Arguably, no government in the twentieth century has succeeded in exercis- ing as much control over its people as has the Kim government. A half-century of propaganda and social control has shaped the attitudes, values, and behav- ior of the masses and the elite. The goal of this ideological and behavioral shaping is to transform the North Korean people into selfless socialists who unquestioningly obey their leaders. The Kims’ attempt at total control, with multiple layers of control mechanisms reinforcing a corpus of lies, has created a society that on the surface is remarkably stable and resistant to change, con- sidering the dire economic straits into which the people have fallen. But underneath this facade is a society riddled with corruption and plagued by dissatisfaction.
Social control mechanisms have functioned better in some respects than in others. Kim Jong Il’s control of top government, party, and military leaders appears to be successful: they are closely watched, amply rewarded, and occa- sionally severely punished as an example to others. The ability of the MPS and the SSD to prevent the formation of unauthorized organizations and gather- ings seems effective. Voices of dissent are not raised in public; even in private people are extremely careful about criticizing the Kim regime.
Social control seems to be slipping in regard to keeping the population from moving around the country. The security police often take pity on hungry peo- ple who are searching for food; in any case, the police will generally accept bribes to look the other way, even when people go back and forth across the Chinese border. Beginning in 1998 several sources reported that many North Korean children had left home or been abandoned by their parents, who were unable to feed them. These children roamed the countryside and cities as beg- gars, sometimes joining together in small bands. On September 27, 1997, Kim Jong Il ordered that these vagabonds, called kotchebi (flower swallows), be detained in special “9-27” camps.52Living conditions in the makeshift camps
are said to be miserable, and children often escape to roam again.
The Kim regime has also been unable to prevent the formation of farmers’ markets. These markets have existed in one form or another since the found-
ing of the republic; they have been periodically suppressed by the authorities but always return.53To the masses, the markets gained increasing importance
in the 1980s as the state food rationing system began to break down. For the privileged classes, the markets provide a means of disposing of surplus goods at a handsome profit.
The regime’s social control mechanism is also failing to halt a rise in crime. Defectors from North Korea report that robbery and prostitution are wide- spread. Crime helps poor people cope with a worsening economy (although sometimes crimes are committed for personal gain, especially by the children of the elite). Criminal activity is made possible by the willingness of security personnel to accept bribes. Often security and military personnel engage in crimes; according to one report, hungry soldiers have even crossed the border into China to commit robbery.54
The Kim regime’s social control efforts have been unable to stamp out cor- ruption among officials and bureaucrats. On many occasions Kim Jong Il has publicly complained about the unsocialistic behavior of bureaucrats, and in a few cases he has made an example of high-level party or government officials who accepted bribes or conducted private business on the side. But Kim can hardly lead by example, for his corrupt practices put him in a class by himself, and the elite know this. Throughout the bureaucracy—especially as the pri- mary economy has collapsed, taking the value of government salaries with it—corruption has become the primary means of livelihood for many offi- cials and bureaucrats. To get anything done, such as receiving a job promotion or a travel document, one must koyora (“pile up the goods”).55A former North
Korean truck driver explains why so few of the goods he transported to Pyongyang from the Chinese border reached their destination: police as well as bandits would set up roadblocks on major trading routes. At each stop the driver would be forced to pay an unofficial toll. By the time the truck reached its destination, it would be carrying only 50 percent of its original cargo.56Left
unsaid is the likelihood that many truck drivers sell some of the cargo for cash before reaching their final destination. Even though corruption is widespread, most of the North Korean people, including many bureaucrats and officials, are said by defectors to be honest. Many former North Koreans have recounted how neighbors, in a true communist spirit, share with one another. The tragedy is that the Kim regime has left the masses very little to share.
The Kims have tried to create a society in which everyone but themselves is subservient to the party. But rather than become productive workers eager to fulfill their assigned tasks, the people have become disillusioned. The gov-
ernment admits as much in its repeated calls for people to work harder and find their own solutions to problems. Since the death of Kim Il Sung, the rul- ing elite have lost much of their legitimacy and most of the reservoir of trust and hope that kept the people at their work. Kim Jong Il can remain in power only by giving his political and military associates rewards, of which there is a dwindling supply, and threatening to deliver punishments. No government can survive for long by relying solely on rewards and coercion, and the Kim Jong Il regime is unlikely to be an exception.
orth Korea, like the Choson dynasty “Hermit Kingdom,” has throughout its fifty-year history kept its distance from other nations, show- ing little enthusiasm for diplomacy or people-to-people contact. Even during the cold war,North Korea was a close ally of neither China nor the Soviet Union. After the demise of European communism and the economic reformation of China, North Korea became even more isolated.North Korea’s foreign policy is crafted against the backdrop of Korean his- tory, especially the memory of recurring invasions from neighboring powers and years of political subjugation. Given this history, it is unreasonable to char- acterize North Korean attitudes toward the international community as paranoid. After the liberation of Korea from Japan, North Korea’s struggle for political independence continued in the context of its seeking to maintain polit- ical autonomy from its two larger communist allies—China and the Soviet Union—while seeking to liberate the southern half of the peninsula (which the North considers part of its territory). The achievement of this second goal required not only that the North Koreans expel the Americans in South Korea, but that the North Koreans compete and win in a zero-sum game of political legitimacy with the South Korean government.