Características Morfológicas

The third Eelam War includes devastating battles with many casualties on both sides. However, the government’s ‘war for peace’ strategy is highly criticised, which results in a motion of no-confidence. The ensuing 2001 elections see the origination of a situation of cohabitation, which enhances political tensions. The new government changes the policy direction and invites international mediation to the 2002 ceasefire. Unfortunately, these peace negotiations fail once again. New elections result in a victory for the UPFA coalition. The end of this phase includes a culmination of negative events for the LTTE, such as the tsunami, the establishment of the Karuna Group and the international narrative of the war on terror.

Figure 17. Timeline phase 5

Third Eelam War

After the LTTE violated the ceasefire agreement in mid-1995, the Third Eelam War began. Although the main goal of the PA was to engage in a peace process, the circumstances now required a large military campaign. This was the second time in ten years that the army initiated a military campaign in the Jaffna Peninsula. This time, however, they would not be stopped by India. The Sri Lankan army was making progress and, when they conquered the Jaffna Peninsula in 1996, Prabhakaran was faced with a serious problem. He needed more manpower to fight the army, but he could not recruit them from the north, since the army

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 110

occupied a large part of this territory. Prabhakaran appealed to the east, where one of his trusted commanders, Colonel Karuna, was based. His cadres controlled many Tamil villages in this area. Colonel Karuna managed to recruit young Tamil boys from the east and started a counteroffensive against the Sri Lankan Army in 1997. This battle is called Operation Jayasikuru, an attempt by the government to establish control over the main supply route to the north. It became a devastating battle with hundreds of casualties on both sides, also known as the ‘Highway of Blood’. In November 1999, the LTTE recaptured the villages they had lost to the army. Five months later, they even succeeded in capturing the army base of the military at the Elephant Pass. Nevertheless, the army fought back and retook the areas in June 2000 (Hashim, 2013, p.120; De Silva, 2012, p.73-79).

The PA created a dual strategy, including a military and a political campaign. They hoped that this would eventually lead to an agreement between the government and the LTTE. During the military campaign, the PA was working on a draft of a new constitution. This constitution would emphasise a significant devolution of power to provinces. They believed that the LTTE would defeated, or at least weakened to such an extent that they would accept something less than self-determination. Unfortunately for the peace process, the strategy failed in two ways. First, the PA did not succeed in gaining a majority in parliament to vote in favour of the new constitution. Additionally, the proposal of the devolution of power caused a public outcry, proving once again that there was no consensus possible in the Sinhalese areas on this issue. The population was sharply divided and the Buddhist nationalist groups opposed these policy solutions that would enhance the political power of the Tamils. It was unlikely that the government would garner sufficient popular support to implement a decentralised political system. This also resulted in the lack of a political majority. Secondly, the LTTE managed to avoid military defeat. This was partly due to their skills in guerrilla warfare, which the army was not able to counter. The other advantage of the LTTE was their easy access to the sea. The coastline in the north had many isolated coves, which both created access and provided security for the LTTE. The national navy did not have the proper equipment to be effective in such waters, but the Tigers did (Interviewee B, personal communication, 26 October 2015; De Silva, 2012, p.73-79).

The LTTE’s suicide attacks continued. In 1998 the LTTE attacked the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, one of the most sacred Buddhist sites on earth. The attack did not cause heavy casualties, but it hit the religious heart of Sinhalese Buddhism. Kandy had been considered a

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 111

safe area until this point, and the attack had a negative effect on tourism in the city. The main consequence of this attack was that the government outlawed the LTTE. This was a step in the government strategy to obtain international acknowledgement of the LTTE as a terrorist organisation (Moorcraft, 2012, p.35; Volkskrant, 1998).

The LTTE declared a ceasefire in December 2000, but continued to inflict violence none the less. In April 2001, they started a large-scale attack on the military in the northern jungle. In July 2001, a suicide bombing attack destroyed eight air force planes and four passenger planes at Colombo airport. This attack had a devastating impact on tourism. Eventually, the circumstances led to a motion of no-confidence against president Kumaratunga in December 2001. Because the highly criticised ‘war for peace’ strategy had not led to the decline of violence, and because of the deteriorating economic situation and the shortage of manpower, the motion was passed (Hashim, 2013, p.114-115; Moorcraft, 2012, p.84).

