50 per cent. See I.J. Brugmans, et al., (eds), o p ,cit., p-490. 73 See the conference report, 'Verslag Persidangan Meningkatkan Hasil
Boemi Didaerah Soerakarta Koochi 27 Oktober 1943', typescript, AMN, p.l.
new members of producing compost fertilizers.
The pangreh praja hierarchy of Ken Cho, Gun Cho and Son Cho made propaganda for the programme of increased agricultural production among the people. Moreover, the Ku Chö and Kumichö, who were in direct contact with the peasants, were charged with seeing that they enlarged
fheir plantings of certain crops. Japanese-inspired organizations,
such as Seinendan (Youth Corps), Kcibodan (Vigilance Corps), and
Fujinkai (women's association), also assisted the Ku Cho in this programme. The Susuhunan and Mangkunegoro were themselves appointed members of the
75
Zosan Kyoshinkai, and were compelled to propagate its aims actively.
Early in 1944, the Japanese even managed to get the Susuhunan and
Prince Mangkunegoro to travel around the villages to make propaganda for increasing food production. In the early months of the reign of the new young rulers Mangkunegoro VIII and Susuhunan XII, the Japanese authorities were still more direct in the way they manipulated them for propaganda purposes - in the same sort of way they manipulated other
local leaders. The effect of this was to reduce the status of the rulers to a similar category as that of politicians and youth leaders.
In 1944, a crisis in food and textile supplies had begun seriously to affect the people. In October 1944, Wonogiri regency, a dry region of Surakarta, suffered greatly from a shortage of food. A
76
report by the Ken Chö of Wonogiri listed some reasons for this. Chief among these was the delivery of agricultural produce to the Japanese. The Japanese made forced purchases at low prices, demanding that at least one-third of production be sold to them. Another third was kept in the Ku as a food reserve, and the remainder could be retained by
the peasants who had grown it. A later Japanese demand for
more rice resulted in the depletion of the Ku reserves,
leaving the peasants with no local buffer stocks.
74 For details on Chio Iinkai, see ibid., p.4.
75 Appointment letter of Chokan of the Surakarta Kochi, 3 January 1944, no.10/K/04, AMN.
76 See 'Rapot Rahasia', 16 October 1944, Djawatan Ekonomi Wonogiri, 1944.
Additional reasons cited for the Wonogiri crisis were insufficient rainfall and a lack of local transportation.
In Kedawung subdistrict, the peasants had also been forced to deliver one-third of their rice production at half the normal price. I.i some cases, the peasants, who had previously been members of the PKS, rejected the ordered target and delivered only one-fourth of their
rice production. This helped to make the Kempeltal suspicious of the
disbanded PKS organization in rural Surakarta.
As a result of the food shortage, there was serious suffering from hunger in rural Surakarta, particularly the poorer areas such as
Wonogiri, Karanganyar and Boyolali. In 1944 many peasants died of
malnutrition. To obtain food, peasants sold their property, including
cattle, land and even gold, to rich peasants. Chinese also played a
role in buying the peasants' gold. Although many rich peasants became
wealthier as a result of this process, some were themselves plunged into poverty as a result of a Japanese campaign to have them contribute their cattle and gold for the war effort.
An additional source of rural hardship was the recruitment of villagers as romusha, who were sent to labour on war projects, both
locally and in other parts of Java - or even to Burma. Many of them
died as a result of the heavy work with inadequate food and health
facilities. In 1944 a local source reported that there were about
2,000 men from Surakarta who had never returned to their villages. 77
It was not even known whether or where they had died.
As a result of food shortages, another new board was
established, the Badan Oeroesan Makanan Rakjat (Board of People's Food
Affairs) or BOMR. Its main goal was to sell food at a normal price.
BQMR had branches at the Ken, Gun and Son levels, and its management was in the hands of Indonesians, mostly from the pangreh p r a j a ,
Keibodan members and teachers. Tills board did nol fully satisfy the
77 Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944-1945: Sub romusha, AMN»
people's needs,78 in no small part because of the corruption carried out by certain members of the board, commonly called tukang catut
(tukang = workman; catut = small pliers) 79 As a result of this corruption, regional food stocks were depleted and artificial price
levels affected everyday goods in the market places.
To cope with a shortage of textiles, village women were obliged to weave clothing at government looms set up by the Japanese in the houses of the Ku Chö. There were special Japanese officials who advised and taught the villagers how to use the looms. To supply the government looms, the villagers were forced to grow cotton. The gunny
sack factory of Delanggu, in Klaten regency, was converted for the weaving of textiles. According to a member of the managerial staff of the factory during the occupation, production was planned to provide for the needs of romusha and other laborers, and the basic material used was not cotton but jute.8U These efforts were intended to replace imports,*01 so that the village economy could be self-sufficient.
