CAPITULO UNICO

Rebel Territorial Control Hypotheses

Proposition 2 suggests that community collective action capacity increases territorial control under conditions in which the community expects little or no protection and access to basic services from the state or local power brokers, but that collective ac- tion capacity decreases territorial control in conditions under which the community expects greater benefits associated with ousting rebels from the village. Especially be- cause of the national government’s concurrent expanding state-building and economic development efforts and transition to population-centric COIN, the state represents the primary outside option for communities to obtain protection and services. I test the accountability theory’s proposed conditional effect of collective action capacity, using the Good Governance Index (GGI): the central government’s performance rat- ings for the Local Government Units (LGU), the municipality-level administrative unit. The GGI is designed to measure the quality of service provision and adminis- tration in the municipality, as defined above.

Hypothesis 1. Collective Action Capacity, Local Government Performance, and NPA Territorial Control:

CPP-NPA territorial control increases with village social cohesion (bridging) in areas with low LGU performance. The positive correlation between village social cohesion (bridging) and CPP-NPA territorial control declines as the LGU performance in- creases, and reverses direction when LGU performance is sufficiently high.

Because the quality of local government services may be endogenous to conflict processes and/or community social structure, I also investigate the conditional rela- tionship by examining the geographic and temporal trends in the relationship between

community social cohesion and observed territorial control. The theory predicts that the positive effect of community social cohesion on rebel territorial control will be greatest in areas and during time periods in which the government administrative capacity is particularly low and in which the counterinsurgents use primarily enemy- centric tactics.

The observed panel of the AFP’s data on CPP-NPA territorial control corre- sponds to the shift from enemy-centric to population-centric COIN under the IPSP- Bayanihan. Therefore, state-building efforts and population-centric COIN increase and expand into the periphery over time during the panel. The Aquino administration accompanied the shift in COIN tactics with investments to extend anti-poverty and economic development programs, reform local governance, and other state-building efforts to peripheral communities increases over the course of the panel.

Hypothesis 2. Temporal Trends:

At the beginning of the observed panel (2011), village social cohesion will increase CPP-NPA territorial control. The positive correlation between village social cohesion and CPP-NPA territorial control will decline in magnitude and reverse direction from year-to-year over the course of the panel.

In areas close to the central government’s centers of power, especially the major political and economic centers in the National Capital Region and Cebu, the theory expects the effect of collective action capacity on CPP-NPA territorial control to be negative. For regions with a long history of state penetration into society, in which the government has developed a strong service-delivery infrastructure, communities on average have greater incentive to use their bargaining power to deter rebel entry. In areas distant from the government’s centers of power, where the state has mini- mal presence or a history of neglect, the theory expects the effect of collective action

capacity to be positive.

Hypothesis 3. Regional Trends:

In regions furthest from centers of state power, village social cohesion increases CPP- NPA territorial control. In regions closest to centers of state power, social cohesion decreases CPP-NPA territorial control.

Finally, it is worth clarifying that, whether or not conflict process also influence subsequent community social cohesion and organizational structure, the accountabil- ity theory implies pre-existing community collective action capacity has an inde- pendent effect on rebel decision-making regarding investment in territorial control. Though the quantitative data do not include village-level communist control measures prior to the family networks in order to examine endogeneity in the quantitative data, the claim underlying the exogenous effect of collective action capacity is testable in the qualitative analysis of interview data.

Hypothesis 4. Exogenous Collection Action Capacity:

1. Village experts report that CPP-NPA personnel intentionally seek out, and may be dependent on, pre-existing social and leadership structures to exert territorial control.

2. Village experts report that pre-existing social and leadership networks in the community facilitate communication with, organize support for, and influence/manage relationships with CPP-NPA personnel attempting or establishing territorial control.

Rebel Governance Hypotheses

Proposition 1 predicts that community collective action capacity generally increases rebel governance, with the exception of villages exposed to severe government ne- glect or repression (for example, villages exposed to the Lost Command or other military-perpetrated indiscriminate violence). Precisely because the theory implies the underlying relationship between collective action capacity and governance costs affects rebel territorial control in the first place, the observable relationship between collective action capacity and the level of rebel governance is not clear-cut. The in- crease in the demand for rebel governance has a deterrent effect on the NPA unit’s decision whether, or to what extent, to invest the resources to control territory in the village. In other words, the theory implies that full range of variation in rebel governance is not necessarily observable in the empirical record, because villages with high community collective action capacity are less likely to experience rebel territorial control necessary to observe the level of governance. Therefore, tracing the causal process in selected village cases represents an especially critical method to empirically test the accountability theory’s mechanisms.

The accountability theory implies that, in communities with adequate outside options, collective action capacity increases rebel governance by enhancing commu- nity bargaining power to demand better protection from civil war violence and access to basic services in exchange for material support. The theory predicts that village experts will describe NPA investment in governance activities to appease the local population and “win hearts and minds” in response to organized capacity for collective action. Local leadership may communicate, even pressure, NPA personnel to adopt particular policies or actions during periods in which they operate in surrounding territory. NPA personnel may consult local leaders to negotiate a revolutionary tax rate, limit recruitment of child soldiers, and exercise restraint regarding the use of

civilian-targeted violence as punishment for individuals supporting the government. In areas exposed to state repression or extreme neglect, the theory expects lower levels of rebel governance. The community may be willing to sacrifice resources or protect valuable information in defiance of counterinsurgents without the quid pro quo expectation of rebel governance.

Hypothesis 5. Collective Action Capacity and Rebel Governance:

1. In villages with a history of military abuses (repression) or extremely low levels of pre-insurgency state service provision (neglect), village experts will report weak or no CPP-NPA investment in governance during periods of rebel control. Village experts may express the virtues of NPA presence and willingness to collaborate with CPP-NPA without expectation of governance.

2. In villages with at least moderate state capacity to provide protection and ser- vices, village experts will report CPP-NPA investment in governance traceable to community pressure. Village experts may report CPP-NPA consultation with community members regarding insurgents’ presence in the community, access to resources, and/or established public order.