Calidad

The difficulty with Dreier‟s usage of his variation on Karmo‟s Law (VKL) is not that (VKL) is false. Rather, the difficulty is that Dreier has an unduly narrow interpretation of

what a „moral standard‟ is. Moreover, he offers no justification for this narrow interpretation. For Dreier, a moral standard can‟t include a claim about how to morally evaluate other moral

standards. We can see this because if Drier were to allow that moral standards could include claims about how to morally evaluate other moral standards, his examples could be examples of such moral standards. If this were the case, it would mean that Dreier had failed to show

that archimedean propositions can be morally neutral. Thus, in order for Dreier‟s argument in

favour of the possible neutrality of archimedean claims to be successful, he must offer additional arguments for the moral non-neutrality of his examples. To illustrate, let‟s take one

of the claims that comes out with a diagonal of T‟s in Dreier‟s matrix: Abortion is wrong if

and only if it is wrong according to my moral standard. Drier is correct that this claim does not commit us to a range of 1st order moral claims dealing directly with the moral status of abortion. However, Dreier has not shown that this claim does not commit us to 2nd order moral claims about how to morally evaluate moral standards relating to abortion. In other words, Dreier has not shown that this claim does not commit us to a claim that is 2nd order

and simultaneously moral. To see this, let‟s observe the claim “Abortion is wrong if and only if it is wrong according to my moral standard.” This claim implies the denial of

(V) Abortion is wrong independently of whether it is wrong according to my actual moral standards

and

(W) It is incorrect that “abortion is wrong only if it is wrong according to my actual moral standards.”

(V) and (W) seem, on the face of it, like 2nd order claims. On the other hand, they also seem to be capable of being read as moral claims. (V) says if one chooses to evaluate my actual moral standards, one should not assume that my moral standards determine whether or not

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abortion is wrong. (W) says that if one were to assert that abortion was wrong iff it were wrong according to my actual moral standards, they would be mistaken. Of course, it is true that one could give a purely descriptive reading of (V) and (W). The point is the moral reading

has to be excluded for Dreier‟s use of (VKL) to adequately demonstrate that archimedean

theories can be morally neutral. Moreover, merely claiming that (V) and (W) are 2nd order

would not be sufficient to do this. This is for two reasons. The first reason is that that Dreier‟s

claim about abortion appears to be both 2nd order and morally non-neutral. The second is that

Dworkin‟s whole point is that plausible moral claims that appear to be 2nd order claims can

be interpreted as 1st order claims. Dreier needs to exclude the moral reading of his abortion claim in order to show that the 1st order interpretation does not work.

I will leave it an open question for now whether or not (V) and (W) actually are 1st or 2nd order. Quasi-Realists like Simon Blackburn would probably want to classify them as 1st order moral claims that express higher-order attitudes. Other theorists like Mackie would probably want to classify them as 2nd order claims which happen to be false. Regardless of which order one chooses to interpret them as being, Dreier must show how a moral

interpretation of them is either impossible or implausible. One cannot simply point out that the claim tells us little about additional moral standards the agent who affirms it may or may not hold if one is attempting to demonstrate the moral neutrality of the claim. One must show that it is not a moral claim about how to evaluate other moral claims. This is because a claim about how to evaluate abortion claims may be moral on the one hand and on the other hand silent about the specific views the agent who affirms it holds about abortion.

If we don„t rule out this possibility, we can certainly say that such claims commit

whoever affirms them to a range of moral claims in that world. They may not be claims about whether or not one should take a pro or anti-abortion stance. However, they could be claims about how it is appropriate to evaluate moral claims that take pro or anti-abortion stances. Moreover, in the absence of an argument that (V) and (W) must be read as descriptive, we could say that if we heard a speaker affirm or deny (V) or (W) in any world, we would be able to narrow down the set of moral claims they believe in. If a speaker affirmed “Abortion is

wrong if and only if it is wrong according to my moral standard”, we would know he denies (V) and (W). If he affirmed (V) or (W), then we would know he denies “Abortion is wrong if

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and only if it is wrong according to my moral standard.” If there are no arguments to show

that (V) and (W) are descriptive, it seems that Dreier‟s abortion claim involves moral

commitments after all. They are just not substantive pro-abortion or anti-abortion commitments. Here, Dreier might reply that the kinds of moral commitments we are highlighting are irrelevant to his project. He might protest that his aim was simply to show that there is a criterion for deciding when a moral claim is morally neutral in the sense of not committing its proponents to 1st order moral claims. Such claims, he may insist, are not also claims about how to morally evaluate moral standards. Perhaps this is what Dreier meant by the set of all uncontroversial moral sentences. If Dreier were to give this rejoinder, he would

be begging the question against Dworkin. One of the key claims of Dworkin‟s argument is the

assertion that many claims that sound like 2nd order archimedean claims are, in fact, 1st order moral claims. If archimedean theories commit those who assert them to these moral claims that sound as though they are 2nd order, those archimedean theories are not morally neutral. Dreier needs to show that no archimedean theories commit their proponents to 2nd order moral claims about how to evaluate moral standards. In order to defeat Dworkin, he also has to show no archimedean theories commit their proponents to any moral claims whatsoever.

As we recall, part of Dworkin‟s strategy is to do two things. He wants to say that any

2nd order claims that validate or undermine 1st order claims can be reduced to 1st order moral claims. On the other hand, he wants to say that those 2nd order claims which validate or undermine 1st order moral claims and cannot be reduced to 1st order moral claims are implausible claims to assert. These latter 2nd order moral claims are the archimedean claims Dworkin opposes. If Dreier can show that all these archimedean claims are morally neutral, he will have shown that there are no 2nd order claims which can validate or undermine 1st order

moral claims. Because Dreier fails to make the above attack, his reply to Dworkin‟s views on

secondary qualities is particularly problematic. As we recall, Dreier tries to generate a version of secondary quality theory that is able to get 3 diagonal T‟s in his matrix. His aim, as noted earlier, is to show that Dworkin is mistaken in thinking that there is something inherent in secondary quality theories that makes moral claims. Therefore, he constructs a version of secondary quality (which he labels (ASQ)) which is expressed by a proposition he believes is morally neutral regarding abortion:

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(ASQ): For every X, necessarily, X is wrong if and only if x is wrong according to my actual moral standards.

While Dreier is correct that (ASQ) can get 3 diagonal T‟s in his matrix, this again fails to show that (ASQ) is morally neutral. This is because, like the above claim about abortion, (ASQ) can be read as a moral claim about how it is morally appropriate to evaluate moral standards. Like Dreier‟s abortion claim, (ASQ) implies the denial of two claims:

(Y) X can be wrong if X is wrong according to my actual moral standards.

and

(Z) It is incorrect that “For every X, necessarily, X is wrong if and only if x is wrong

according to my actual moral standards.”

Like (V) and (W), it looks on the face of it that (Y) and (Z) are capable of being read as moral claims. (Y) says if one chooses to evaluate my moral standards, one should not assume that my moral standards determine whether or not X is wrong. (Z) says that if one were to assert that X was wrong if and only if it were wrong according to my moral standard, they would be mistaken. Like (V) and (W), it is true that one could give a purely descriptive reading of (Y) and (Z). Again, the moral reading must be excluded for Dreier to use (VKL) to adequately demonstrate that (ASQ) is morally neutral. As we can see, Dreier has failed to exclude this moral reading. Hence, (ASQ) fails to show that a version of secondary quality is morally non-committal.