Elections in 2001 and the ensuing ceasefire

In December 2001, after the motion was adopted, elections were held again. These elections shifted the political majority in parliament from the SFLP to the UNP. The former SFLP prime minister, Ratnasiri Wickremanayake, was replaced by Ranil Wickremesinghe from the UNP. Chandrika Kumaratunga (SLFP), who had been president since 1994, would remain in this position until 2005. Wickremesinghe and Kumaratunga had many differences, both political and personal. Wickremesinghe was Western-orientated and cosmopolitan, while Kumaratunga was a strong nationalist. Wickremesinghe had an indulgent attitude towards the LTTE. In his attempts to end the conflict, he accepted the involvement of Norway in the peace negotiations. This was the first time a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by both parties in order to stop the violence. During the ceasefire, discussions were held regarding constitutional arrangements, mediated by Norway. According to Nira Wickramasinghe, this Norwegian involvement would not have been possible under SFLP rule. There were no fundamental differences between the SFLP and the UNP in their approach to the conflict. However, there were small ones. The SFLP argued from a more grassroots position and their primary concern was to keep the nation safe. The UNP was no less nationalistic, but they were more open to negotiations. Overall, however, the most influential factor was the personal position of each politician. After all, Kumaratunga would never have involved Norway (N. K. Wickramasinghe, personal communication, 6 October, 2015; Volkskrant, 2004; Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.207, p.310; Hashim, 2013, p.116).

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 112

Prabhakaran agreed to a 30-day ceasefire beginning on 19 December 2001, partly because of the efforts by Norway. Two days later, the Sri Lankan government accepted the proposed ceasefire by pausing its own violence as well. Ranil Wickremesinghe showed a great deal of leniency in the negotiations. For example, the embargo on non-military products to the LTTE controlled areas was lifted. Even more striking was the planned assassination of Prabhakaran that was halted by Wickremesinghe. The intelligence services of Sri Lanka had found out where Prabhakaran would be on Christmas Eve 2001. They planned a secret mission to eliminate the leader of the LTTE, strongly believing that this would end the war. The mission was cancelled, thus enraging the leaders of the intelligence service (Moorcraft, 2012, p.38-39; Hashim, 2013, p.115).

Norway continued to play an active role in the negotiations. A permanent ceasefire was announced on 22 February, 2002. Norway set up a commission of several Nordic countries that would monitor the ceasefire: the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM). The ceasefire had two stages. The first was meant to bring humanitarian aid to the war-torn areas. The second phase was meant for peace negotiations in order to find a lasting solution that would be acceptable for both sides. For the first time, the mood was highly optimistic. The government decided to lift its ban on the LTTE, opening up the possibility for direct negotiations between the LTTE and the government. Additionally, the LTTE opened a highway that made traffic to the north possible and flights to the airport in Jaffna were allowed again. Even the international community was optimistic about the progress. Many countries promised financial aid if the peace process continued (Hashim, 2013, p.115).

The talks took place in Phuket, Berlin and Oslo. For both sides, the positions they took in the negotiations were unprecedented. The LTTE was taking the option of federalism seriously for the first time, having never before deviated from their cause of a Tamil Eelam. Prabhakaran did not change his opinion. It is argued that Anton Balasingham, the moderate chief negotiator for the LTTE, accepted these proposals on his behalf (De Silva, 2012). On the other side, the option of federalism was also not popular among the nationalist government of Sri Lanka. Previous proposals for the devolution of power had not gained majority support in parliament and had generated resistance among the Sri Lankan population. Indeed, according to Nira Wickramasinghe (personal communication, 6 October, 2015), supporting federalism

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 113

led to accusations of favouring the secessionist cause of the Tamil Tigers (Hashim, 2013, p.115).

