CARACTERÍSTICAS DEL ARTÍCULO DE OPINIÓN O INDICADORES PARA VALORARLO

______________________________________________________________________________________________________ Little or Considerable or

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: no extent Some extent very great extent

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Fair Treatment on the Job (weighted mean = 3.2):

In the past 2 years, to what extent do you believe you have been treated fairly regarding the following?

a. Career advancement 39.1 23.9 37.0 b. Awards 31.3 29.7 39.1 c. Training 28.4 31.0 40.6 d. Performance appraisals 17.8 26.0 56.2 e. Job assignments 21.5 26.8 51.7 f. Discipline 24.4 21.4 54.2 g. Pay 22.5 30.3 47.3

FACTOR ANALYSIS: Factor loadings are between .68 and .79 and Cronbach’s alpha = .87.

Table 1 (continued)

______________________________________________________________________________________________________ Don’t Know Minimal Moderate or

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: or no extent extent great extent

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Supervisory Fairness (weighted mean = 3.4):

To what extent do you think your supervisor will exercise each of the following authorities in a fair and effective manner?

Supervisor rates qualifications of job applicants fairly and effectively. 14.7 14.0 71.4 Supervisor selects people for vacancies or promotions fairly and effectively. 16.3 16.3 67.4 Supervisor determines pay increases and awards fairly and effectively. 23.2 21.0 55.7 Supervisor sets employees’ pay within broad pay bands fairly and effectively. 41.6 17.3 41.1 Supervisor handles adverse actions fairly and effectively. 35.4 20.9 43.7

FACTOR ANALYSIS: Factor loadings are between .73 and .85 and Cronbach’s alpha = .85.

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Table 1 (continued)

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Disagree Neither Agree

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Trust in Immediate Supervisor (weighted mean = 3.7):

I trust my supervisor to do the following:

a. Fairly assess my performance and contributions. 13.2 15.4 71.4 b. Support me in pay and award discussions with upper management. 19.2 22.1 58.7

c. Listen fairly to my concerns. 14.1 14.8 71.1

d. Apply discipline fairly and only when justified. 16.3 19.7 64.1 e. Clearly communicate conduct expectations. 15.8 17.5 66.7

f. Act with integrity. 11.6 16.7 71.7

g. Refrain from favoritism. 22.7 18.6 58.7

h. Keep me informed. 21.2 18.0 60.8

FACTOR ANALYSIS: Factor loadings are between .87 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96.

Table 1 (continued)

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Disagree Neither Agree

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Trust in Upper Management (weighted mean = 3.4):

I trust managers above my immediate supervisor to:

a. Clearly communicate organizational performance expectations. 21.8 22.5 55.7 b. Fairly assess my performance and contributions. 23.6 26.6 49.8

c. Listen fairly to my concerns. 23.1 25.7 51.2

d. Apply discipline fairly and only when justified. 21.0 29.2 49.8

e. Act with integrity. 17.4 24.1 58.5

f. Refrain from favoritism. 30.7 27.1 42.2

g. Keep the organization informed. 24.1 25.0 50.9

FACTOR ANALYSIS: Factor loadings are between .88 and .92 and Cronbach’s alpha = .96.

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Table 1 (continued)

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INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: Disagree Neither Agree

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Organizational Culture (weighted mean = 3.5):

Recognition and rewards are based on performance in my work unit. 29.9 25.1 45.0 My organization takes steps to ensure that employees are appropriately 34.8 27.5 37.7 paid and rewarded.

Information is shared freely in my work unit. 22.3 17.6 60.1 At the place I work, my opinions seem to count. 21.3 24.0 54.7 A spirit of cooperation and teamwork exists in my work unit. 19.2 15.8 65.0 My work unit responds flexibly to changing conditions. 14.0 18.5 67.6 I am treated with respect in my work unit. 11.0 12.3 76.7

FACTOR ANALYSIS: Factor loadings are between .66 and .83 and Cronbach’s alpha = .88.

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Note. Agreement response categories were combined as follows: Disagree = Disagree and Strongly Disagree; Neither = Neither Agree Nor Disagree; and Agree = Agree and Strongly Agree. Descriptive statistics were calculated using the U.S. MSPB sampling weight variable and figures are shown in percentages. Reduced sample includes General Schedule employees only.

