Manipulative behavior is geared toward indirect interference in the decision-making of another person, usually without his or her appro- val. Manipulation is not exactly coercion or persuasion or deception. This elusive phenomenon is located somewhere in the gray area between these motivating actions. The ambiguity of manipulation enables the phenomenon to appear in almost infinite forms and under many different guises.
This chapter sketches a model to classify different kinds of manipu- lative strategies. It proposes to categorize manipulations according to criteria related to sensitive issues for the open society in general and the liberal philosophy in particular. The chief purpose is to create a lexicon to facilitate better political and ethical discussions regarding manipulative behavior and its implications on our social life.
In principle, the open society has always defended the individual’s liberty, autonomy, and independence. Therefore, it seems that almost any moral-political discussion under the liberal umbrella needs to examine the connection between the problem at hand and the ability of the individuals involved to freely choose their actions. Of course, it is extremely important in the case of manipulation.
My first criterion will be the intentions of a rational manipulator concerning the target’s freedom of choice. I propose distinguishing between two types of manipulation:
1. Limiting manipulations. These manipulations are intended to limit a target by maneuvering the target toward one specific
option or reducing the number of options that he considers while making a decision.
2. Expanding manipulations. These manipulations are intended to open a target’s mind by maneuvering the target to expand his ‘‘field of vision’’ toward open possibilities while making decisions.
Categorizing manipulation according to limited or expanded choices is insufficient. It omits a unique characteristic of manipulative behavior: trickery. Of course, trickery can manifest itself in many variations that might affect the target on different levels. Therefore, any categorization of manipulation according to various ends should be cross-referenced with classification according to different means to achieve the ends. Is such classification possible?
The difficulty is that manipulative behavior is a sweeping phenome- non encompassing infinite means, including temptation, distraction, and intimidation. Therefore, in order to cope with the classification problem, which seems impossible at first, we need to employ a simple device. Let us take a close look at the phenomenon.
Manipulative behavior can be quite a sophisticated motivating action that appears in many forms, shapes, and disguises. A rational manipulator, while choosing his strategy, considers several means and methods of influence, everything from fear and intimidation to pity and flattery. However, we should not forget that all such means remain geared toward the generation of a motivating effect.
The thrust is that focusing on the motivating effect ‘‘miraculously’’ enables us to distinguish between two types of manipulative strategies: emotional and intellectual. The first one is geared toward maneuver- ing the target to act impulsively while the second one is geared toward maneuvering the target to ‘‘choose’’ his actions out of biased, subjec- tive considerations.1Hence, the motivating effect criterion enables us to distinguish between two kinds of manipulations:
1. Emotional manipulations. These manipulations are geared toward maneuvering the target to act impulsively, reflexively, and automatically.
2. Intellectual manipulations. These manipulations are geared toward maneuvering the target to act from reason and consider- ation of some sort.
It is important to emphasize that in both types of manipulations the means could be emotional, intellectual, or both. The difference lies in the motivating effect.
It is clear that argumentation and reasoning can motivate a person to act impulsively. Good examples include ‘‘killing’’ jokes, such as the story about the Jewish rabbi who refuses to bury a dog in a Jewish ceremony. However, after receiving a considerable sum of money, our rabbi suddenly reverses his verdict and declares, ‘‘It comes to my attention that this dog is actually a Jewish dog and, therefore, deserves a full ceremony in accordance with orthodox Jewish law.’’
Of course, the manipulator is the joke-teller while the target is his audience. Under the assumption that a ‘‘real’’ laugh is an impulsive reaction, jokes can be classified as emotional manipulations. However, entertainment can enfold hidden political messages. Indeed, many jokes and caricatures make fun of Jewish people by drawing frighten- ing pictures of them. These confusing messages intend to give the impression that Jewish people are inhuman and, therefore, introduce to the listener a reason to vote for Jew-hating political candidates. Accordingly, in the final account we face an intellectual manipulation: ‘‘Jews are not human. Therefore, I shall vote for the leader who knows how to ‘solve’ this ‘bothersome’ problem.’’
The differences between the two types of manipulation, emotional and intellectual, lie in the motivating effect. Emotional manipulations are meant to confuse and limit the target’s ability to provide any logi- cal explanation for his actions, while intellectual manipulations are built to supply the target with an adequate rationalization to behave in a way that the manipulator wants. Combining the classification of means with that of ends enables us to distinguish between four types of manipulation, as shown in Table 1:
Four Types of Manipulation 47
Table 1
Ends Means Emotional Intellectual
Limiting Limiting emotional manipulations
Limiting intellectual manipulations Expanding Expanding emotional
manipulations
Expanding intellectual manipulations
Certainly, this model does not encompass all possible manipula- tions. The ability to distinguish between intellectual and emotional manipulations can be extremely difficult. To facilitate discussion and bypass this obstacle, most examples in this book begin in the labora- tory of a rational manipulator. I will assume that in each case the intention was to manipulate and that the manipulator decided in advance which motivating effect he wished to create: emotional or intellectual.
Of course, to remain exclusively in the laboratory of a rational manipulator is insufficient because reality is dynamic, complex, and unpredictable. Each strategy, as sophisticated as it could be, can lead to many unintended consequences. The evaluation of possible outcomes and implications in deciphering a manipulative interaction will help me present the challenges that manipulation embodies to passionate advocates of the open society.2
NOTES
1. I borrowed this idea, emotional versus intellectual, from Fried and Agassi [Paranoia: A Study in Diagnosis (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.1976)]. The authors use this distinction to differentiate between different kinds of mental sicknesses. At first blush, it seems that the two sub- jects, demarcating mental illnesses and classifying manipulative strategies, are disconnected. However, mental patients are often enough labeled as human beings who have had their decision-making process damaged, and manipulative behavior is motivated by external hidden interference in the decision-making process of a target. Therefore, it is not so hard to find the parallel.
2. I assume that there are other proposals to classify manipulations. For example, Maoz (‘‘Framing the National Interest: The Manipulation of For- eign Policy Decisions in Group Settings,’’ World Politics, 43 (1990): 92–94), writing on the subject of political manipulation, proposes different classifica- tions. I do not claim that my proposal is the best available way to classify manipulations. My hope is that my proposal, the model presented here, will suffice as an efficient methodological instrument to introduce problems and dilemmas via the analysis of manipulative strategies and their ramifications.