Unfortunately, there were also factors that impeded the peace process. First, Sri Lanka had changed its government structure in 1972. For almost thirty years, this system had caused no problems in Sri Lankan politics, but this changed in 2001. When Ranil Wickremesinghe was elected, a situation of cohabitation emerged for the first time that created high tensions within the government. Wickremesinghe was from the UNP, while the president, Chandrika Kumaratunga, was from the SFLP. Aside from their personality differences, as explained before, their political differences stood in the way of a constructive peace process. Wickremesinghe saw federalism as the only possible solution to the conflict. He considered it his duty to persuade the government and the LTTE to agree with this. Unfortunately for him, many right-wing politicians thought the plan would give too much power to the LTTE. Additionally, because of the nationalist attitude of many Sri Lankan politicians, the international mediation was tolerated, but with suspicion. They all remembered the failed previous attempt at international involvement by the IPKF (Hashim, 2013, p.116). The following quote from Mangala Samaraweera, chief opposition whip and treasurer of the SLFP at that time, sums up the feeling of discontent: “Of course we can't expect anything better from a nation of salmon-eaters who have become international busybodies” (BBC, 2003). This was said during a discussion in which the SFLP blamed the Norwegian mediators for not taking the feelings of Sri Lankans into account (Moorcraft, 2012, p.39).

However, the impeding factors came not only from the government. Despite the permanent ceasefire both parties had agreed to, the LTTE continued its military activities. Child soldiers were still recruited, the smuggling of weaponry did not stop, taxes were still collected and members of rival Tamil groups were still murdered. This did not go unnoticed by the government so the right wing’s suspicion concerning the LTTE’s motives for the ceasefire grew. Eventually, in April 2003, the peace negotiations stalled. Although Anton Balasingham promoted a more moderate solution during the peace talks, Prabhakaran still argued for secession. They decided to quit the negotiations, but returned at the end of October with their own proposal: the Interim Self-Governing Authority. The main provision of this proposal was that the LTTE would have full authority over the north and the east of Sri Lanka (Moorcraft, 2012, p. 42; Hashim, 2013, p.117).

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 114

After this proposal, changes began to occur in rapid succession. President Kumaratunga proclaimed a state of emergency. This gave her the power to take control of the ministries of the media, internal affairs and defence. Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was accused of being too lenient towards the LTTE, which according to the opposition, had resulted in this escalation. The SFLP decided to join forces with the JVP, resulting in the establishment of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA). New elections were held in April 2004 and this alliance won with a convincing majority. Rajapaksa (SFLP) became the new prime minister and the situation of cohabitation ended (Hashim, 2013, p.117).

War on Terror

Meanwhile, the Al-Qaida attacks on the World Trade Centre on 11 September, 2001 greatly influenced international opinion on terrorist organisations. The ensuing war on terror also had its effect on the Sri Lankan conflict in several ways. First, the growing anti-terror attitude created reluctance among the Tamil diaspora to give money to the LTTE. Although the fundraising efforts did not stop, and became even more aggressive in response to decreasing returns, this significantly affected the LTTE’s strategy. This sharp decrease in resources meant that the LTTE needed a ceasefire to build up new resources and regain strength (HRW, 2006, p.13). However, the main tactic of the LTTE, suicide bombings, were politically sensitive and associated with terrorism. This further decreased the international level of tolerance. Based on his decisions to continue these attacks, it appears that Prabhakaran underestimated these international changes (Uyangoda, 2015, p.115). Second, the international community started to list the LTTE as a terrorist organisation. India was the first to put the LTTE on its list of terrorist organisations in 1992 after the 1991 assassination of Rajiv Ghandi. In 1997, the LTTE was put on the United States’ list of terrorist organisations. In 2001 and 2006 the United Kingdom, Canada and the European Union followed respectively (Wickramasinghe, 2014; HRW, 2006).

