Características de la mediación comunitaria

The Indonesian government’s transmigration program, led by Suharto’s New Order Regime, has been an important force in shaping territorialisation and, through it, vulnerability in Dusun Simbar. With political pressure to relocate residents from overpopulated Java to the ‘under-developed’ outer islands, the state used volcanic eruptions as a mechanism to enlist participants. The relationship between transmigration and vulnerability to natural hazards demonstrates that the production of risk is in Rebotier’s (2012) words, ‘both material and discursive’. By making claims to land through spatially labelling areas ‘unsafe’, the state was able to relocate residents into transmigration sites. However, while this program aimed to move people away from hazards, it also influenced conditions of vulnerability for some in unexpected ways as will be discussed below.

The transmigration policy, which initially began in the early nineteenth century under Dutch colonial rule, aimed to relieve perceived population

pressures in Java, Madura and Bali by relocating residents to the archipelago’s less developed islands, namely Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and Papua (Eaton, 2005). While this program diminished towards the end of the colonial administration, following Indonesia’s independence its aims broadened to develop and integrate the outer islands into a united Indonesia (Eaton, 2005). While the transmigration program met significant resistance and shortcomings, including conflict between local residents and migrants in the transmigration sites and broken promises made by transmigration officials (van der Wijst, 1985), a downscaled version continues today that facilitates the relocation of Javanese farmers to the sites of oil palm plantations in Kalimantan (Potter, 2012). During the New Order Regime transmigration was conducted to assert state rule and ‘develop’ Indonesia’s more remote and ‘ungovernable’ areas. As Li (1999b) asserts ‘“Development” authorises state agencies to engage directly and openly in projects aimed at transformation and improvement’ (p. 297). While transmigration certainly reduced some exposure to volcanic risk in Dusun Simbar, it was also linked to the state’s plan to develop the outer islands using Javanese labour.

Following the 1979 eruption of the Timbang Crater Complex, residents of Dusun Simbar were subtly, though coercively, enlisted into Indonesia’s transmigration program. With the total destruction of Kepucukan Village and the loss of all its residents, Simbar became the closest village to the main Timbang Crater. Subsequently, in the weeks following the eruption it was officially ‘closed’ by the state in the interest of public safety. However, to offset this loss residents were offered five hectares of land to build a home and manage a rubber plantation if they transmigrated to Palembang, South Sumatra. With few alternatives, all but seven households transmigrated. Those who remained moved around the region lodging with relatives in the Banjarnegara and Wonosobo districts. However, for many, transmigration was not permanent. The state of the rubber plantations and the homes in South Sumatra varied considerably and many informants complained of the hard labour they expended to make their new abodes and farmland both liveable and productive. Combined with the oppressive heat and the

geographical isolation, many residents chose to return to Dusun Simbar by their own means. The first families returned just three months later while other families stayed on for a period of three years and some settled there indefinitely. Estimates from village officials suggest that about half of Dusun Simbar’s original population remain in Palembang.

While residents of Dusun Simbar were not technically ‘forced’ to join the transmigration program they found themselves temporarily excluded from their homes and fields as officials guarded the village. Many thereby had little choice other than to follow. Vandergeest et al. (2007) argue that development-induced displacement is coercive in nature and this may be expressed in violent or more subtle forms (see Barney, 2007; Jack, 2007; Szablowski, 2007). Likewise, while technically not compulsory, the majority of Simbar’s residents heeded state direction and transmigrated:

The government told us that we had to transmigrate, this village was not allowed to be lived in. So the community were forced to leave (Interview 17, male farmer aged 58, Dusun Simbar, 27/11/15).

The closure of Dusun Simbar following the eruption of the Timbang Crater Complex in 1979 was only officially enforced for a period of six months. This allowed past residents and migrants from neighbouring villages to eventually resettle homes and fields. In the years immediately following the closure, the future of Dusun Simbar was uncertain and no one knew if it would be forcibly closed again. This uncertainty resulted in a temporary drop in land prices, making Dusun Simbar an attractive location for land poor or landless farmers in neighbouring villages and those returning from the transmigration site. Furthermore, additional land became available for purchase within the village as half of the original population decided to permanently resettle in Palembang. While land prices in Dusun Simbar have since risen and are now relative to elsewhere in the Dieng Plateau, the transmigration program of the late 1970s inadvertently increased the area of land available for new migrants and returning transmigrants. One informant explained her move from Pekasiran Village to Dusun Simbar after the eruption of the main

Timbang Crater in 1979 which was prompted by the availability of affordable land at that time:

We moved here because the land here was cheap. Land in Pekasiran was very expensive compared with the land here that became very cheap after the Sinila and Timbang eruption. We bought land for 400,000 rupiah at the size of 24 by 26 metres. That would have been several million rupiah in Pekasiran. However, nowadays the land here is also very expensive. Before if we could buy one piece of land in Pekasiran, we could buy 2 pieces of land here (Interview 2, female aged 60, Dusun Simbar, 23/10/15).

