Assistance Agreement was first raised in September 1952, some months after the creation of the National Security Force, when Yoshida's close associate Ikeda Hayato conferred with United States Secretary for the Treasury Sneider and State Department Special Adviser Dodge in Mexico City. The Americans urged expansion of the National Security Force from 110,000 to 180,000 men by the end of 1952, with the
ultimate object of creating a 325,000 man army by 1954-55. Dodge and Sneider expressed their willingness to request U .S .$300,000,000 from Congress in the next budget to arm and equip the enlarged Japanese force.3
As was to be expected, Yoshida reacted unenthusiast ically to these overtures. On 21 November the Director-General of the National Security Agency reportedly told American military officials that it would be difficult to increase the strength of Japanese forces beyond the existing level of 110,000 men.4 The Prime Minister's policy speech at the new session of the Diet in November had little to say about rearmament. Nevertheless in January 1953 the Director of the Foreign Ministry's International Co-operation Bureau (Kokusai Kyöryoku Kyoku) was sent to Washington
to explore American intentions. He was reportedly told the United States would like to see at least 150,000 Japanese under arms
(presumably by the end of the year).6 Early in March Yoshida sent Ikeda to Washington for further exploratory talks.7 While no account of these discussions has been published, Ikeda apparently returned convinced that acceptance of MSA aid would necessitate formulation of a detailed defence plan.8 This news was probably responsible for Yoshida’s continued negative attitude towards the question. On 5 March he told the House of Representatives Budget Committee that Japan would not participate in a Pacific alliance and that, in view of Japanese public opinion, the Americans would not propose such a scheme.9 This was not a direct refusal to accept MSA aid but it showed the United States that since Japan would not undertake
greater military responsibilities expansion of the National Security Force would serve no useful purpose.
From the summer of 1953, however, strong pressure was exerted on Yoshida from two directions. On 5 May Dulles told a joint Senate-Representatives Foreign Relations Committee hearing in Washington of a plan to extend MSA aid to Japan.10 The American
Secretary of State later gave the Japanese to understand that the aid would enable Japan to establish ten army divisions and place 350,000 men under arms.11 The Japanese Government, taken by surprise
immediately instructed its Ambassador in Washington to sound out American intentions.12 Yet Washington’s attitude was increasingly clear. The Japanese were not simply being invited to avail themselves of the benefits of MSA aid. Even though Yoshida's attitude to further defence expansion was known to be hostile and no formal negotiations had taken place, Japan's participation in the scheme was regarded as a foregone conclusion. Budgetary provisions were already being made and the United States had formulated plans for Japanese use of the aid to be extended.
At home,- deteriorating economic conditions associated with the end of United States Korean War special procurements
prompted business leaders to urge acceptance of MSA aid. On the one had it was felt that a properly negotiated agreement could direct much aid into economic rather than strictly military channels, raising the
level of Japanese technology and improving industrial competitiveness. On the other hand it was felt that refusal of MSA aid would damage
Japanese-American political and, ultimately, economic relations. It
might also adversely affect Japanese trade with America's client states in South-East Asia and the Pacific.13
Despite these pressures, Yoshida held his ground for
some time. A week after Dulles' announcement,Foreign Minister Okazaki
told a meeting of foreign correspondents in Tokyo that it would be 'premature to say anthing definite about MSA aid'.14 On 26 May Yoshida told the House of Councillors that 'we are not at present considering increasing the strength of the National Security Force, nor do we wish to do so'.15 On 29 May, in an obvious reference to the Dulles speech, the Prime Minister told the House of Councillors Budget Committee that since there had been 'no formal communication' from the United States Government on the question he could not speculate about the possibility of Japanese participation in the MSA scheme.18
The following day, however, Senator Everet Dirkson, a prominent member of the Senate Budget Committee, arrived in Japan for
talks with Yoshida.17 What passed between the two men has not been
revealed. Yet the Senator's visit seems to have convinced Yoshida that
the long term cost in American goodwill of refusal to accept MSA aid might be greater than the price of a carefully negotiated acceptance. Whatever the reason, Yoshida's position gradually changed from about the
time of the Dirkson visit.18
Enquiries at the American Embassy suggested there could be considerable flexibility in negotiating the quantity and type
of aid. The Americans gave Yoshida to understand that the MSA scheme
would have favourable effects on Japanese-American economic relations, They stressed they were not insisting on a degree of rearmament beyond
Japan's economic and political capacity to absorb. Japan could comply
with the requirements of the MSA act by maintaining internal security, fulfilling her duties under the Security Treaty and effectively
exercising her right of individual and collective self defence. Thus the Japanese gradually formed the impression that MSA aid would have as much economic as military significance and would not involve them in new military responsibilities.19 After further promptings from the
United States20 they announced their ’inclination' to accept MSA
assistance,21 although Okazaki took care to tell the Diet (16 June) that he was thinking of the 'economic' rather than the 'military' aspects of the scheme.22 Cabinet finally decided to apply for aid on 30 June and the first round of negotiations began a fortnight later (15 July) in the Foreign Ministry.23
2. The first round of MSA negotiations, July 1953 - September 1953