ife is a series of coincidences. In 1988, I happened to be posted as India’s deputy permanent representative at the United Nations, when Malta took the initiative of placing the question of climate change on the UN agenda. Few delegates were familiar with what was till then an esoteric meteorological subject. Scientists had only recently begun to express concern about the increasing accumulation of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. In 1985 and 1987, two important scientific workshops sounded a call for action on climate change at the political level. Malta was quick to recognize the importance of the issue and bring it up in the Second Committee of the UN, dealing with economic issues.
A. Gopinathan, a young officer of great ability, and I represented India in this committee. I thus had an early opportunity to familiarize myself with the climate change problem before leaving New York in 1989. In December 1990, the General Assembly passed a resolution to launch negotiations for a climate change convention. The convention was to be formally adopted by world leaders at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro, scheduled for June 1992. This meant t hat the negotiati ons had to be completed in less than eighteen months.
By another coincidence, I was appointed additional secretary (International Organizations) in the Ministry o External Affairs not l ong before the negotiations began. Th e Government of India was only vaguely aw are, at that ti me, of the implications of climate change. It was generally viewed as som ething that was best left to meteorologists and environmentalists. Fortunately, the reigning foreign secretary, Muc hkund Dubey, was one of our most brilliant multilat eral negotiators and it required littl e effort on my part to explain to him the environmen tal and economic issues involved in a climate change agreement.
Since the negotiations were being held under the aegis of the United Nations – as distinct from the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP) – it was decided under the government’s rules of business that the Ministry o External Affairs would take the lead in the negotiations, while the Ministry of Environment and Forests retained primary responsibility for policy matters. Hence it fell to me to lead our delegation, reporting jointly to the
environment secretary and the foreign secretary. The arrangement worked smoothly. Rajamani, the environment secretary, was a very decent and intelligent human being. Neither he nor I had any time for petty inter-departmental skirmishes. We received st rong encouragement and support from t he dynamic environment minister, Kamal Nath.
Not all ministries were equally cooperative. In the labyrinths of the finance ministry there dwelt a sage whose omniscience enabled him to judge whether India should be represented at any particular internati onal conference and, i so, by whom and for how many days. Under our financial rules, every proposal to send a delegation abroad was scrutinized by a mid-level officer in the finance ministry, whose recommendations were speedily endorsed, in almost every case, by the secretaries empowered to authorize overseas travel. Since I was elected as a vice-chairman of the International Negotiating Committee for Climate Change, the UN met my travel and other costs. My trips in connection with the negotiations did not entail the expenditure of a single paisa from the national budget; yet, the regulations required that the sage be satisfied as to the necessity for my travel on each occasion. This was not always easy. Penetrating questions were raised as to whether it was really necessary to be present on the opening day of a conference. Was this not reserved for routine questions concerning the agenda, etc? Or , for t hat matt er, was it necessary to be present for t he entire duration of the m eeting? Would a few days not suffice to enlighten foreigners about the right course of action and could we not depart thereafter? The lofty mind of the sage soared above such mund ane concerns as lobbying, bargaining or coalition building. Clearance for travel was usually received, or denied, less than twenty-four hours before planned departure, presumably to pre-empt any appeal to reason against a negative decision. I recall at least one occasion when clearance was not received till the conference was already in progress.
Developing countries often lose out in multilateral negotiations because they arrive late on the stage, after the developed countries have already defined the issues and framed their proposals. Entering the game at this stage,
countries of the South adop t a defensive stance, seeking to protect t heir vital interests against demands advanced by the North. I was determined that this should not happen in the climate change negotiations. It was essential to define the
issues appropriately and present our own proposals ri ght at t he beginning.
Reflecting the views of the industrialized countries, the powerful Western media had already begun to define the problem as one arising from carbon dioxide emissions. This carried the implication thatall countries were responsible
for the problem, albeit in differing degrees. I proposed that we frame the issue somewhat differently, pointing out that the problem was caused not by carbon dioxide emissions, per se, but by excessively high levels of these emissions. Human activities have led to carbon dioxide emissions ever since the discovery of fire, but this did not precipitate climate change till very recently. Emissions srcinating from the developed countries have increased rapidly since the Industrial Revolution. The problem of climate change has arisen because of excessive levels of carbon dioxide emissions, past and present, in the i ndustrialized world.
We maintained that every human being has an equal right to the atmospheric resource. The developed countries had exceeded their per capita entit lement and should, therefore, reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
Proceeding from these premises, we maintained that the industrial ized countries, which w ere responsible for causing climate change, should shoulder the costs of international response measures. They should reduce their emissions in a timebound manner and also provide finance and techno logy to developing cou ntries t o meet t he costs of mi tigation and adaptation to climate change.
As I recall it, a paper on these lines was submitted to the cabinet for approval. During the next fifteen months, we regularly kept the cabinet informed of developments in the negotiations and sought its approval for our initiatives whenever this was necessary.
