Among the questions which confront scholars or professional soldiers studying any campaign
or battle is defining the political and strategic reasons why combatants fought. The reasons men
fight are as old as man himself. The motivations to initiate hostilities throughout the centuries
vary, but a general commonality linking nation states or individuals to violent action stem from
33 Tartu University Astronomic Observatory, Astronomic Calendar, 21st Edition 1944, (Dorpat (Tartu),
Estonia: University Publishing 1943, as well as the Eesti Meteoroloogiajaamade Vork, Weather Record, February 1944, (Dorpat (Tartu), Estonia: Station Year Record 1944.
14
either a perceived or real fear of something or someone, the need to maintain personal or national
honor and some form of personal or national interest.34 In the past two decades historians have debated the extent of power exercised by Hitler and Stalin in their respective countries. This
thesis assumes both as pivotal in their role of forming and executing policy within the limits of
their reach. Both Hitler and Stalin knew the Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939 would not last.
Some scholars believe Stalin had plans to attack Hitler before Germany could attack the Soviet
Union. The fact is open hostility between Germany and the Soviet Union began with the German
attack of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.35 The strategic reasons behind the German attack have generally been identified with the need for resources, such as oil and grain, as well as for
ideological reasons such as lebensraum, or living space.36 The horrific contributions to the physical dimension are well known. The political motivations for this conflict fueled the brutality
of fighting at the tactical level on both sides as each combatant made consistent efforts to de-
humanize their opponent.37 Thus the political motivations for the conflict are directly linked to the moral and mental dimensions of war through physical evidence .
With an understanding of the strategic motivations for war in 1941, scholars and professional
soldiers are better able to understand how these motivations evolve over the course of the war as a
34
Thucydides, Landmark Thucydides (New York, NY: Free Press, 1998), pg 43.
35
While to date, a significant topic of discussion, several authors are examining the possibility of a Soviet attack before the German general assault of June 22, 1941. The argument of Gorodetsky has also been looked at by Joachim Hoffman and Viktor Suvorov independently. See: Gabriel Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (Hartford, CT: Yale University Press, 1998).
36
Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Munich, Germany: Zentralverlag der NSDAP, 1941) 726. Chapter 14, beginning on page 726 of this edition instructs the world on Hitler’s ideas for the East. While the subject of German goals in the East are still hotly debated, Hitler's thoughts dominated the National Socialist Party and the logic for war with the Soviet Union as future chapters will show.
37
The brutality of fighting on the Eastern Front is well known. For general examples of conduct in the East, see: Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Washington D.C.: Department of the Army 1968), Omer Bartov, ‘Soldiers, Nazis, and War in the Third Reich,’ Journal of Modern History 63 (March 1991), 44-60., or Klaus Jürgen-Müller, ‘The Brutalization of Warfare: Nazi Crimes and the Wehrmacht,’ in John Erickson and David Dilkes, ed. Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1993.
15
result of sustained operations. While there are several variables effecting the Germans and
Soviets, there are two which the combatants have in common, those being the terrain and the
weather.
When combined, terrain and weather have the ability to bring operations to a standstill at the
strategic, operational and tactical levels. Terrain and weather are often overlooked by scholars and
professional soldiers when examining the strategic context of a conflict. Often, most think terrain
and weather are too tactical a consideration to examine.38 This lack of understanding demonstrates many think of war in isolation, meaning the strategic level independent from the operational and
the tactical isolated from the strategic and operational levels. If nothing else, terrain and weather
are unifying factors which interconnect the levels and dimensions of war more closely.
A key consideration of why terrain and weather are so important in the study of war resides in
the notion of time and space. The considerations of time and space are the dominate factors
governing the employment and sustainment of forces at the strategic, operational and tactical
levels. Forces failing to understand the terrain and the effects of weather will never be able to
effectively measure how long it will take to move their forces into contact with the enemy, or how
long it will take to resupply those forces once in contact.39
In the 1950s, the United States Army spent considerable effort employing captured German
officers with Russian Front experience to write about the terrain and weather of northern
38 What is important about terrain and weather is not the conditions, but the effects they have on military
operations. Terrain and weather impact not only the abilities of leaders to employ weapons in cold weather because they are frozen at the tactical level, these conditions typically inhibit strategic and operational leaders ability to mass material, manpower or firepower to assist the tactical level.
39 Documents of the Estonian National Archives, ERA 1091-1-1797 contain detailed information which
scientifically demonstrates the Estonian port and airfield composition which would dictate German logistical throughput capacity.
16
European Russia.40 The result was a series of studies elaborating issues associated with operating in Russia. These studies are an excellent collection of lessons observed, but lack significant
explanation of the operations conducted to be of value to scholars. These studies also lack
conclusive modern scientific evidence.41 One of the goals of this work is to show the
interconnection between the sciences of climatology and geology in relation to planning and
executing a campaign plan.
1.4 SHAPING THE SITUATION IN 1944: THE EASTERN FRONT FROM DECEMBER