Capacidades en CTI para el sector en la región Caribe

(11) FAQ Intergovernmental Group on Meat (FAO IG on Meat) Date; 1971-

Membership: 54 importing and exporting members.

Objectives: Review of international meat trade and provision of

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Î

P r e sent s ta tus; Active

(13) FAQ IG on Bananas Date g 1965-

Membership: All interested FAO members

Objectives % Price stabilisation and general information Methods g Studies of trade

Present status; Active

(14) Interna LicmaJ- Load and ^ n c Study jGroup Oates I960-

Methods; Discussion in content of FAO, Present status; Active

(12) FAQ IG on Oilseeds, oils, and fats

Date: 1966

Membership: All major countries except the USSR (which is not a % member of the FAO).

Objectives: Review of trade.

i

Methods: Discussion I

Membership: All major countries, including Australia, Canada, India, the UK, the USA, the USSR, and most EEC members. EEC has observer | status. Financed by members.

Objectives; Statistical information. Present status; Active.

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(d) Exporters' Organisations

(15) Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Dates 1950'“

Membership ; Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. ® Objectives; to unify members' petroleum policies and safeguard their

interests generally.

Methods: Co-ordination of pricing policies and execution of oligopolist

power to raise prices. |

Present status; Active !

(16) Organisation o¥ Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) ' Date; 1968-

Membership; Egypt, Kuwait, Algeria, Dubai, Libya, AbuDhabl, Qatar,

a

Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Bahrain,

Objectives: Co-ordination of members' activities in the oil industry. Methods: As in OPEC,

Present status: Active.

(17) Intergovernmental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (CIPEC) Date; 1968-

Membership: Chile, Peru, Zaire, Zambia,

Objectives: Co-ordination of measures to expand industry and copper exports, and increase in members' development resources. Attempts to stabilise and raise copper prices through joint action.

Methods; Sales cut of 10% from December 1974; increasing nationalisatiol of mining industries.

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(18) I n tern a i. i o n a 1 B a ux i te Association ( IBA ) y Date s 1974—

Membership: Australia, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierra Leone, Surinam, Yugoslav Objectives: Fair and remunerative returns for bauxite and alumina expor Methods;^ Co-ordination of taxation and local ownership policies,

sta bus ; Active. :h

(19) Cafe Mondial pate: 1973-

Membership: Exporting countri0s , Objectives: Price support,

Me^odsj Withholding of production. Heavily dependent on Brazilian finances,

P r s B n t s t a t ii s : Active

(2 0) Union of Banana Exporting Countries (UBEC) Date; 1974-

Membersh^s Mainly Latin America,

Objectives: Price increase and stabilisation.

Methods: Co-ordination of export taxation policies. Present status ; In its infancy,

(21) Cocoa Producers' Alliance (CP A) Date; 1962—

Membership: Brazil, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Gabon Ecuador,

Objectives: Price stabilisation; promotion of exports.

Methods: Export quotas ; surplus stock control and disposal indicator

prices. j

Present status: 'Economic' clauses are inactive. Production sales j promotion encouraged,

'138.

(22) Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries (ANRPC) '9

Dates 1975- “i

Membership: India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua-New Guinea, Singapore, |

Sri Lanka, Thailand. i

Objectives; Stabilisation of natural rubber prices.

Methods; Buffer stock and supply control arrangements. J

Present status: First two-year agreement signed in December 1976 by Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Singapore. Members to | provide finance for buffer stock of up to 100,000 metric tons. F Sources: Adapted from K.Morton and P^Tulloch, Trade and Developing Countries^

GDI. Groom Helm, London 1 9 7 7 7

For a review of agreements operative in the pre-Second World War period,^ see J.W.F.Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade, Cambridge i University Press, 1965; B.C.Swerling, ’Buffer Stocks and International Î Commodity Problems’, Economic Journal, December 1953; Max Gideonse, ' ’Commodity Agreements and Methods of Trade’, New Brunswick, N.3.1943; { B.Wallace and L.Edminster, International Control of Raw Materials, j

Washington, O.C., Brookings Institution, 1930; and S.S.Tsou and 3.0. , Black, ’International Commodity Agreements’, Quarterly Journal of

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CHAPTER FIVE AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN SUGAR

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»‘l 40'“

In this chapter, we will adopt a partial equlibrium, comparative

this typo of analysis has proved very useful in the literature, and can shed considerable light on important agricultural issues.' * The

« Agricultui^l Policy and International Trade in Sugar JT

1

static type of analysis to study the different agricultural policies i

■

operated today and how they influence international trade in commodi-

ties in general, and in sugar, in particular. Despite its shortcomings,

presentation will assume two countries, an exporter (country e) and an

importer (country m), both of which produce sugar under free trade con­ ditions and there are initially no transport costs. The first trade \

barrier we consider is the one most commonly used, the tariff,

r F

In Fig.5-1, the free trade equilibrium at price *

** i-

implies trade at the level Qp» The imposition of the tariff, T, f

reduces quantity traded to Qy: in the exporting country e, quantity

supplied falls by yz, but quantity demanded increases by wx; in the

-t

importing country m, quantity supplied rises by ab, but the quantity

demanded falls by cd. Assuming that the marginal utility of money is ■

constant across the too countries, and that the income effects of a ;r’ ( )

change in the price of sugar are negligible' \ the gains and losses

from the tariff may be summed as follows: consumers in country e gain P EilP I, while producers lose f. consumers in country m lose

* The most obvious example is the continuing controversy over the UKs

replacement of the Deficiency Payment Schemes operated since the I 1930s as the means of farm income support by the European Economic Community’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). See, in particular, -ü T.E.Oosling, Agriculture and Britain's Policy Dilemma, Thames Essay

I

No.2, Trade Policy Research Centre, 1970; and T.E.Josling et al, j Burdens and Benefits of Farm Support Policies, Agricultural Trade

Paper No.1, Trace Policy Research Centro, 1972. 1

** The latter assumption is quite plausible given the relatively small , expenditure on sugar by households compared with total income.