I was fortunate in having access t o Prime Minist er Narasimha Rao, having served u nder him for many years when he was the minister for external affairs. I took the opportunity to brief him from time to time and seek his guidance on some difficult questions. I admired Narasimha Rao for his wide erudition and his sharp and subtle mind. His great intellectual gifts were not, however, matched by an ability to hand down clear-cut decisions. The prime minister was absolutely clear on the principle t hat we should reject any proposal which would retard our development; but his usual response to a request for approval of a specific initiative was to thrust his lips forward into a thoughtful pout and give utterance to something between a grunt and a ‘hmmm’. When this was accompanied by a slight nod, I interpreted i t as a sign of approval, qualified by the caution that the responsibility for failure would lie on my shoulders. This was sufficient for my purpose and I proceeded as intended. I was grateful to the prime minister for being generous with his time.
The first round of negotiations was held in February 1991 in the town of Chantilly, near Washington, DC. It settled questions relating to the organizational structure of the negotiations. The conference elected as its chairman the leader of the French delegation, Jean Ripert, who had recently retired from the post of a UN under secretary-general. I was elected as one of t he four vice-chairpersons.
Negotiations on the substantial issues commenced at the next session, held in Geneva in June. Even before the session, delegations had begun to advance their proposals or comments in the form of informal documents known in diplomatic parlance as ‘non-papers’. We presented a ‘non-paper’ setting out the draft of a full framework conven tion on climate change. This ensured that our proposals wou ld be on the negotiati ng table right from the beginning and that we would have a role as ademandeur , instead of playing a purely reactive and defensive role.
The crux of our proposal was contained in the draft article on ‘commitments’. We intended to sharply focus the negotiations on the obligations of the developed countries, since they were responsible for causing climate change and since they also possessed the financial and technological resources needed to address the problem. The following extract from our draft convention might be of interest.
The Parties agree to work towards a common long-term objective of stabilizing the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, at an appropriate level to be agreed upon . . . on the basis of an equitable formula requiring,inter alia, that anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide from States should converge at a
common per capita level, and which would take into account net carbon dioxide emissions during this century.
Developed country Parties shall, as immediate measures: (a) declare, adopt and implement national strategies to stabilize and reduce their per capita emissions of greenhouse gases, particularly carbon dioxide; stabilization . . . should be achieved by developed country Parties at the latest by the year 2000 and should be set at 1990 emission levels, with the goal of achieving at least a (20%) (30%) (40%) (50%) reduction on these stabilized levels by the year 2005; (b) provide new and additional financial resources for developing country Parties for the objective described in paragraph 4 below . . . ; (c) provide assured access to appropriate, environmentally sound technology on preferential and non-commercial terms to developing countries; and (d) to support developing countries in their efforts to create and develop their endogenous capacities in scientific and technological research and development directed at combating climate change.
Developing country Parties may, in accordance with their national development plans, priorities and objectives, consider feasible measures with regard to climate change provided that the full incremental costs involved are met by provision of new and additional financial resources from the developed countries.
large extent reflects the common views shared by many developing countries’. In informal conversations, some developed countries prai sed our ‘non-paper’ for its comprehensiven ess and logical consistency, even while crit icizing it as an ‘extreme’ position. We were amused to learn that a story was circulating to the effect that our ‘non-paper’ had been drafted by a high-powered twenty-four-member expert group. We did nothing to encourage this notion but, to be
quite honest, neither did we deny it, since the rumour seemed to further raise the profile of the non-paper! The prosaic truth was that the document was drafted in the Ministry of External Affairs during a weekend since there was no time on working days. I drew up the preamble and the first three arti cles, including the ‘commit ments’, while Ajai Malhotra, an extremely able officer in the UN division, drafted the two other articles. The draft was approved, with very minor changes, by the environment secretar y, Rajamani.
In presenting our proposals at Geneva, I explained the rationale as follows:
In these negotiations, the principle of equity should be the touchstone for judging any proposal. Those responsible for environmental degradation should also be responsible for taking corrective measures. Since developed countries with high per capita emissions of greenhouse gases are responsible for incremental global warming, it follows that they have a corresponding obligation to take corrective action. Moreover, these are also the countries which have the greatest capacity to bear the burden. It is they who possess the financial resources a nd the technology needed for corrective action. This further reinforces their obligations regarding
corrective action.
The debate in this session revealed not only a basic divide between the North and the South but also very significant differences within each of these groups. Most developing countries maintained that binding emission limitation obligations should apply only to developed countries since they were responsible for inducing climate change. Developing countries could only accept emission commitments of a conditional or contractual character, that is, commitments which would be implemented only if the developed countries agreed to meet the full incremental costs. Most developed coun tries pressed for binding commitments f rom all countries, including develop ing countries, though they added that there could be a ‘differentiation’ between their own emission commitments and those of developing countries. As regards financial commitments, OECD countries generally accepted the need for providing support to developing countries, but they viewed this as ‘assistance’ or aid, referring to ‘agreed’ rather than ‘full’ incremental costs. This fell far short of the position of the developing countries regarding the conditional and contractual nature o their own commitments. The US rejected outright the call for developed cou ntries to t ake on financial commitm ents.