Logit Results

Table 2 presents the multivariate logit results in the form of logit coefficients, z-statistics, and odds-ratios. The percent change column translates logit coefficients into expected percentage point impacts using the prchange function in STATA software (Long & Freese, 2001). Coefficients for most key factors expected to influence pay for performance beliefs had the predicted sign and the majority were statistically significant at the .001 level.

Employee attitudes regarding the performance evaluation system, perceived fairness, and organizational culture proved to be highly influential in leading employees to believe that better performance results in more pay. Logit coefficients for these key attitudinal variables were positive and statistically significant at .001, holding all other variables constant. Employees who expressed positive perceptions of their performance evaluation system were 9.0 percentage points more likely to believe in pay for

performance. Respondents who felt they were treated fairly regarding personnel decisions were 16.2 percentage points more likely to believe that better performance leads to more pay. Employees with positive perceptions of supervisory fairness regarding pay for performance decisions were 4.4 percentage points more likely to believe in pay for performance. Employees who portrayed their organizational culture in a positive light were 13.7 percentage points more likely to believe that better performance leads to more pay. Overall, positive employee attitudes in these areas significantly

increased the likelihood of pay for performance belief among federal workers.

The impact of trust in decision-makers on pay for performance belief was the only hypothesis not supported by the data. Although previous research found a significant

positive relationship between pay for performance perceptions and employee trust in supervisors (Folger & Konovsky, 1989), trust in top management (Vest et. al, 2000), and trust in all decision-makers (St-Onge, 2000), this relationship did not hold up in my multivariate logit model. The logit coefficient for trust in immediate supervisors was negative and the coefficient for trust in upper managers was positive. After controlling for other variables, trust at both levels of decision-making proved to be extremely weak with logit coefficients lacking any statistical significance. Despite these disappointing statistical results, the importance of gaining employee trust to enable pay for performance strategies to succeed warrants further study of this concept in the future.

Although I had no expectations regarding demographic variables, a significant relationship was found between pay for performance belief and age, education, salary, and race. Older federal workers were significantly more likely to believe that better performance leads to more pay (p < .05). Employees with high school diplomas (or equivalent) and bachelor’s degrees were 8.8 and 11.1 percentage points more likely than comparable employees with doctorate degrees to believe in pay for performance

respectively, while other levels of education lacked a significant relationship with pay for performance belief. Salary was the strongest predictor of pay for performance belief: employees with higher salaries were significantly more likely to believe better

performance results in greater pay (p < .001). Whites were 9.9 percentage points more likely than comparable Asians to believe in pay for performance. However, there was no statistically significant difference between whites and other minorities in this study. None of the coefficients on the remaining variables (male, federal service, supervisor, union) were statistically significant.

A great deal of variation occurred among agency variables. Among the 23 agencies included in this study, the Merit Principles Survey of 2005 revealed 12 negative and 11 positive agency logit coefficients, with 14 achieving statistical significance. Employees working for Agriculture, General Services Administration (GSA), Homeland Security (DHS), Interior, Justice, State Department, Transportation (DOT), and Veterans Affairs (VA) were all significantly less likely than U.S. OPM employees to believe in the promise of pay for performance. These results are especially damaging to the

Department of Homeland Security where a pay for performance system already exists. Results indicate that Homeland Security employees are 15.2 percentage points less likely than comparable workers at U.S. OPM to believe better performance leads to more pay. On a more positive note, employees working for Commerce, Air Force, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Labor, Social Security Administration (SSA), and Treasury were all significantly more likely than U.S. OPM employees to believe that better

performance results in more pay. The fact that three out of four logit coefficients were positive (with one statistically significant) suggests that the Defense Department’s new pay for performance program enjoyed greater success in 2005 than the program at Homeland Security. In particular, Air Force employees were 16.5 percentage points more likely to believe in pay for performance than comparable employees at U.S. OPM. In view of the overall results, it is clear that the agency of employment can have a

significant impact on whether employees believe in the promise of pay for performance.