S i eliminamos del modelo de regresión el score UKDS las variables con un efecto independiente para predecir arteriopatía periférica son: la edad (OR=1,03) y el fumar
19 LIBERTAD PARA BEBER
10.6. Calidad de Vida Relacionada con la Salud
Despite being powerless and largely dependent on the British command, as discussed in previous chapters, the leadership of the Musavat-dominated government tried to take independent steps when addressing the international challenges faced by their country. The main foreign policy objective of the young state was without doubt to secure international recognition of its sovereignty and the existing definitions of its territory. By sending a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, the Musavat government made a tentative but definite step towards self-reliance and an independent existence for Azerbaijan. It continued to pursue this policy throughout 1919, securing a degree of success
33. D. I. Buzinkai, ‘The Bolsheviks, the League of Nations and the Paris Peace Conference, 1919’, Soviet Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2, 1967, p. 258.
in securing its objectives, although the Soviet invasion of the country in 1920 meant that the significance of the achievement was ultimately limited.
As early as November 1918, the members of the Azerbaijani government secured a promise in talks at Anzali with the Chief of Allied Forces, General Thomson, that they would be allowed to participate in the Peace Conference. Following the entry of the Entente troops into Baku, General Thomson, and subsequently General George Milne, repeated that Azerbaijan would participate in the Paris Peace Conference. Thomson and Milne were the official representatives of the Entente in Azerbaijan, and their statement can be regarded as an official invitation to the conference. General Thomson assured the government of Azerbaijan in writing that all disputed territorial issues would be addressed and resolved at the peace conference. He pointed out that in this regard he had formal authorization from the British government.35 When speaking at a meeting of the Azerbaijan Parliament on 26 December 1918, the Prime Minister Khoyski announced on behalf of the newly elected government that ‘the first and principal task of the government’ was to secure international recognition
of Azerbaijan's independence. Following the announcement, the delegation was selected for participation in Paris Peace Conference.36 The main task facing the delegation was to achieve recognition of the sovereignty of Azerbaijan and its territorial integrity, as well as political and economic support by the great powers for the Musavat government.
In December 1918, on the eve of the peace conference, the Azerbaijani parliament confirmed the composition of the delegation that was to go to Paris. Ali Mardan-bey Topchubashov, one of the most respected politicians of that time, was elected its head. His deputy was the former Foreign Minister Mamed Hasan Hadjinsky. The consultants were Jeyhun Bey Hajibeyli, Mahammad Maharramov and Mir Yagub Mirmehtiev. The delegation also included two secretaries and three translators (for English, French and Turkish).37 According to the general mandate given to the delegation on 7 January 1919, its members had the authority ‘to participate in the peace conference of the states and nations that must
35. Raevskiy, Angliyskaya Interventsiya, p. 33.
36. Azerbaydzhanskaya Demokraticheskaya Respublika (1918–1920), Vneshnyaya Politika. (Dokumenty i Materialy), Baku, Elm, 1998. p. 116.
take place after the World War, as well as in all conferences, alliances and agreements between the states and nations, having a right to conclude on behalf of Azerbaijan various contracts and agreements of a political, economic, or financial nature’.38
It was seen earlier that the Azerbaijani delegation that arrived in Constantinople in January 1919 was forced to stay there in the town for three and a half months because the French were unwilling to provide entry visas. In his reports back to Baku, A.M. Topchubashov, the head of the Azerbaijani delegation, noted that the French were perturbed by his presence in the delegation.39 All the available documents suggest that French political circles were influenced by Armenian propaganda, which strongly opposed the admission of the Azerbaijani delegation to the Paris Conference.40 This situation was confirmed by the Azerbaijani Consul in Batumi, M. Efendiyev, who informed his government that Ali Mardan-bey was not allowed to Paris because of Armenian intrigues:
According to my information, as a result of the active intrigues of Armenian representatives abroad, our figures like Ali Mardan-bey … are compromised in the eyes of foreigners right now….The press of the Allies in Istanbul and especially the French newspapers began to attack and slander our eminent figure, the respected Ali Mardan-bey.41
The delay was also a result of the initial unwillingness by the victorious allied powers to admit to the Conference representatives from the new states established on the territory of the former Russian Empire. By the end of 1918 there had already been established in Paris a new body - the Russian Political Conference - that saw itself as the representative of the various white governments in Siberia and North and South Russia. Its members saw one of their main tasks as opposition to all political movements of non-Russian peoples that sought independent statehood after the collapse of the tsarist empire.42 Many representatives of the Entente countries believed that the ‘Russian question’ had to be solved
before any possible discussion might take place about the independence of a number of new republics.
38. Ibid, p. 163.
39. Raevskiy, Musavatskoye Pravitel'stvo, p. 26.
40. Gasanli, Russkaya Revolyutsiya i Azerbaydzhan, p. 352.
41. Batumskiy Konsul Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki v Ministerstvo Inostrannykh Del., 3 April 1919, GAAR, f. 970, op. 1, d. 141, l. 6.