Tsunami

On Boxing Day in 2004, an earthquake in the Indian Ocean caused an enormous tsunami. Sri Lanka was one of the countries where the tsunami caused major damage and thousands of casualties. The disaster struck the island when the conflict was between war and peace. The tsunami had major political consequences. First, the international community pressured Kumaratunga to work together with the LTTE. The coalition partners (the SLFP and the JVP) already had their differences, but the tsunami widened the gap between the partners even

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 115

more. In order to deal with the enormous damage and the almost 40,000 victims, the government created the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure. This plan was created to allocate funds for rebuilding equally over the six districts in the east and the north that were affected by the tsunami. Under this plan, government officials, Muslims, and LTTE representatives were to collaborate. The JVP balked at the cooperation with the LTTE, since the balance of power resulting from the plan would lean towards the LTTE. After trying to postpone the act, the JVP decided in June 2005 to leave the coalition. Additionally, the JVP began organising renewed protests, which attracted significant numbers of people. At last, the JVP went to court to file a case against the tsunami policy. The judge agreed that it was unconstitutional and most of the clauses were deleted. This once again put the JVP in the political spotlight (Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.166, p.207; Jayasundara-Smits, 2013, p.187).

The tsunami did not transform the conflict as many people had hoped and expected. Both parties shared grief caused by the same external factor that bought the population together for a while. However, as the situation described above shows, the tsunami merely intensified the political dynamics. The JVP left the coalition, leaving the SLFP with a minority in parliament. The government gave the LTTE much control over aid distribution in the north and the east of the island, and so the LTTE gained strength. It re-established the authority and legitimacy of the LTTE in the east (N. K. Wickramasinghe, personal communication, 6 October, 2015; Wickramasinghe, 2014, p.166, p.208).

Tamil diaspora

An enormous number of people were displaced by the conflict. People fled not only within Sri Lanka, but also to other countries. A 2001 estimate put the figures for the diaspora at between 600,000 and 800,000 people. Most of these went to Canada, India, the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Australia (HRW, 2006, p.10). The majority of the refugees were well educated, mostly upper-caste Tamil men (Van de Vooren, 2014). The West wanted to stop the refugee flow, so many countries promoted conflict resolution by funding local NGOs or establishing new organisations (personal communication, 6 October, 2015).

These Tamil diaspora communities financially supported the Tamil Tigers to a large extent. A report by Human Rights Watch published in 2006 provides details on this support. Once the Tamil diaspora had settled in a new country, they began founding Tamil institutions and

The Sri Lankan Civil War: Tigers vs. Lions 116

organisations. Many Tamils had experienced and witnessed atrocities by the Sri Lankan army against the Tamils, so they wanted to support their people with money. Examples of such organisations include the World Tamil Movement, the British Tamil Organisation and the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO). These organisations stated that the money they collected was meant to support civilians victimised by the war. Research by the Canadian intelligence services showed that a significant amount of the money was channelled to the LTTE in order to buy weaponry. The LTTE registered all these organisations, including the individuals that were raising funds. They sought influence over these organisations and collected the money. Prabhakaran himself established the TRO, which made the TRO dependent of the LTTE. The organisation needed the approval of the LTTE for everything they did. The victims of the tsunami in the Tamil area could only receive aid with supervision of the LTTE (Botje, 2005). During the 1990s, 80 to 90 percent of the total military budget of the LTTE came from the Tamil diaspora. There was strict control over the fundraising. When Tamils in the diaspora began collecting less or wanted to stop collecting, the LTTE sent people to pressure these individuals to continue (HRW, 2006).

Child soldiers

During the ceasefire, peace talks were organised in February 2003 in Berlin. The LTTE spokesperson made the promise to UNICEF that all children would be released from the military. In July 2003, the government and the LTTE signed a UNICEF action plan. This plan was created in order to address the needs of war-affected children in the north and the east of Sri Lanka. The LTTE still employed many child soldiers, whose average age of recruitment was 15. In early 2004, the LTTE released 650 children from the military. Nevertheless, thousands probably remained to fight for a Tamil Eelam. Although the ceasefire should have been a period of demobilisation, it appeared that both sides used the relatively peaceful years