Another Japanese purpose for the village economy was to recruit villagers to plant castor-oil plants on the sides of roads and on
uncultivated land. As the first step, the Japanese delivered the seeds to the tillages and the Ku Ch5 divided them among the villagers. Each
farmer who could produce 1 kg of new seeds from his plants was permitted to buy 0.3 litres of petroleum (1 litre of petroleum cost 12.50 cents). Through this system the Japanese could increase the number of castor-oil plants.32 Because castor-oil was important for the war, central coordination
73
79
According to Soekardi, secretary of the BOMR of Kedawung Son Sragen Ken. Interview with him, 26 July 1979.
oudj Lto Sosrodidurdjo, o n.clt., p.-V7j ho explains that -ne
ukang catut carried out corruption without rational plans and that I was cm i y I in; l dan In l. in I tin broader: moaning, tjjkvwvj—
oferred to trade activity in which profits were Urge; see ,j. Drug mans, ut u.L, (uds) , op . ci t . , pp.491-92,
Interview with Gondowidjo jo, 14 August 1979. 81
82
Cf. Clifford Geertz, The Social History of an Indonesian Town (Cambridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1965), p.60.
See 'Tjara Boeah Djarak
Membagi Minjak Tanan Kepada Orang-Orang Jang Mfcnjerahkan Bendel Roepa-Roepa Djaman Djepang 1943-1944, no.29, AMN
was in the hands of the Chokan of Surakarta Kochi.
During the occupation the Japanese authorities in Surakarta concentrated on four main plantation crops - sugar, rubber, jute and coffee. Production was mainly for war needs, as the traditional export market was removed by the war. The Japanese experienced many difficulties in their efforts to enlarge estate production. Lack of capital was one of the major factors, many Surakarta banks having become bankrupt as a result of the war.
Sugar, needing more capital than other plantation crops* was particularly badly affected. In 1941 the area covered by sugar
plantations in Surakarta was more than 4220 ha and the production about 71,095 tons. During 1942 and 1943 the planted area decreased
82a
to 3152 ha and the production to only 59,232 ton. A similar decline affected the sugar industry throughout Java. In 1942 there were 85 sugar factories operating in Java. This total decreased to 51 factories
8 2b in 1943, 47 factories in 1944 and 12 factories in 1945.
Another reason for the decline in estate sugar production was a lack of the labour normally supplied by neighbouring farmers. These farmers were burdened heavily with obligatory work on war projects and semi-military training, especially for youth. In addition the
farmers were forced by the Japanese authority to cultivate cotton on their own land. At least one-third of the farmers' own land had to be used for cotton. All this left farmers with little time to work on the sugar plantations.
With Surakarta society oppressed by the economic situation, the Japanese carried out a plan to collect the gold and diamonds owned by the population. On 29 December 1944, the Chokan set up a committee
8 3
for Gold and Diamond Collection, headed by Nishimia, a Japanese who proved very assiduous in his task. Both the Susuhunan and Prince
82a Cula, 1/ no.5, January 1947. 82b Ibid.,
'Kepoetoesan Soerakarta Koochi Jimu Kyoku Chokan', 1944, no.693, AMN.
Mangkunegoro were involved in the central committee, and they in turn became the leaders of gold and diamond collection committees in their
areas. Not surprisingly it was the priyayi who could give more than
the other social classes. In some villages, particularly in our sample
areas of Bendosari and Kedawung, the collection of gold and diamonds
was thwarted by villagers, who defied the Son C h o *1s orders despite the
sanctions used against t h e m . ^
The results of this collection more than satisfied the
Japanese in Surakarta. In a letter to Prince Mangkunegoro, dated
85
- February 1945, Hiroshi Watanabe, the Chokan of Surakarta, who knew
Indonesian well, expressed his gratitude. On 6 February Watanabe also
sent a letter to the members of the committee, stating that the Surakarta 86
region had achieved the largest diamond collection in Java. In such
collections, many of the nobility lost their treasure, and this was one of the reasons thev were to become poor when they lost their positions after the revolution.
In all of those programmes, as a part of its economic blueprint for the Netherlands East Indies, the Japanese government regarded the Surakarta region, as it did other regions in Indonesia, as a source for obtaining the mctterials demanded by the war.
84 Interview with S. Martodidardjo (village head of Toriyo, 1934-74),
2Ü August 1979; Sastrosuwarno (a village head of Gayam, 1943-74),
1 September 1979; interview with Soekardi, 26 July 1979.
85 This letter was written in both Indonesian and Japanese. It was
kept in the Reksopustoko Library, and was filed in the Bendel Djaman Djepang 1944, no.29, AMN.