You have to remember that in many ways this is not a government, but a PR agency with fabulous offices. And as with all PR, you are at the mercy of public opinion as it shifts course. Sometimes it tugs you both ways, and you end up doing the splits, very painfully (Hoggart 2012, Simon Hoggart Diaries The Guardian ).
Although this somewhat cynical comment was directed at the UK’s Cameron government in 2012, it could quite easily sum up one of the emerging characteristics of government in New South Wales from the 1990s onwards, where public relations, media management and the marketing of government became an integral part of day-to-day governance (Ward 2003). Neville Wran, the Labor Premier of NSW from 1976-1986, has been credited with being the first premier in Australia to realize the potential of media management as a way of marketing government to the public (Tiernan and Weller 2010; Young 2004). Since then, the expansion of public relations and communications into day-to-day policy and politics in Australia has led some commentators to say that Australia has been in danger of becoming a PR state, ‘characterised by an army of media advisers and the siphoning of public money into polling, marketing, advertising and media monitoring’ (Young 2004, p.1; see also Ward 2003).
In NSW a further significant expansion of media management practices took place under the successive Premierships of the Hon. Bob Carr (1995 – 2005), mirroring the media strategies of the UK Labour governments led by Tony Blair and his Communications Director, Alistair Campbell (1997-2007).59 The NSW Premier
was seen by this project’s interviewees and by political commentators alike to be a very skilful and astute media relations’ manager who believed that control over both politicians’ and public servants’ communications and ‘staying on message’ was vital to successful government and administration. Clune (2005) in his review of the Premiership of Bob Carr remarked that ‘his desire to lead, shape – and his critics say - manipulate the public debate, is inexhaustible. He had a strong media team and
59 The extent and ferocity of media management in the UK was satirised in The Thick of It a British political
comedy that centred on role of political media advisers and was supposedly based on Alistair Campbell who was the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Director of Communications. An Australian version The Hollow Men was equally scathing about the superficiality of public relations experts and their influence on policy.
each minister had a strong army of specialized press secretaries’ (p.51). Clune argues that the Premier took a hands-on approach to his ministerial team and their dealings with the press. Young (2004) states that the Premier, along with his chief of staff Bruce Hawker and head of communications Dave Britton, managed a tight, centralized communications strategy.60 During this time media advisors became central to governance. According to Ward (2003), advisers ‘occupy a key role between the ministers, government departments and the media, they overview the monitoring of media output, any oral and written information from policy stakeholders and from all of this put together information for policy and political responses’ (p.30). 61
A 2002 feature article by journalist Paola Totaro (aptly titled Come in Spinner) provides details of the input of the Premier on the media strategy and how it worked in practice. She describes how his concerns with the media shaped the Premier’s day:
In less than an hour, he devours the day's newspapers, follows radio talkback debate, formulates - and rehearses - a junior minister's radio response to a controversial issue and rings another senior minister to discuss yet another controversy (Totaro 2002 p.1).
According to Totaro (2002), the Premier‘s staff were actively engaged in ringing news rooms, talkback radio and individual journalists to offer a ‘grab’ on current issues as well as occasionally suggesting an introductory print paragraph. Clune (2005) also argues that the Premier himself took an interest in monitoring all ministers to make sure they performed well, which involved keeping a diary of their media performances and commenting on them (p.51). However, media monitoring was not confined to watching over individuals but included all aspects of policy, it
60 Bruce Hawker has a long association with both the NSW and Federal Labor Party. He left Carr’s team in
1997 and established his own private PR consultancy firm with Dave Britton - Hawker-Britton, specializing in ‘government relation, financial communications, strategic advice, and issues management’ (Young 2004, p.63). Young notes that Hawker and Britton in 1999 were described as two of the best political strategists in Australia, and as two of the most influential people in politics (Young 2004: 63).
61 A number of Labor party political careers were also launched from working as a media advisor Graeme
Wedderburn (who is still one of Bob Carr’s senior political advisors) joined Hawker Britton for a while in the late 1990s before he returned to work for Carr (Young 2004). By 2002 Amanda Lampe, had become the Premier's principal media adviser. She eventually moved on to become Prime Minister Gillard’s chief of staff, and then was considered for the position of ALP National Secretary (Totaro 2002; Coorey 2011). Walt Secord who became Director of Communications held the position from 1997-2003, he then joined Hawker Britton and was later to become chief of staff for Hon Kevin Rudd in his move to head the Labor Party and then Prime Minister, and Secord himself is now a Member of New South Wales’ Legislative Council ( Keane 2008 ).
8. In the court of Carr: Media, politics and policy covered departmental activity, and in many government departments media units were consolidated and professionalised to engage in proactive media strategies (see the discussion of the work of media units in chapter three). The media monitoring service Rehame provided twenty-four hour monitoring so that media advisors, teams and politicians could be ready to react to any news both positive and negative (Totaro 2002). By 2002 the Sydney Morning Herald reported that the government had 19 ministers who between them had 23 media advisors (Totaro 2002). Media advisors, formerly called press secretaries, were generally either ex political journalists, or were from corporate marketing and advertising, or from public relations (Totaro 2002; Young 2004). Although it appears no precise figures were available publicly in 2002 Totaro calculated that ninety nine media and marketing positions in the public service - costing $7.63 million a year - were advertised and filled in NSW in 2001/2002 (Totaro 2002)62. Totaro describes in detail the expansion of media management across public service departments:
…each of the big four departments - transport, police, education and health - has an executive director of communication and each earns between $138,000 and $160,000 a year. Many of them head up PR branches of 30 or more media people. Employed as public servants (their contracts are not tied directly to the life of the Government), they nevertheless play pivotal political roles because they are often the main contact point between the ministerial press secretaries and the bureaucracy (Totaro 2004 not paginated).
In Clune’s opinion the Carr government became a ‘media machine’ which ‘pounces on stories…to either give early extra oxygen to positive stories’ and or ‘suffocate the negatives’, where the media staff, ‘maintain a steady stream of stories trying to take up all media time and marginalize other views’ (2005, p.51). Premier Carr was described at the time in the media as a ‘master of damage control by distraction’, who was able to pull ‘out a controversial new policy or appointment to divert the public spotlight from the drama’ (Sydney Morning Herald 9th September 2002, cited in Clune 2005, p.58). And, that, ‘when a decision is badly received or a crisis emerges, the government’s first response is a barrage to soften opposition or deflect the electorate’s attention’ (Clune 2005, p.52). Tiffen (2004) in his analysis of media coverage of police corruption in the 1980s and 1990s in New
62 The comparative value placed on a good communications officers can be gauged by the salary of Paul
Willoughby, Director of the NSW Police Media Unit who earned far more than senior police officers during his brief term of office in 2005/2006 (Sunday Telegraph 16th July 2006).
South Wales says that the scandal and drama surrounding the police and revelations from the Royal Commission Into Police put a lot of pressure on the Carr government after it took office to contain the damaging fall out, and in turn provided opportunities to positively promote the police and the criminal justice system in general (Tiffen 2004, see also McGovern 2005 for her history of police/media relations in NSW).