Capacidad de coordinación general y segmentaria

I suggested above that the turn to narrative ways of conceptualising human experiences and social action is rooted in interpretivist epistemology. Such subjective narrative approaches to the study of lives have been inspired by Weber’s verstehen, Schutze’s phenomenology, and Chicago interactionism (Roberts 2002). However, although this approach represents a turn away from

earlier modes of enquiry and master narratives of theory, within the context of this growth in narrative writing, it is possible to make distinctions between different epistemological positions, or as Denzin (1989) puts it, subjective or objective knowing. Further, there is a huge literature debating the status of these accounts, although such different epistemological positions are often not explicitly named. The purpose of this discussion therefore is to outline narrative approaches from two broad epistemological perspectives. I outline an epistemological continuum of approaches to narrative analysis in order to identify the range of approaches available and to set my choice of approach in context.

It is useful to discuss the differences between writers’ approaches to narrative analysis in terms of how they view the way that knowledge is generated and the knowledge itself (Temple 2008). On the one hand, some approaches treat narratives as ‘objective presentations of experiences’ (Temple 2008 p 2), and narrative is limited to content and themes, while alternative approaches perceive narratives:

‘As social encounters situated in particular contexts, and the writing up of narratives as an active and creative rather than a neutral process’ (Temple 2008 p. 2).

As I discussed above, I adopt an approach to narrative analysis which fits with the second reference point and assert that:

‘Interpretation is inevitable because narratives are representations’ (Riessman 1993 p. 2).

Narratives therefore, do not speak for themselves: they need to be analysed and interpreted. Further, they are subjective, rooted in time, place and experience, are perspective ridden and linked to culture and history. As suggested, these positions also differ in terms of the role of language and the nature of how truth claims are made and I discuss these aspects in more detail below.

Some writers associated with the first perspective outlined above have tended to adopt narrative approaches to the study of lives because of some kind of disillusionment with ‘traditional methods’. For example, Bertaux (2003) argues that ‘Life stories can bring objective information’ (Bertaux 2003 p. 41).

However, my approach to studying community does not attempt to treat its existence (or not) as ‘an objective event, but a phenomenologically different experience’ (Riessman 2008 p. 90). The issue of truth and how truth claims are made also has epistemological significance. Interpretivist perspectives do not claim that respondents’ accounts are ‘untruthful’, but argue that truth is multiple and subjective and ultimately an interpretation:

‘Narratives are not treated as ‘true’ but rather as subjective versions of truth’ (Guy and Montague 2008 p. 389).

The issue of truth seems much more straightforward for those writing from the first perspective: for these writers, a narrative is treated as though it reflects reality and language mirrors life. As I have argued above, my approach is not concerned with universal or absolute truths and I explore how truth claims are made rather than if an account is factually true. There are other ways of approaching ‘a truth’ and many see narrative truth – as different from logical or scientific truth:

‘Oral sources are credible but with a different credibility…. the importance of oral testimony may not lie in its adherence to fact, but rather in its departure from it, as imagination, symbolism and desire emerge’ (Portelli 1998 p. 68).

Ricoeur (1984), writing from the second perspective, refers to narrative understanding rather than truth, while Hath and Wismiewski (1995) suggest that truth goes beyond notions of reliability, validity and generalisability and would prefer terms like ‘adequacy, aesthetic finality, accessibility, coherence, plausibility, trustworthiness, epistemological validity and verisimilitude. In my research, I analyse the coherence and persuasiveness of accounts of

community in relation to place, networks and identity rather than focus on attempting to discuss whether or not what women tell is factually true. I examine whether women tell convincing stories about their experiences of

community in Spain and this relates to how the stories are emplotted and how their multiple and shifting identities are conveyed.

In terms of my research on community among retired British migrants in Spain, I am not merely attempting to excavate or reveal – which would be essentialist - the ‘truth’ about whether community ‘exists’, nor is it

epistemologically appropriate for me to attempt to objectively measure it. Instead, as I suggested in Chapters One and Two, my aim is to explore my participants’ constructions and representations of community using my understandings as a framework. I have outlined my uses of community in relation to place, networks and ethnic identity and suggested that there are multiple representations. My epistemological approach takes into account that the people I interviewed may have different uses of the concept and my

interpretation of their understanding is necessarily partial and thus a

reinterpretation. I explore the processes that underpin the construction and reconstruction of community and examine this through narratives. I

acknowledge therefore that women’s narratives of community are subjective accounts, influenced by context, that is, culturally a Western22 perspective. Temporally, this takes place in the 21st century and finally, spatially, these narratives are influenced by their knowledge of and experiences of living in the UK and Spain. Any knowledge that is generated has to take this and the women’s previous experiences into account, although it is not possible to objectively measure this. Further, my attempt to understand constructions of community is necessarily shaped by my subjective positionalities and

experiences which are also both multiple and non-measurable: I cannot edit myself out and I have attempted to be as transparent as possible in terms of how I understand, apply and use the literature, analyse the narrative data and also how I claim to gain knowledge from it. I discuss this in detail in the

following chapter. Moreover, and to emphasise, I am interested in how and why it is constructed, experienced and reconstructed through narrative.

An alternative perspective is put forward by Roos (2003), who writes:

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I use this to refer to European and North American post-capitalist secular society

‘I thus propose to treat autobiographies…as essentially reality- and truth-orientated narratives of practices, where the truth is seen from a unique, concrete viewpoint: that of the author’ (Roos 2003 p. 31). Further, as I discussed in Chapter Two, the UK Home Office currently present community as the solution to problems in society (Back et al 2000). The Home Office’s ‘master narrative’ on community suggests that is directly

observable and measurable through immigrants speaking English, adopting a British ethnic identity through Citizenship Ceremonies and swearing

allegiance to the monarchy. Further, whether different ethnic groups share social networks with others is also perceived as an indicator of whether community exists or not. This narrative can be understood to fall into the second perspective.

However, narratives are active constructions and therefore should not be taken to accurately represent individual experience:

‘Narratives are emergent, a joint venture and the outcome of

negotiation by interlocutors.’ (De Fina and Georgakopoulou 2008 p. 381).

Rather, they should be seen as partial representations of that experience (Riessman 2008). Ultimately, within interpretivism, the distinctions between true and false need not be problematic since ‘Sincere people may not be telling the truth’ (Tonkin 1992 p. 113).

I have argued that there are a range of approaches to conceptualising narratives, broadly ranging from positivist epistemologies which treat narratives as ethnographic testimonials. Moreover, I use ‘truth’ and the making of truth claims as the main differential between positivist and

interpretivist approaches and the use and perception of the role of language. In the final section of this chapter, I discuss how women’s narratives will be analysed in terms of content and structure in light of my epistemological position. I now go on to discuss how I analyse women’s narratives of community in Spain.