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while producers gain f the government in m gains

f»g* K ’l* in tariff revenues. It may be shown that the summation yields a "deadweight" loss equal to nrt in the central, trade graph, this loss

being apportioned nrs to the importer (since consumers now pay higher prices) and srt to the exporter ( since the producers now receive lower prices)« Note also that transfer payments to the government of the importing country m equal the rectangle vntu (quantity traded multiplied by tariff rate).

The tariff analysed here could be either an ad valorem tariff or a specific tariff. Similarly, transportation costs are analogous to a tariff in terms of deadweight loss, although they yield no revenues to the government. Figure 5.1 could be used to demonstrate equally well the effects of a quota imposed by the importing country. If the quota set equals QT, the effects, in terms of price changes from the equilibrium free trade situation, are exactly as for the tariff T, The deadweight loss is also exactly as before, but the distribution of government

revenues is different; there are no such revenues. The suppliers in the exporting country 0 receive the full sum which previously accrued to the government in tn. Should the government in e be the export agent, it receives these revenues; should the government in m auction the quota QT competitively, then it receives the revenues and the tariff and quota become exactly equivalent. Under the United States Sugar Act, quotas were allocated to "friendly" foreign suppliers. Since the exporting

governments were usually also the export agents, the revenues from possess-?

("M" ) -I

ion of a quota passed on to them. ' Under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement * It is, therefore, hardly surprising to discover that such governments

expended large sums of money in lobbying in Washington for the mainte­ nance or expansion of quotas. F.O.Licht reports that Brazil, for example, paid /180,000 in 1973 to its agent in Washington. See F.O. Licht, International Sugar Newsletter, Ratzeburg, Germany, Dec.1974.

^'1

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the Sugar Boards were,effectively,the export agents of the respective ;

governments, which therefore benefited From holding such sugar quotas, ] The European Economic Community protects its domestic beet sugar

industry with a fairly recent type of agricultural policy, a variable -

levy on imports. This is shown in Figure 5.2, where pTH refers to the .1

threshold price, and Qtg is quantity traded under the levy with threshold j

TH Ï

price Pg . The EEC decides upon a minimum import or "threshold" price; pfH. If this price is less than the free-trade equilibrium price (as ^

happened dur ng the commodity price boom years of 1973 and 1974), it has %

no impact, e.g. in our diagram. Should this price, however, exceed

the equilbrium price e.g. in Fig.5.2, imports are restricted to

that quantity entering at this price, Q^2* The effect may again be

interpreted as being exactly equivalent to a tariff of magnitude pt) Because the EEC demands competitive bidding on the quantity .to be imported at price P^^, all of the government revenues accrue to the EEC and none to tho exporting country's government. In the recent past (before 1973 ^ and from 1975 onwards), the threshold price for sugar was fixed by the EEC at a level such as at which no imports occurred. Under the Lome ^ Convention, a prohibitive variable levy exists, but export quotas have been allocated to those countries which were the exporting parties under T the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement.

We will now expand briefly on the operations by any agency in

intervention buying. The objectives are usually to support farm prices | and incomes, and the agencies are generally subsidised. The purchasing operations of this type of organisation are shown in Fig,5.3, in which

# For further details on the various prices existing under the CAP, see below.

o in

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"144#" .;3 ■rff

1

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«*145r

/

\

146- g

a hypothetical agency is empowered to purchase any amount oF the commodity i at a flow price, P|_» Wo thus obtain a perfectly elastic demand curve at Pj_, so that the total demand curve facing farmers becomes the sum of the

agency*3 demand curve and the normal downward-sloping domestic demand % curve' '; this is shown as the curve FGH. The agency can therefore

expect to purchase the quantity be at the intervention price P , Domestic i demand falls by bd, domestic output rises by ac, and an export (stored) surplus of be is created. Note that 0^$ S^, and are domestic demand, domestic supply, and world supply curves ( the last curve is perfectly elastic at the world free market price of Py). After the imposition of a variable import levy equal to P^Pw, the world supply curve becomes

% + I * In comparison with the free world market pricing situation, | farmers’ incomes increase by (OP, »0„ 0P,,,.0_) _{L. Lf UJ d} « but net incomes increase by the amounts in the areas (A 4- B + C + H + 3), Clearly, continuous | intervention involves a cost to consumers in the form of higher prices (Pj_. instead of P^); the loss in consumer surplus is (A -f B 4- H + 3 4- I + G 4- F 4 5). Since purchasing costs of produce into intervention may not be fully recoverable from sales, the liability to the Exchequer is equal to the amount in the areas (B 4- C 4- D + E 4- F 4 G 4* H 4 L 4 K ) ^

The variable import levy is generally associated with the Common Agricultural Policy of the EEC, The threshold price set for imported produce is the lowest price at which imports can enter the EEC. After the addition of transport costs from the ports to different markets, the threshold price reaches a target price. The variable import levy that is For a useful survey of the CAP, see ’The Economics of Agricultural Policy’, by D.Colman and 3 .Ficlnerney, in Current Issues in Economic Policy, (eds.) P.M.Grant and G.K.Shaw, Philip Allan, Oxford 19^5, Since consumers pay a higher price, there will be a fall in real incomes; the exact effects of this fall will depend on the proportion of income spent on sugar, and on the price elasticity of demand for sugarI the actual amount spent has changed form Oq.OPy to Ob'OP^»

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In document Capacidades en ciencia y tecnología del sector agropecuario colombiano 2012 (página 52-57)