In short, while the poorer South emphasized the link between the commitments of countries and their historical and current responsibility for causing climate change, the affluent North sought to gloss over the connection, or ignore it altogether. The US maintained that all countries should respond to climate change ‘in accordance with the means at their disposal and their capabilities’, ignoring altogether the question of the degree of responsibility for causing the environmental problem.
Though they were united in call ing upon the developing co untries to take on binding commitments, t he industrialized countries were divided on the question of their own commitments. The European Community (EC) called on industrialized countries to stabilize their carbon dioxide emissions at 1990 levels, individually or jointly, by the year 2000. Japan proposed a ‘pledge and review’ agreement, under which every country – developed or developing – would pledge to implement certain measures to limit emissions, providing targets or estimates of the expected reduction in emissions. The pledges and their outcomes would be subject to periodic reviews. The US wanted on ly a m inimal treaty containing no sp ecific commit ments for reducing emissions.
There were significant differences within the group of developing countries as well. The Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), concerned that the rise in sea level resulting from climate change might lead to the disappearance o many of its member countries, wanted a convention with the strongest possible emission reduction commitments. On the other hand, a minimal treaty was favoured by countries whose economies were heavily dependent on oil exports. Due to these and other differences, the Group of 77 and China were unable to adopt common positions on many important issues. Nevertheless, it provided a forum for sensitizing developing countries to the implications of the proposals under consideration and eliciting support from a substantial number of like-minded developing countries.
This proved invaluable later in the negotiations.
Regardless of these sharp differences, relations between delegations were generally cordial, in contrast to the acrimony and distrust witnessed in the Copenhag en summit. We had excellent working relati ons with most delegations, both of the North and the South. Though we occasionally sparred at the conference, the American delegate, Bob
Reinstein, became a friend and we kept in touch for many years after Rio. Reinstein had a particularly difficult task, since he represented the only major industrialized country that refused to commit itself to reducing its emissions or providing financial support to developing countries. He carried out his negative mandate with considerable diplomatic
skill, judging accurately when to exercise his considerable oratorical skills and when a policy of masterly inactivity was the more appropriate option. He later told me that he was personally congratulated by President George H.W. Bush, Sr, after the successful conclusion of the negotiations in 1992. His moment of glory proved to be short-lived. The presidential elections later in the year brought a new administration into office and this able American diplomat lost
his job.
Apart from interesting personalities among the delegates, the negotiations also brought me into touch with two men who were destined to become international celebrities. My efforts to delve deeper into the science and economics o climate change led me to a modest, two-storey building in the residential area of Jorbagh in New D elhi. This housed the Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI), whose head, Dr R.K. Pachauri, was made the chairperson of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In 2009, Pachauri (on behalf of the IPCC) and Al Gore jointly received the Nobel Prize.
Al Gore took a deep interest in the cli mate change negotiations, as also in the work of the preparatory committee for the 1992 UNCED. We met regularly on the sidelines of these negotiations. A strong critic of President Bush’s climate change policy, he spared no effort to keep himself fully informed about the l atest developments. I took the opportunity to sensitize him on the concerns of India and other developing countries. I have on my personal files a hand-written letter from Gore, appealing to me t o return to a meeting of the UNCED preparatory committee which I had to abandon midway because the finance ministry refused to permit me to stay on for the full duration. It took quite some time to compose a suitable reply since I could not, of course, explain the absurd nature of the problem!
Both the North and the South made efforts to bridge inter nal differences within their ranks in order to consolidate their respective coalitions. The EC explored the possibility of reconciling its own position with the Japanese ‘pledge and review’ proposal. On the last day of the Geneva session, the EC proposed that the convention should include a ‘pledge and review’ provision, while expressing the ‘view’ that its own stabilization target was only ‘an example of a commitment t hat should preferably be embodied in a protocol’.
India and other developing countries made it clear that the ‘pledge and review’ proposal was unacceptable since it lacked clarity and transparency; failed to differentiate between the commitments of developed and developing countries, respectively; diluted the specific commitments of the developed countries; and sought to impose binding legal obligations on the developing countries. We also pointed out that the proposed ‘reviews’ could only be of an arbitrary nature since there were no agreed criteria and guidelines. We apprehended that, in practice, the ‘pledge and review’ mechanism would be used to shift to the shoulders of developing countries responsibilities which should properly be borne by the industrialized countries. ‘Pledge and review’ also came under heavy fire from the NGOs. The NGO bulletin ECO carried a devastating commentary, calling it a ‘hedge and review’ proposal!
Under this barrage of criticism, the EC gave way and reversed its stand in the next session, held in Nairobi in