Despite initial government efforts to shift people away from the hazardous land surrounding the Timbang Crater Complex, my discussions with informants in the field revealed that such efforts were short lived. While residents were officially told their homes and fields couldn’t be accessed, the district government eventually conceded and issued land certificates for land parcels located in the potentially hazardous zone. This process was articulated by one informant:

After the eruption of Sinila, Kepucakan village and Dusun Simbar all became part of the dangerous red zone. We weren’t allowed to cultivate this land. However, the community requested that the Government issue us with land titles anyway, so a program where bulk certificates were issued was initiated (Interview 19, male aged 50, Dusun Simbar, 26/10/15).

The lack of local or district government interest in land zoning following the initial relocation suggests that while transmigration occurred under the pretext of village safety, it was also tied to achieving ambitious transmigration targets. At this time Indonesia’s President Suharto, with financial backing from The World Bank, strongly promoted the transmigration program, setting large (if not unrealistic) five yearly targets to be met (Fearnside, 1997; Hardjono, 1986; Leinbach, 1989). The eruption

of the Timbang Crater Complex and heavy loss of life suffered by Kupucukan Village were thereby used as a catalyst to recruit more transmigrants and support the New Order ‘development’ focused regime.

Indeed, there is a long record of the Indonesian state creating territorial zones in volcanically hazardous areas to enlist rural communities into the transmigration program. One of the most notable examples is Mount Merapi. Following the 1961 eruption, Laksono (1988) describes how all of the residents of Gimbal Village were forcibly relocated to Sumatra despite the village itself being unaffected by the preceding 1961, 1954 and 1930 eruptions. A similar situation occurred following the 1963 eruption of Mt Agung in Bali where 85,000 Balinese were displaced and encouraged to relocate to the outer islands (Hugo, 2006). Further afield in the Banda Islands, Pannell (1999) describes how the isolated ethnic Wortay people were forcibly relocated following the 1968 volcanic eruption into a state administered transmigration area. As argued by Dove and Hudayana (2008) and Dove (2010) in the case of Merapi, the state’s focus has been on ‘developing’ a few thousand people living in hazardous locations rather than on the threats posed in transmigration sites including malnutrition, infant mortality and other hazards such as floods and landslides. In fact, Schlehe (1996) argues that people living on the flanks of Mount Merapi have been more fearful of forced transmigration than eruptions themselves.

The transmigration program in the Dusun Simbar example, however, failed in its goal of entirely relocating residents away from a hazardous area and actually facilitated its reoccupation. Following the initial relocation, neither the provincial nor district government ensured that land surrounding the main Timbang Crater remained off limits to farming activities. While some critics may argue this reflects a failing of the state to enforce its regulations, Li (1999b) takes a contrary position suggesting such governance reflects the necessity of ‘compromised rule’. Analysing Indonesia’s program of relocating isolated people to more accessible regions from the 1950s onwards, Li (1999b) argues that such ‘compromises are integral to rule’ (p. 296). As relocation programs are inherently prone to failure the state reinterprets

these failures as a compromised success (Li, 1999b). In the Dusun Simbar example, the fact that half of the population remained on in Palembang can likewise be interpreted as a program success.

The reoccupation of land thus reflects a subtle form of state resistance on behalf of Dusun Simbar’s returning residents and new migrants. Vandergeest and Peluso (1995) argue that this ‘open resistance has helped render territorial control, which is simple and efficient on paper, complex and inefficient in practice’ (p. 416). The return of half of Dusun Simbar’s population supports the argument that state claims to land throughout Southeast Asia are countered by local property rights (Peluso, 2005; Vandergeest and Peluso, 1995; Wadley, 2003). Just as Wadley (2003) found in West Kalimantan, district officials are hesitant to enforce official counter claims to land. After official relocation programs are completed, residents have some autonomy over decisions to return and reoccupy hazardous land. Laksono’s (1988) study of relocation following the 1961 eruption of Mount Merapi likewise found that villagers resisted resettlement efforts, a situation that while persisting to this day also contributed to the heavy loss of life caused by the 2010 pyroclastic flows (see Mei et al., 2013).

