Los cambios en la interpretación del modelo constitucional postpositivista 74

Wherever there is land and rain will be my homeland.198 (Darfurian migrant)

Is water the main reason the conflict in Darfur happened? When looking at the facts of the Darfur conflict one most say no. The deliberate actions taken by the government to counter the rebel movement in Darfur are far more important. Then what was the role of water in the conflict, amidst all other factors?

Since the big drought of the eighties water became available on a much larger scale in Darfur. International relief agencies, the Sudanese government and the United Nations invested in the installation of water points like wells, hand-pumps and dams. The efforts of these agencies

197

O’Fahey, ‘Conflict in Darfur’, 29.

198

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were very effective in providing water to the Darfurian population. Actually some studies reveal

that the greater access to water led to an explosive rise in animal population.199 Water was

available to the population, and although scarce, there were no specific weather shocks around

or before 2003 that would have motivated such an outburst of violence.200 Lack of rainfall did

accelerate the desertification of Darfur, and the land degradation that simultaneously occurred. But weak institutional quality has caused this resource stress to become a full-scale war. Better protection of land rights for nomads, cooperation between the ethnic groups on conflict resolution, or the option for the farmer communities to express their grievances in a non- violent way by using the courts or through voting, could all have helped to prevent the resource stress from escalating into mass murder.

The government arming and supporting the Janjaweed was a risky move. The government released frustrated, anxious people who were armed onto the civilian population of the farmer communities. The Janjaweed got the chance to take revenge on the population that was endangering their livelihood, and they did. With brutal and systematic methods they tried to eradicate Darfurian Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa life, and remove these populations from Darfur. Sadly, they succeeded. The Darfurian refugees currently in camps in Chad are faced with the fact that they are not likely able to return home. If they dare to return home they are going to live under a government that allowed the violence inflicted on them, have neighbors that took part in the killing of their loved ones and probably have civilians of the formerly nomadic tribes farming the land they used to live on. In other words, returning civilians have no security, no land and no means of living.

If the Sudanian government had acted differently this tragedy would not have happened. So water is not the main reason the Darfur conflict erupted.

But the Janjaweed might not have acted so brutally to remove the civilian population if they did not believe there was something to gain from the removal of the population. There was a prize to win, land, and by gaining this land the tribes ensured themselves of a future in Darfur. The nomadic tribes are currently settling on the most fertile lands left behind by the refugees. Abandoned land with good soil and close to wadis is the most popular area to settle on. Water

199

Fadul, ‘Natural Resources’, 41-42.

200

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therefore does play a role in the conflict. It is the prize the nomadic tribes gained from winning this conflict on behalf of the government.

What does this mean for my hypothesis that water can lead to internal conflicts within states when elites try to divert the scarce water to the most easily lootable production method? The hypothesis does not hold in the Darfur case. The focus of the elite in Khartoum, is to stay in power and to derive as much wealth as possible from Sudan for their tribes. But in Darfur there was not much wealth to gain. The most important reason for the harsh backlash of the government to the rebellion was the domino effect Darfur might cause. The fear within the government was that another rebellion would undermine the power and income of the ruling elite. The harsh governmental reaction was not based on greed for Darfur, because the outcome of the Darfur conflict did not enrich the governing elite. It was greed driven because other conflicts in Sudan might impoverish the governing elite. The elite in Khartoum already lost the rich oilfields in the South of Sudan, they would not allow another big loss to their income. Even if that means they have to prove that point by acting without conscience in a remote and poor region. This means that the Sudanian government’s greed is not driven by the water availability in Darfur. But the acts perpetrated by the Janjaweed can be considered an act of resource greed. For my hypotheses this means that there is a second level of resource driven greed. The elite is only concerned with its main sources of loot. For the lower groups in society, in this case the “Arab” tribes the loot can consist of water. In the case of Darfur this means lands which have access to water. The governing elite did not care what happened in Darfur as long as Darfur remained a part of Sudan and the rebellion was suppressed. The elite “outsourced” this task to the Janjaweed who acted on their own greed driven motives. The elite gave a marginalized group in society a carte blanche to act as they pleased. The marginalized group acted out of greed for resources and grieved by perceived past injustice. This anger was directed against another marginalized group. If the government had provided other ways for conflict resolution or acted on the growing water and land scarcity in Darfur this conflict would not have happened. But as the government was just focused on remaining in power, water was redistributed in a violent way. This leads to the conclusion that water driven greed and grievance does play a role in the Darfur conflict. The bad institutional quality of the Darfurian

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state is a prerequisite for this conflict. But the local actors in the conflict were driven by water. Water was not the main cause of the conflict because the bad institutions were the root cause of the conflict, but water was a factor. In the final conclusion I will present an overall conclusion about what this means for my hypothesis.

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