42. A.M. Topchubashov, Pis'ma iz Parizha. Doneseniya Predsedatelya Delegatsii Azerbaydzhanskoy Respubliki na
Eventually, the Azerbaijani delegations obtained an Italian visa, and on 22 April the entire delegation left for Italy on the steamship ‘Bulgaria’. On 2 May, members of the delegation arrived in
Rome from where after several days they went on to Paris.43 The Azerbaijani delegation was therefore absent from the opening of the peace conference and only arrived in the middle of May 1919. From the moment of its arrival, Topchubashov tried to establish contact with the diplomatic representatives of the Entente countries in order to make them aware of the problems faced by his country. He gave most attention to establishing links with the representatives of Great Britain, as the country whose armed forces were located on the territory of Azerbaijan, and therefore likely to have a great influence on the future destiny of the Azerbaijan Republic. On 13 May, Topchubashov, along with other members of the delegation, visited the military adviser of the British Embassy in Paris, handing over a letter of introduction from General Thomson. Expressing admiration for the British nation, the delegates asked for an audience with the British Ambassador in Paris (Lord Derby).44 Since Derby felt unable to take responsibility for granting an audience to the representatives of Azerbaijan, he wrote next day to Charles Hardinge, the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Office, noting that he was personally inclined to receive Azerbaijanis unless Hardinge had any objections.45 Hardinge replied on 17 May saying that he himself had no objection to the proposal, although he warned Derby to ‘carefully refrain from any encouragement or support to their claims for independence’. He added that it they persisted they should be informed that only the Conference would resolve such questions’.46
On 19 May 1919, a meeting took place between the Azerbaijani representatives and Lord Derby, who after receiving general information about the Republic of Azerbaijan, appointed a separate expert to maintain ties with Azerbaijani delegations. The person appointed to this role was a British diplomat, Sir Louis Mallet, an Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office who was attached to the British Delegation in Paris. He was also a former British ambassador in Constantinople and well known for his hard anti-Bolshevik positions. On 23 May, Topchubashov and Hadjinsky visited Mallet, informing
43. Hasanli, Foreign Policy of the Republic of Azerbaijan, p. 188.
44. Note for His Excellency the Ambassador, Paris, 13 May 1919, FO 608/100/13, fol. 567.
45. Lord Derby to the Right Honourable Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Paris, 14 May 1919, FO 608/100/13, fol. 566. 46. Lord Hardinge of Penshurst to Earl of Derby, Paris, 17 May 1919, FO 608/100/13, fol. 569.
him that they would submit a detailed document to the British delegation with their demands. According to Mallet, among other things, the delegates asked:
Whether His Majesty’s Government would support their claim for recognition of their independence and whether there was any possibility of His Majesty’s Government accepting a mandate for Azerbaijan. No hope was held out in the latter direction, and they were informed that their claim for recognition of their independence and the question of mandates were not matters which concerned His Majesty’s Government alone, but must be decided by the Conference.47
The question of a possible British mandate over Azerbaijan, touched upon in the conversation of Topchubashov, was not a random one since the broad issue had already been seriously discussed among the Allies. As early as March 1919, Lloyd George, wishing to ease the burden of maintaining British troops in the Caucasus, raised with the Italians the possibility of sending troops to Azerbaijan while also taking a mandate for the administration of the Caucasus. The prospect of the replacement of British troops by Italian troops raised discontent and anxiety among the dominant political and economic circles of the Caucasian states, who were fearful that Italy could not cope with such a challenge. They were anxious that Italian troops sent to the Caucasus would not be able to protect the region from the Bolsheviks and might themselves be susceptible to the influence of Bolshevik ideology.48 It is therefore no coincidence that during the meeting with Mallet on 23 May, Topchubashov stressed that he was extremely regretful to hear rumours about the departure of British troops from the Caucasus.
The most significant event of the first months of the delegation's stay in Paris was its brief reception by President Woodrow Wilson on 28 May 1919. During the meeting, Wilson ‘displayed a cold and rather unsympathetic attitude’.49 reflecting the difficulty faced by the Azerbaijani delegation in its search for allied support. Reporting to its government, the Azerbaijani delegation stated:
Wilson had stated that the Conference did not want to partition the world into small pieces. Wilson advised the Azerbaijanis that it would be better for them to develop a spirit of confederation, and that such a confederation of all peoples of Transcaucasia could receive the protection of some Power on the basis of a mandate granted by the League of Nations. The Azerbaijani question could not be solved prior to the general settlement of the Russian question.50
47.Balfour (Paris) to Earl Curzon, Paris, No. 813, 26 May, 1919, DBFP, Vol. 3, pp. 324-25.
48. L. Mallet, Minutes of Conversation with Colonel Stokes, Paris, 7 June 1919, FO 608/851, fol. 58 A. 49. Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 266.
50. ‘Report of the Delegation’, No.7, June 1919, fund of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dossier No.3, p.7, cited in Kazemzadeh, The Struggle for Transcaucasia, p. 266.
A month later, Topchubashov met James Simpson, ‘a member of the Political Intelligence
Department of the British Foreign Office, who was responsible for advising on matters concerning Russia and the Baltic states’.51
During the meeting, stressing that “although Azerbaijan was anxious to be on friendly terms with all its neighbours, he ruled out the idea of returning to a Russian federation, as ‘our language, religion, our ways of living are different from those of the Russians’”.52 The allies were simply unwilling to agree publicly to independence for the states of the Transcaucasus at a time when they were still supporting White forces in their struggle against the Bolsheviks.