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CAPÍTULO XVIII

There was a certain lieutenant in the 1st Battalion. Rhodesian African Rifles who had distinguished himself on Operation

Nickel

in 1968 ... an operation mounted in the wake of the first major terrorist incursions into Rhodesia.

He had carried out a follow-up operation of some85 kilometres(54 miles) in just48 hours, and such was his determination that he had to take a boot resupply.

He always led from the front and during a brief pause, he heard the click of a safety catch or a similar sound made by the withdrawal of a grenade pin, indicating that he was in the centre of a well-concealed enemy position, and the middle of an ambush.

Acting on reflexes, he immediately fired towards the sound, killing two terrorists and causing four others to surrender. On learning that other terrorists were concealed nearby, the lieutenant, with complete disregard for his own safety. immediately positioned himself where he could subject the area to fire. and in the ensuing battle, a further six enemy were killed and two appeared with their hands held high above their heads.

The lieutenant radioed for helicopter support, eased springs and returned to base camp, wondering what the fuss concerning terrorism was all about

The success of the action was entirely due to his quick, fearless reactions and remarkable qualities of leadership, and he was later awarded the Bronze Cross of Rhodesia for his gallantry.

Having seen action with the RAR he decided to try his hand with the SAS and duly passed selection in 1969. There was a shortage of officer accommodation at the time and a number of men were given permission to live out of the camp. The lieutenant decided to choose a fellow subaltern as a flatmate.

During a slack period, the two friends were "on the town" as usual and after remov­ ing a "Men at Work" sign and putting it outside the Nurses' Home, they decided to check the "talent" at

The Lighthouse

nightclub in Avondale ... a popular gathering spot for the youth of Salisbury, and where most of the RLI and SAS members met when off duty.

On entering the circular nightclub, they decided that things definitely needed livening up. Everyone appeared subdued It was the weekend, after all. and a bit of merriment was clearly needed.

Our lieutenant returned to his vintage Jaguar which served both as a car and armoury. Selecting the missile of his choice - a teargas grenade - he returned to the club.

Popping his head around the door. he nonchalantly tossed the grenade into the subdued smoke-filled nightclub atmosphere. Then. closing the door behind him. he strolled into the night air. looking like innocence personified, took up a comfortable position outside the club, and waited for the fun to start

He did not have long to wait- about 4,5 seconds in fact!

It became apparent very quickly to the occupants that something was amiss. The gas attacked their skin, eyes and nasal senses causing immediate respiratory stress ... and not being able to breathe equals panic! Within a matter of seconds the scene in the club changed from tranquility to pandemonium.

Chivalry fell by the wayside as everyone fought for the door, leaving a trail of destruction. Furniture was crushed like matchsticks and the breakages were fantastic. The management disregarded orders to allow customers out first and decided they too must abandon the

Lighthouse.

The fight for fresh air took priority.

Yet, despite the commotion. one enterprising RLI trooper managed to keep his wits about him. Not one to let an opportunity pass him by, he quickly made off with the Lighthouse till- only to be brought down in a rugby tackle by one of the management a few centimetres from the door as he attempted to make good his escape.

The hitherto peaceful scene outside had now taken on a new appearance. People were crying. gasping and vomiting in every direction. Some were bent double leaning over the outer club walls ... others were lying prostrate. trying to regain their composure.

It was like a First World War battle scene and the culprit responsible was in hysteria watching it all.

But during the mass confusion. the vigilance of the law remained unimpeded It was not long before a policeman spotted our man and asked if he wouldn't mind assisting them in the investigations.

He was politely asked to open the boot of his car ... and the eyes of the BSAP officer came out on organ stops as the lieutenant's private arms cache was revealed Armaments varied from 7,62 millimetre ammunition to thunderflashes to- teargas grenades . .. Teargas grenades!

The game was up and our hero was in deep trouble.

By now. his flatmate had decided to retire to his flat and continue his little party with his friends.

The police officer was convinced that a bigger and better arms cache existed some­ where else. and, escorted by the policeman, the lieutenant was asked to proceed to his home for further investigations.

On reaching the flat in one of the city avenues. it was very apparent another party was in progress. Blaring music and hoots of joviality could be heard from the street

As they opened the door. the expression on the policeman's face was a picture. For the centrepiece of the party appeared to be a teddy-bear which was in the process of being roasted on the rotisserie.

A search of the flat unearthed more materials of war. whereupon the two flatmates were invited to accompany the officer to the station.

