CARACTERISTICA TECNICAS CABLE DE FIBRA OPTICA TIPO OPGW

organizations within an area of operation. These relationships allow the BCT to nest operations with both their higher headquarters and with the overall United States effort within the joint operational area. A whole-of-government approach, along with collaboration and cooperation with unified action partners— those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations (ADRP 3-0)—are key components of operations focused on stability. The BCT staff incorporates personnel from these organizations into the operations process as soon as possible.

M

P

8-24. Mission tailored military police support to the BCT integrates police intelligence operations (see ATP 3-39.20) throughout the offense, the defense, and operations focused on stability. Police intelligence operations address the reality that, in some operational environments, the threat is more criminal than conventional in nature. In those environments, it is not uncommon for members of armed groups, insurgents, and other belligerents to use or mimic established criminal networks, activities, and practices to move contraband, raise funds, or generally or specifically further their goals and objectives. Police intelligence can provide relevant, actionable police information or police intelligence to the BCT through integration into the operations process and fusion with other intelligence data. United States Army criminal investigations division and provost marshal staffs provide criminal intelligence analysis to the commander that identify indicators of potential crimes and criminal threats against, facilities and/or personnel.

S

O

F

8-25. The BCT builds relationships with United States Special Operations Forces operating in their area of operations. These units are under operational control to a Joint Special Operations Task Force or higher and execute different tactical tasks that may directly or indirectly support the operational objectives and end states of the BCT. The BCT relies on interdependence with special operations forces along, with other unified action partners to combat sources of instability. The exercise of interdependence facilitates shared understanding between the BCT and special operations forces and provides a conduit by which the special operations forces can provide the BCT relevant, useful and timely information during the operations processes. Special operation forces, within the BCT’s area of operation, coordinate and synchronize efforts to ensure reinforcing and complementary effects. Planning efforts, update briefs, and working groups are specific events where BCTs incorporate special operations forces. (Refer to ADRP 3-05 for additional information.)

8-26. Civil affairs operations are essential to the conduct of operations focused on stability. The full capability of the civil affairs force manifests itself in the conduct of stability tasks in every environment across the range of military operations. Civil affairs support to stability tasks include the execution of all five civil affairs core tasks, employment of civil affairs functional specialists, and continuous analysis of the civil component of the operational environment in terms of both operational and mission variables by civil affairs staff elements. The five civil affairs core tasks are populace and resources control, foreign humanitarian assistance, civil information management, nation assistance, and support to civil administration.

8-27. Civil affairs support to operations focused on stability depends on the nature of the operation and the condition of the affected indigenous population and institutions. The civil affairs staff continually monitors the condition of the host nation throughout the operation, applies available resources to affect the civilian component, and recommends functional skills required to support this critical phase of the operation. Civil affairs support the BCT, United States government agencies, and the host-nation civil administration in transitioning power back to the local government. During the transition from offense or defense to operations focused on stability, civil affairs units place greater emphasis on infrastructure, economic stability, and governance expertise. (Refer to FM 3-57 for additional information.)

P

R

T

8-28. A provincial reconstruction team is part of a long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to provincial governments. It is a potential combat multiplier for maneuver commanders performing governance and economics functions and providing expertise to programs designed to strengthen infrastructure and the institutions of local governments. The provincial reconstruction team leverages the principles of reconstruction and development to build host-nation capacity while speeding the transition of security, justice, and economic development to the control of the host nation.

8-29. The provincial reconstruction team structure normally has sixty to ninety personnel. A provincial reconstruction team is intended to have the following complement of personnel:

z Provincial reconstruction team leader.

z Deputy team leader.

z Multinational force liaison officer. z Rule of law coordinator.

z Provincial action officer.

z Public diplomacy officer.

z Agricultural advisor. z Engineer.

z Development officer.

z Governance team.

z Civil affairs team. z Bilingual cultural advisor.

I

N

O

8-30. BCTs also must recognize the value of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations and build effective relationships with these actors. These organizations may have the most extensive amounts of resources to conduct stability tasks within the BCT’s area of operation. Intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations are the primary sources of subject matter expertise in many essential services and governance topics. They also are the primary provider of humanitarian, infrastructure and essential services in immature operational environments. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations potentially have experienced and detailed knowledge of the civil environment. Usually the intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations will have a better understanding of the civil considerations than any other actors other than host-nation personnel. This insight can assist the BCT in the continual process to understand and shape the environment.

8-31. Building relationships with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations is unique, as opposed to host-nation forces and interagency actors, who often have different mandates and alternative

perspectives to operations, focused on stability. The BCT commander and staff utilize these differences to see the operational environment and tactical problems from different perspectives. Additionally, understanding where intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are in the area of operations and the nature of their activities helps develop a common operational picture. This common operational picture enables the BCT to anticipate changes to the operational environment, the effects of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations on primary stability tasks and BCT operations, and future friction points between the organization’s interests and the BCT’s interests.

8-32. Building relationships with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations might also be difficult because these organizations are reluctant to establish associations with United States forces. The BCT must be cognizant of this and establish these relationships on terms beneficial to all parties involved. Intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations can bring valuable resources, information regarding the civil populace and the operational environment, and alternative perspectives to the BCT’s operation. Examples of interagency personnel that can provide the BCT valuable information are members of a Department of State Embassy or Consulate country team, chiefs of stations or bases, defense attaches, and subject matter expertise from other governmental departments (Departments of Agriculture, Justice, Treasury and so forth).

8-33. Humanitarian organizations avoid any blurring of the distinction between neutral, independent, and impartial humanitarian action and development aid derived from political engagement, as the latter is potentially linked to security concerns or support to one side. The BCT often works through civilian representatives from United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations, or the host-nation when coordinating with nongovernmental organizations. BCT commanders avoid publicly citing nongovernmental organizations as information sources, as that might jeopardize their neutrality and invite retaliation by adversaries. The BCT primarily uses civil-military operations centers operated by civil affairs units to coordinate with nongovernmental organizations. (Refer to ATP 3-07.5 for additional information.) BCTs operating with nongovernmental organizations follow these guidelines:

z Military personnel wear uniforms when conducting relief activities.

z Military personnel make prior arrangements before visiting nongovernmental organizations.

z Military personnel do not refer to nongovernmental organizations as force multipliers or partners

or other similar terms.

z United States forces respect a nongovernmental organization’s decision not to serve as an implementing partner.