Rosario Vda. De Andrade (Rosario) was the registered owner of four parcels of land known as Lots 17, 18, 19, and 20situated in Cebu City (subject properties) which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed by one Simon Diu (Simon).When the redemption period was about to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan (Bobby) who agreed to redeem the subject properties. Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her son, Proceso Andrade, Jr.
(Proceso, Jr.), for P100,000.00 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Saledated April 29, 1983 (subject deed of sale). On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests over the subject properties in consideration of P50,000.00.
The Deed of Assignment was signed by, among others, Henry Andrade (Henry), one of Rosario’s sons, as instrumental witness. Notwithstanding the aforementioned Deed of Assignment, Bobby extended an Option to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr., giving the latter until 7:00 in the evening of July 31, 1984 to purchase the same for the sum of P310,000.00. When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs therefor were issued in his name.
Fourteen years later, Rosario’s children (petitioners in Gr. No. 172017) filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of deeds of conveyance and damages against Bobby before the RTC. In their complaint, one of the arguments they maintain is that, since the subject properties were inherited by them from their father, Proceso Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light, they argued that they remained as co-owners of the subject properties together with Bobby, despite the issuance of the TCTs in his name.
The RTC ruled that the subject transaction was an equitable mortgage, that the subject properties were exclusive properties of Rosario, and that the action has already prescribed. The CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling except that it reversed its finding as to the nature of the properties.
The CA held that the properties were conjugal.
Issue: Whether the nature of the subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario thereby allowing her to dispose of the same without any inhibitions or whether they pertain to the conjugal properties of Rosario and her deceased husband thereby entitling the children to retain their ownership therewith.
Held: The subject properties are exclusive properties of Rosario.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title over the subject properties were issued on September 28, 1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of legal age, widow, Filipino." Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were procured during the coverture of their parents or that the same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed parcels of land in the
subject deed of salewas not disputed by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same.
Hence, by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s finding that the subject properties were exclusive or sole properties of Rosario.
Rationale: Article 160 of the Civil Code xxx states that "[a]ll property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply, the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily prove that the property was indeed acquired during the marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane:
x x x As a condition sine qua non for the operation of [Article 160] in favor of the conjugal partnership, the party who invokes the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage.
In other words, the presumption in favor of conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, the presumption may be rebutted only with strong, clear, categorical and convincing evidence. There must be strict proof of the exclusive ownership of one of the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting it.
Succession Case Digest Tiggangay vs. Judge Wacas, April 1, 2013
Facts:
During the May 14, 2007 election, Tiggangay and Dagadag ran for a mayoralty position at Tanudan, Kalinga. Tiggangay lost at a slim margin of 158 votes. Following Dagadag’s proclamation, Tiggangay filed an electoral protest and the case was raffled to the sala of Judge Wacas. Judge wacas ruled in favour of Dagadag with a modification that Tiggangay actually lost by 97 votes. On appeal to the COMELEC Second Division, the RTC decision was affirmed. The COMELEC En Banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration.
It was then at this point that Tiggangay filed his verified letter-complaint charging Judge Wacas with Impropriety and Partiality. He alleged that he learned that Judge Wacas is Dagadag’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s aunt is married to an uncle of Dagadag. The Court Administrator recommended the dismissal of the complaint which was concurred in by the CA.
Issue:
3. How does a person become a relative by affinity or consanguinity according to the provisions of the New Civil Code and Family Code?
4. Whether the invocation of the said affinity or relationship of Dagadag (the winning candidate) to that of Judge Wacas (who rendered the decision on the electoral protest) is true, and if in the affirmative, does it have a material bearing to actually indict the said Judge for impropriety and partiality and even, to prevent him from hearing the electoral protest?
Held:
3. Affinity denotes ―the relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse.‖ It is a relationship by marriage or a familial relation resulting from marriage. It is a fictive kinship, a fiction created by law in connection with the institution of marriage and family relations. Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by affinity, therefore, are those commonly referred to as ―in-laws,‖
or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like.
Affinity may also be defined as ―the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that marriage makes husband and wife one.
The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife’s blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa.‖ Indeed, ―there is no affinity between the blood relatives of one spouse and the blood relatives of the other. A husband is related by affinity to his wife’s brother, but not to the wife of his wife’s brother. There is no affinity between the husband’s brother and the wife’s sister; this is called affinitas affinitatis.‖
4. In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of
Dagadag that Judge Wacas is the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree. But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag. In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’
aunt, like Judge Wacas. In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election Case No. 40.
Case Digest in Property Las Pinas City on July 10, 1979 while a Deed of Absolute Sale was also executed between the two parties, together with another co-purchaser, over Lot 21. These lands were covered by TCTs but were never registered in the name of the spouses even after full payment of the loan contracted by the spouses with the Development Bank of the Philippines and the further cancellation of the real estate mortgage over Lot 20 which stood to secure the loan obtained by the spouses from the said bank.
Angelito Opinion on the other hand, maintains that he became the owner of the subject lots through an extrajudicial foreclosure sale when the Gorospes failed in their obligation to pay the loan contracted by them with the former on January 12, 1995. The TCTs that were acquired by Opinion through said extrajudicial foreclosure sale were later on cancelled and new ones issued in his name. Opinion avers that he never questioned the title of the Gorospes and the continued settlement of Spouses Vilbar was tolerated because of his knowledge that the same is just for tenancy.
The trial court ruled in favor of Opinion and the CA concurred therewith. Thus, this petition.
Issue: Who between the parties has a better right over the subject lots?
Held: The Court ruled in favor of Opinion.
xxx the Court recognizes "[t]he settled rule that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a prior unregistered sale. This result is a necessary consequence of the fact that the [properties] involved [were] duly covered by the Torrens system which works under the fundamental principle that registration is the operative act which gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land."