The Lighthouse culprit was obviously in big trouble. Telephone calls were made to Major Peter Rich, the OC'. revealing the sad sorry tale. Hurried visits were made to and from Army HQ and hushed conversations took place at all levels behind closed doors.

Our hero was to be formally charged and would go on trial for a number of offen­ ces. varying from disturbing the peace to malicious damage to property.

During the court case. suppressed giggles could be heard through the courtroom as the facts unfolded

Even the magistrate could be seen biting on his lower lip. An African interpreter­ who sat in on every case - was becoming progressively gigglier and finding it very difficult to contain himself, much to the annoyance of the magistrate who had by now

taken a grip of his own emotions. ·

He had almost subdued his desire to burst out laughing when the guilty party was asked why he placed the "Men At Work" sign outside the nurses' home. When he replied, "I thought it would be a bit of a giggle", it was all too much for the interpreter and he broke down and howled with mirth.

The lieutenant's superior officer at the time of Operation Nickel was called to give evidence in mitigation and. because his plea concerned current operations, his evidence was heard in camera.

He must have put up a command performance as he related the brave exploits of the lieutenant He must have played on the stress factor and the fact that the young operational officer had to have some form of emotional release: that his behaviour was really only high spirits.

The court accepted this and the young lieutenant was spared a prison sentence in favour of a heavy fine.

He eventually left the Rhodesian Army and went off to fight in the Middle East. where by all accounts., he was held in high esteem.

Out of the bush he was a bit of a nuisance. He was, however. a typical example of a superb operational soldier and a fea,rless and natural leader.

His men would have followed him anywhere ... even. as one young soldier quipped, if it was just out of curiosity ...

Into Mozambique, 1969-1972

Up until the late sixties and early seventies. guerilla incursions into Rhodesia were not militarily successful for a variety of reasons.

A very real factor was the vigilance by security forces and other government depart­ ments in the Zambezi Valley. The fanners too. who in the main were members of the Police Reserve and had the benefit of training programmes, were a force to be reckoned with.

The few large-scale incursions there had been had left the terrorists severely mauled by the security forces. The Zambezi had indeed become a valley of death.

Then in 1967 ZIPRA made a political blunder when they infiltrated with the South African ANC (African National Congress). Pretoria immediately dispatched anum­ ber of policemen to strengthen Rhodesia ·s security. They became more involved from the following year and were to stay patrolling the Valley until 1975.

A massive incursion took place in 1968 and the six-week operation. codenamed Cauldron, lasted six weeks and involved the army. air force and police. During the operation. the SAS picked up a thoroughly emaciated insurgent who hadn't had a drop to drink or anything to eat for ten days. They gave him a packet of Army .. dog biscuits .. which he ate - and to their ut�r amazement. dropped stone dead at their feet Next day, Captain Brian Robinson sent a signal to the Quartermasters' Stores congratulating them on their first kill!

Smaller urban groups had

pe

netrated Rhodesia intent on striking at the heart of the country's administration. but in the main. although a few explosive devices were detonated, the impact was negligible and the police were able to deal with the matter. The enormous hardships encountered by groups in the Zambezi Valley was another very real deterrent and gave the defender an advantage.

The Zambezi River and Lake Kariba were natural barriers that had to be crossed The valley was extremely hot; there was disease and little water. And there was no one to give them food, shelter and intelligence.

Insurgents would cross the Zambezi loaded down with ammunition and those who did not drop dead through lack of water, had the stuffing knocked out of them by the security forces, while others failed the river crossing attempting to escape. South of the river were high bare hills, ravines and a vast expanse of open bush. It was a good thirty days' journey from Zambia before a man could get into action against a reasonable target; another thirty days back to get an ammunition resupply.

Infiltrators also made the basic errors which in insurgency led to certain death. They moved in columns, wore green fatigues and a standardised boot with a distinc­

tive pattern which made tracking easy.

The Rhodesians' intelligence network was excellent and continually had the nationalists guessing.

Political strife within the two opposing factions of ZANU and ZAPU did not help their plans to take Rhodesia through the barrel of the gun. either. Neither did their

initial lack of recruits.

In the early days of the war. only one country could really be used as a springboard for incursions and that was Zambia. Although Botswana was used in a limited way.

Zambia was the only liberated country to share a frontier with Rhodesia where large concentrations of men could be assembled.

To the cast was Portuguese-ruled Mozambique. which meant a hostile passage for the terrorists. But time and history were destined to change all that

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There was an airline advertisement which regularly told Rhodesian television audiences of the delights of a Mozambican coastal holiday. "The Portuguese have been there a long time." it said as it showed fleeting visions of sand. sea and platters piled high with seafood.

