CARACTERÍSTICAS DE LAS PARTÍCULAS DEL SUELO 1 Tamaño y Forma.

The EU Maritime Security Strategy, adopted on 24 June 201465, identifies a number of threats against maritime security:

a. Threats or use of force against Member States’ rights and jurisdiction over their maritime zones;

b. Threats to the security of European citizens and to economic interests at sea following acts of external aggression including those related to maritime disputes, threats to Member States’ sovereign rights or armed conflicts;

c. Cross-border and organized crime, including maritime piracy and armed robbery at sea, trafficking of human beings and smuggling of migrants, organised criminal networks facilitating illegal migration, trafficking of arms and narcotics, smuggling of goods and contraband;

The Strategy puts emphasis on the importance of the naval capabilities of the Member States to challenge a number of the threat in case these would occur in reality. Unfortunately many navies of the Member States have witnessed large budget cuttings since the end of the Cold War to such a scale that global operations may be difficult to realise. But also the flagging status of the merchant navy plays a role. During the Falkland Crisis in 1982 the United Kingdom was only able to conduct the logistical operation to retake these island because UK flagged vessels were pressed into service to support the navy. With the reduced number of UK flagged ships this would be very difficult if not impossible nowadays according to British experts66. Unfortunately this does not only apply to the British navy only but to all navies of the European Union. There were already problems for EU navies to carry out two operations at the same time (the Libya crisis of 2011 and anti-piracy operation Atalanta)67. In order to play a role on the global level they rely on their own auxiliary ships or in case of emergencies the merchant ships flying EU flags. The number of auxiliary ships has dropped down sharply in EU navies (together with the number of warships)68_{. For example, in 1980 the Royal Navy of the} United Kingdom alone had fifteen tankers; today it has just five Tankers. Carrying on from this, as of 2014 the German Navy has five Tankers, the French Navy has four Tankers, and the Italian Navy has three Tankers. These are the navies of four principle European members of the NATO alliance, and yet today their combined auxiliary strength, the thing which is most crucial to maintaining effective fighting forces at distance from their nation’s shore, is on a par with what one of these states had just thirty-four years ago.

Most of the above listed threats can have a direct or indirect impact on maritime shipping. The strategy however does not spell all these threats in detail. One of these could be named here. With the introduction of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ, article 55) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) generated a new potential for military conflicts at sea. The maximum 200 Nautical Miles wide zone gives coastal states sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living (Art.56 UNCLOS). This resulted in the need for additional boundary demarcation at sea. A specific role in this process is given to islands, which according to article 121 UNCLOS islands generate their own territorial sea and EEZ. The article also explains what an island is, or what it actually not is: “Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. Since these wordings in UNCLOS many coastal states have tried to convince other states that 1. They are the sovereign state of certain islands, and 2. In case of doubt whether it is actually an

65 _{The Council of the European Union, European Union Maritime Security Strategy, Brussels, 24 June 2014} 66 _{The Telegraph, Drop in UK-registered ships risks damage to British economy, 6 March 2015}

67 _{http://europesworld.org, We must merge our 23 navies to safeguard the EU’s security, 1June 2012}

39 island, deployed military units on it on a semi-permanent basis to testify that it can sustain human habitation and hence define it as an island in the meaning of UNCLOS which is entitled to its own EEZ. Many of the present island disputes are in Asian waters, close to important international shipping lanes (e.g. Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in Figure 2.22). An escalation of these conflicts could result in redirecting international shipping from Asia to Europe and additional transport costs.

Figure 2.22 South China Sea disputes and international shipping lanes

Source: Reuters

During the Libya crisis in 2011 it became clear that European navies are not that well equipped to handle a large security crisis close to the European Union without the support of the United States Navy69.

Of all the threats listed in the EU Maritime Security Strategy above the threats against port security and piracy and armed robbery at sea have had the largest effect on shipping since the beginning of the 21st _{century. Port security is arranged by the International Ship and Port}

Facility Security (ISPS) Code is an amendment to the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) Convention (1974/1988) on minimum security arrangements for ships, ports and government agencies and came into force in 2004. In the next section we will discuss ISPS in relation to workload of ship crews.

40 Piracy and armed robbery against ships

Piracy, according to Article 101 UNCLOS, is conducted (1) on the high seas against (2) another vessel and (3) for private gain. The IMO apples a wider definition and speaks not of piracy, but of acts of armed robbery against ships or at sea, thus also encompassing attacks in territorial waters and in internal waters like ports. There can also be a political dimension to such acts. The distinction between piracy (in international waters) and armed robbery in territorial waters and internal waters (ports) remains very important. This is because Article 105 UNCLOS entitles all states to combat piracy in international waters, while in all other cases only the coastal state has jurisdiction to act.

Piracy and armed robbery against ships have undergone a change in patterns. In 2000, most incidents occurred in territorial waters and ports, with the exception of the Strait of Malacca where ships moving at high speed were also subject to piracy and armed robbery. In West Africa and in the Gulf of Guinea there has been a concentration of attacks on ships in the Port of Lagos and the nearby Nigerian coast. Here, the pirates’ objective is usually to steal cargo, although frequently crew members are also kidnapped and held for ransom. In Latin America, robbery is the main threat to maritime security, affecting inland waterways as well as coastal waters and ports. The issue however rose to the top of the international maritime policy agenda at the end of the last decade, when the majority of incidents occurred in international waters, concentrated off the coast of Somalia.

The International Maritime Bureau noted recently however that pirate attacks on the world’s seas had fallen in 2013 for the third consecutive year. Small tanker hijacks however, by armed gangs are escalating in Southeast Asia70. This last development has been one of the reasons for China’s decision to construct new oil and gas pipelines and ports in Myanmar, thus avoiding piracy waters when transporting oil from Middle East to China71. Ships in piracy affected areas need to implement specific security measures. The “Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy”, an informational guide and set of recommendations developed by maritime industry and security professionals, provides a minimal set of core practices that ships might reasonably be expected to adopt for their protection. Within the European Union a discussion is ongoing whether private and armed guards are allowed to protect EU flagged ships. While most European Navies have been established with the aim to protect their national merchant ships around the world and keep international shipping lanes open, it is difficult from an operational point of view to have military personnel on board of merchant ships in piracy affected areas. Yet, the EU led naval operation in Somalia (EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta) was successful in combating piracy in the region.

The next section will include a subsection on the effects of these additional security measures on the workload of the crew members.