This Court also treats Opinion as a buyer in good faith. Admittedly, Opinion stated that prior to the execution of the mortgage, he only went to Lots 20 and 21 once and saw that the properties had occupants. He likewise admitted that he never talked to the spouses Vilbar and Guingon to determine the nature of their possession of the properties, but merely relied on the representation of Gorospe, Sr. that the occupants were mere tenants. He never bothered to request for any kind of proof, documentary or otherwise, to confirm this claim. Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the CA that Opinion is not required to go beyond the Torrens title, viz:
Contrary to the [Spouses Vilbar’s] claim, [Opinion] was never remiss in his duty of ensuring that the Gorospes had clean title over the property. [Opinion] had even conducted an investigation.
He had, in this regard, no reason not to believe in the assurance of the Gorospes, more so that the claimed right of [Spouses Vilbar] was never annotated on the certificate of title covering lot 20, because it is settled that a party dealing with a registered land does not have to inquire beyond the Certificate of Title in determining the true owner thereof, and in guarding or protecting his interest, for all that he has to look into and rely on are the entries in the Certificate of Title.87
Inarguably, Opinion acted in good faith in dealing with the registered owners of the properties.
He relied on the titles presented to him, which were confirmed by the Registry of Deeds to be authentic, issued in accordance with the law, and without any liens or encumbrances
G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014 MAGDALENA T. VILLASI, Petitioner, vs.
FILOMENO GARCIA, substituted by his heirs, namely, ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, LIZA GARCIA-GONZALEZ, THERESA GARCIA-TIANGSON, MARIVIC H. GARCIA, MARLENE GARCIA-MOMIN, GERARDO H. GARCIA, GIDEON H. GARCIA and GENEROSO H. GARCIA, and ERMELINDA H. GARCIA, Respondents
Facts:
Sometime in 1990, Petitioner Villasi engaged the services of Fil-Garcia Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N.
Domingo Street, Cubao, Quezon City. FGCI alleged that there was failure on Villasi’s part to pay the accomplishment billings so the former filed a suit for collection of sum of money against the latter. Villasi, on her part, maintains that it was FGCI that failed to complete the construction of the said building. The trial court ruled in favour of FGCI. On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court’s ruling and even found that Villasi paid an excess amount to FGCI. After the judgment became final and executory, Villasi moved for the execution of the judgment in her favour. The sheriff, in order to satisfy the judgment levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 379193 and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia). The Spouses Garcia then filed a terceria in order to assert their rights as third party claimants.
Issue: When there is a clear showing that the land in question is owned by the third party claimants (Spouses Garcia) while the building thereon is owned by the FGCI, does ownership vests only upon one of them?
Held: No. While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, that is, the ownership of the property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially,32 such rule is not without exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld. In a number of cases, we recognized the separate ownership of the land from the building and brushed aside the rule that accessory follows the principal.
In Carbonilla v. Abiera,we denied the claim of petitioner that, as the owner of the land, he is likewise the owner of the building erected thereon, for his failure to present evidence to buttress his position:
To set the record straight, while petitioner may have proven his ownership of the land, as there can be no other piece of evidence more worthy of credence than a Torrens certificate of title, he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his claim of ownership or right to the possession of the building. Like the CA, we cannot accept the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Residential Building) with Waiver and Quitclaim of Ownership executed by the Garcianos as proof that petitioner acquired ownership of the building. There is no showing that the Garcianos were the owners of the building or that they had any proprietary right over it. Ranged against respondents’ proof of possession of the building since 1977, petitioner’s evidence pales in comparison and leaves us totally unconvinced.34
xxx
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are
factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.
G.R. No. 193517 January 15, 2014
THE HEIRS OF VICTORINO SARILI, NAMELY: ISABEL A. SARILI,* MELENCIA** S.
MAXIMO, ALBERTO A. SARILI, IMELDA S. HIDALGO, all herein represented by CELSO A.
SARILI, Petitioners, vs.
PEDRO F. LAGROSA, represented in this act by his Attorney-in-Fact LOURDES LABIOS MOJICA,Respondent
Facts:
Respondent Lagrosa claims that he is the owner of a certain parcel of land situated in Caloocan City covered by a TCT and that, he has been reliosiously paying the real estate taxes therefor since its acquisition on November 29, 1974. He further alleged that he is a resident of California and that during his vacation in the Philippiens, he discovered that a new certificate of title of the subject property was issued in the name of Victorino married to Isabel Amparo by virtue of a executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 20, 1992 notwithstanding the fact that there has been an irregularity in the acknowledgement made before the Notary Public.
Issue: Whether Spouses Sarili, in building a house on the subject property of the case, having knowledge of the fact of the irregularity in their Deed of Sale, may be considered as builders in good faith within the contemplation of the New Civil Code?
Held: The Spouses are not builders in good faith.
The Court, however, finds a need to remand the case to the court a quo in order to determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house Sps. Sarili had built59 on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Article 449 in relation to Articles 450, 451, 452, and the first paragraph of Article 546 of the Civil Code which respectively read as follows:
ART. 449. He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.
ART. 450. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, planted or sown in bad faith may demand the demolition of the work, or that the planting or sowing be removed, in order to replace things in their former condition at the expense of the person who built, planted or sowed;
or he may compel the builder or planter to pay the price of the land, and the sower the proper rent.
ART. 451. In the cases of the two preceding articles, the landowner is entitled to damages from the builder, planter or sower.
ART. 452. The builder, planter or sower in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for the necessary expenses of preservation of the land.
x x x x
ART. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
x x x x
To be deemed a builder in good faith, it is essential that a person asserts title to the land on which he builds, i.e. , that he be a possessor in concept of owner, and that he be unaware that
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.60 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and
there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.60 Good faith is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and