of content, the agreement was nothing exceptional, which belies the complexity of the negotiations. On pay, the company agreed to give employees a 2.5 per cent increase in 2009 and 2010. However, the company would give no salary increments or profit share bonuses in these two years, which would have been valued in excess of 6 per cent on average. The 6 per cent set out in the national wage agreement was also set aside. The company committed itself to making no compulsory redundancies in 2010, but did not make any commitments on job security beyond that date. For its part, the union agreed to engage until completion in a review of the company’s defined benefit pension scheme. In November 2009, the staff accepted the agreement, bringing to an end a protracted process. The result was a big boost in morale to both staff and management alike as the agreement restored stability to internal industrial relations.