Li (1999b) argues that the Indonesian state cannot, or chooses not to, implement its own laws. In the Dusun Simbar example, this is seen in the re- establishment of homes and fields following the 1979 eruption, a situation that continues today. When we discussed land use planning with village or district level officials from Bappeda Banjarnegara, we were told that the government couldn’t forcibly move people away from the crater. Even when the state had the opportunity to re-establish land use zones following the 1979 eruption due to the absent population, none were developed nor enforced. Li (1999b) argues that the state balances their claims to land with local claims of ownership. Their generosity in allowing people to access land for livelihoods despite such actions contradicting official policy, allows local officials to project an image of themselves as generous and concerned rather than one that reflects state incompetence (Li, 1999b). I argue that the return of residents to Dusun Simbar led the state to alter their territorial strategy

and after just six months they permitted habitation of Dusun Simbar and use of the land surrounding the main Timbang Crater again. This ‘compromised rule’ (Li, 1999b) was also witnessed on the slopes of Mount Merapi where sustained community-led resistance forced the state to re-evaluate their position (Laksono, 1989). The contestation of hazardous territories is likewise demonstrated in Donovan et al.’s (2012c) study of local and expert struggles and negotiations over the delineation of the ‘safe zone’ on the Soufriere Hills Volcano in Montserrat.

While initially depopulating and then indirectly encouraging the re- settlement of hazardous land, I argue that territorialisation and the transmigration program also brought unintended benefits to some of Dusun Simbar’s residents. Firstly, it allowed land poor or landless farmers from nearby villagers or those returning from the transmigration site to acquire more land than they otherwise could have. The acquisition of more land and subsequent upward class mobility, provided some farmers with greater capacity to recover from disturbances and this has reduced their vulnerability to future eruptions. While some land owners suffered by selling their land at a reduced price, if successful, the newly acquired land in South Sumatra could offset this loss.

Secondly, the transmigration program unexpectedly established the networks needed for some residents to diversify into agricultural activities outside of Java. A few households, who have family remaining in Palembang as a result of the transmigration, have also bought rubber plantations there. These are managed by their extended family and the profits are sent back to Java. This investment has spread financial risk and provides an alternate form of income if potato prices drop or crops fail. When rubber prices were high in 2011 and 2012 this proved to be a very economically beneficial activity for some households. However, with rubber prices currently low, this investment is not as lucrative as it was once. It was also common to hear of young men from Dusun Simbar travelling to Palembang to work on the plantations of their extended family. This occurred particularly when a household experienced recurrent crop failures. The increasing role of multi-

local livelihoods as an adaptation measure to vulnerabilities has also been studied amongst transmigrants in South Sumatra’s Lampung Province (Elmhirst, 2012). By maintaining livelihoods across geographical locations, rural farmers are able to respond to vulnerabilities (Ellis, 2000), a finding also supported by the Dieng example. Furthermore, many of those who remained on in South Sumatra following the transmigration reportedly met financial success there, and for these people their vulnerability to volcanic hazards has certainly been reduced23_.

I argue that the relationship between territorial control and conditions of vulnerability to natural hazards is therefore complex and embedded in historical processes. The state led territorialisation of hazardous land that facilitated transmigration both increased and reduced local vulnerabilities. To reiterate, vulnerabilities increased as a result of the eventual resettlement of hazardous land and the economic loss associated with leaving possessions and productive land in Java to begin anew. Furthermore, those who chose to return to Java paid their own way and suffered the financial hardship of rebuilding. Yet, the transmigration program also reduced vulnerability for some by temporarily creating an affordable land market during which time marginalised farmers could acquire land. In the Dusun Simbar example, transmigration also unintentionally reduced vulnerability by allowing some farmers to spread their financial risk across agricultural ventures. These findings, alongside the discussion of the previous chapter, reveal the many economic benefits that can be gained through the utilisation of hazardous land. Yet, despite these livelihood opportunities, the push for transmigration and state management of hazardous land in the Dieng Plateau has persisted. As the following section will now discuss, this processes relies on representations of volcanic eruptions as ‘crises’ requiring state intervention and control.

23 _{Despite these advantages it is important to reiterate that nearly 40 years ago 149 people} died by passing through the fields below the main Timbang Crater. As there were no survivors from Kepucukan I was thereby unable to study the construction of vulnerability from the perspective of this village. However, the heavy loss of life demonstrates this significant risk associated with occupying this hazardous land.