Características de la petición de herencia

If radiation detection equipment alarms, and or intelligence is received to suggest that a case of illicit trafficking is to take place or law enforcement authorities have conducted a stop and search procedure leading them to suspect the presence of radiation, the following should be considered:

— Confirm that the alarm is genuine by following a pre-planned verification procedure. This might involve the use of a second set of monitoring equipment or by passing the suspected material through the detection equipment two or more times. If these procedures confirm that the alarm is false, the incident can be closed by recording the details for future reference. Appendix II suggests a detailed procedure for searching pedes- trians, packages and vehicles. In some circumstances it may be necessary to bring in additional specialists to make the necessary diagnosis to establish a false or confirmed non-innocent alarm. Details of such experts and resources should be available to the first responder as a result of prior arrangements with the identified experts.

— Ascertain that any intelligence is credible and the information received as part of that intelligence is genuine. If it is confirmed, contact and inform the designated national authorities and set up a line of communication. If it is unconfirmed, the case can be closed by recording the details.

— If the source is discovered and there is no significant health hazard, then the competent person designated as being in charge should first ascertain whether it is an innocent alarm, such as an authorized shipment or an innocent person that has been receiving radiological medical treatment. — In cases in which it has been confirmed that the incident is an innocent

alarm, it is prudent to estimate whether the event was orchestrated in order to ‘test’ the detection capabilities of a particular border or other guarded pathway. Experience has shown that organized criminal groups involved in the trafficking of contraband will test security at border crossings to identify weak spots before attempting to breach the security system.

— Until such time as a complete radiological assessment is made, first response personnel must take precautions to avoid contact with the radioactive material and to follow the general personnel protection guidelines given in Ref. [39].

— Should the presence of radioactive material be confirmed, and the level of radiation is below 0.1 mSv/h, then assess:

• all possible hazards including fires, exposed high voltage wires, sharp or falling objects, or hazardous chemicals;

• transport placard(s)/labels/markings indicating radioactive or other hazardous material and UN numbers;

• the presence of people at risk.

Always consider the possible malicious nature of the incident and be aware of the possibility of so-called ‘booby 0traps’ and secondary devices.

Place cordons around the scene. The incident should be treated as carefully as a crime scene and as such, collection of evidence needs to carefully documented. The FEMT must be consulted and a strategy for entry into the scene and for any examination of the scene needs to be developed to prevent the unnecessary loss of evidence.

— If the situation allows, the first responder should establish the location of the radioactive material. At this stage, it is sufficient to determine the general location of the radioactive source without knowing its exact location. That is, it would be acceptable to determine that the radioactive source was confined to a piece of luggage, to a vehicle or to something such as a large commercial container in which the material could be

isolated if the situation proved to be hazardous. The location of the radioactive material should be determined, if possible, without opening the container or object holding the material.

— If it has been established that there are no significant radiological health hazards associated with the incident, the expert should attempt to identify the radioactive material. This can be accomplished through examination of shipping papers, package markings or with the use of a suitable hand- held gamma spectrometry device. At this stage, it is possible that the suspected radioactive source may be found to be lawfully possessed or non-radioactive, in which case the details of the situation should be recorded and the response terminated.

— If there is evidence of a criminal or unauthorized act, then the agency responsible should seize the persons, material and evidence with the aim of prosecuting those responsible. All items connected with the incident are to be considered as evidence, including packaging, vehicles, suspect clothing, and as such the rules of evidence shall apply.

— Any radiation measurements taken from a suspect or innocent victims including response workers must be recorded following the rules of evidence as these measurements may become vital prosecution evidence at a later date. An assessment of previous incidents has shown that the majority are of an inconsequential nature with little or no radiological hazard. Such incidents can be dealt without the necessity to activate an emergency response plan.