Whether by air or by the long tortuous road leading eastwards. landlocked Rhode­

sians would flock to Bcira or Lourenco Marques (later known as Maputo) and were particularly lemming-like at long weekends in their quest for prawns and cheap vi no. Yet there was another face to Mozambique and it was not tourism that concerned others in the country ... they were interested in severing Metropolitan Portugal's 400-

year-old rule on its far-flung African Province.

They were members of the black nationalist movement FRELIMO (The Front for

the Liberation of Mozambique): they wanted black majority rule and were deter­ mined to get it by armed struggle. The war, which had begun in the early sixties, had become increasingly bitter and FRELIMO were having a fair amount of success.

Prior to FRELIMO beginning its campaign to oust the Portuguese. the Mozam­

bique Province had been the perfect overseas posting for Portuguese Army officers who generally hailed from high-class families. The main concentration of inhabi­ tants stretched along almost one-third of the East African coast and the officers joined them for a fine life under the African sun.

But then things began to go sour. FRELIMO started making their presence felt about the countryside and Mozambique very rapidly lost its appeal - many high­ ranking officers packed their bags and returned to the safety of Portugal.

To counter the growing problems in Mozambique. the Portuguese shipped out the povo - the peasants- men who had not been made welcome there before. and as it was generally a conscript army, moral« was not good

In March 1968. FRELIMO opened up the Tete front in the east. adjoining Zambia. Malawi and Rhodesia. and in 1969 an SAS tracker team was asked to go into Mozam­ bique to hunt down FRELIMO for the Portuguese.

They were the first white Rhodesian soldiers to go into Mozambique and thei.r pre­ sence there was top secret FRELIMO had not yet forced their way south across the Zambezi River, and the SAS teams operated right to the extreme north of the country near the Malawi/Zambia/Mozambican borders.

But the Portuguese were extremely loath to come out of their garrison camps. Their 37

hearts were simply not in the war. and with a few notable exceptions. they generally

only wanted to get back to Portugal in one piece. ·

Junior officers and NCOs objected to being pulled out of university for three years and sent to Africa to fight for people who were important in Mozambique but would be of no consequence back home.

On the rare occasions they did venture out of their garrisons. they did so in strength. and were not prepared to break into smaller groups where they stood the chance of greater success.

Their discipline left much to be desired and their standard drill when getting lost in the bush was to fire shots in the air!

Often to the horror of the SAS trackers closing in on fresh spoor for them. the Por­ tuguese would break open beer cans and start drinking . . . or bang tins or planks to deliberately frighten the enemy away. Most of the contacts the SAS trackers had turned into running punch-ups.

When the Rhodesians located an enemy camp for them. the Portuguese would often do a dry run with their jets. Then they would do the real thing the next day. By then. of course. FRELIMO had fled.

But apart from giving the Portuguese a hand the SAS men did gain a knowledge of the terrain. And the exercise gave them battle experience that proved useful in later years when their own war got into full swing.

Then. in 1970. FRELIMO conducted a large offensive and managed to cross the Zambezi River near Chicoa It was a decisive phase in Mozambique's war and it opened up Mozambique from the Zambezi River down to Rhodesia's north­ eastern border.

But Portuguese forces were stretched. This predicament ensured the unimpeded progress of FRELIMO and ultimately their complete dominance of that part of Mpzambique.

The Rhodesians - the SAS. RLI and Air Force -were naturally eager to keep FRELIMO away from their own border and prevent the war spilling into their own country, so they carried out a classic combined operation with the Portuguese. Even

at this early stage, the security forces were concerned that Rhodesian terrorists might piggy-back on FRELIMO routes.

They aimed to show the Portuguese both the tracking concept and the joint­ operations concept of counter-insurgency warfare where air and land operations were integrated Yet when it came to tracking. it was the Rhodesians who were to learn the biggest lessons.

Up until then. they had viewed tracking as the magic ingredient for success. Their own victories had been in the remote. unpopulated regions of the Zambezi Valley where. if there was no interference from the rain. tracks would remain for anything up to a week.

They soon found that tracking was an entirely different proposition in a heavily­ populated area where it was pouring with rain the whole time. It was the first indica­ tion to the Rhodesians that should things go wrong and the war be taken to the population. they too would have similar problems.

They were not to know it then. but by the time their own war got into full swing. the need for tracking would virtually fall away. There would be so many enemy running

around Rhodesia that there would be no need to track them down; and there would not be enough trackers to do the job anyway.

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