L. CARMELO v. ARMANDO RAMOS Facts:
Mayor of Manila issued an executive order creating a committee "to investigate the anomalies involving the license inspectors and other personnel of the License Inspection Division of the Office of the City Treasurer and of the License and Permits Division of this Office. Petitioner is the chairman of the committee. The committee issued subpoenas to Armando Ramos, a private citizen working as a bookkeeper in the Casa de Alba, requiring him to appear before it. Claiming that Ramos' refusal tended "to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administrative proceedings,"
petitioner filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition to declare Armando Ramos in contempt. After hearing, during which petitioner was required to show a prima facie case, the trial court dismissed the petition. The lower court held that there is no law empowering committees created by municipal mayors to issue subpoenas and demand that witnesses testify under oath. It appears that in a statement given to investigators of the Office of the Mayor, Ramos admitted having misappropriated on several occasions, sums of money given to him by the owner of Casa de Alba for the payment of the latter's taxes for 1956-1959 and that this fact had not been discovered earlier because Ramos used to entertain employees in the City Treasurer's office at Casa de Alba where Ramos was a bookkeeper as stated above.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is WON the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal?
Held:
Petition is bereft of merit.
The rule is that Rule 64 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend
contempt committed against
administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony.
— When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses. There is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees. SC does not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory process of subpoena.
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the provisions of section 580 of the Administrative Code are applicable to the
City of Manila as these pertain to national bureaus or offices of the government.
Even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner.
VIVO v MONTESA G.R. No. L-24576 July 29, 1968
Facts:
The private respondents Juan, Pedro, Julio, Marcelo, Jose, Manuel and Benito, all surnamed "Calacday" arrived in the Philippines from Hongkong, the first four on 18 November 1959, and the last three on 6 December 1959. Upon their arrival they sought admission as Filipino citizens. After investigation, a board of special inquiry, in its decisions of 7 and 11 December 1959, found them to be the legitimate sons of a Filipino citizen, one Isaac Calacday, and thus admitted them into this country. The Bureau of Immigration then issued to each of them an identification certificate as a Filipino citizen. Sometime in February, 1963, however, Isaac Calacday confessed before an immigration official that the seven respondents were not his sons. He retracted his confession in March, 1963, in an investigation in the Department of Justice, with the explanation that, in a fit of anger, he disclaimed, under oath, paternity of the respondents because they refused to give him money (Annex
"I" to Answer).
On 9 May 1963, Commissioner of Immigration Martiniano Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the herein private respondents, stating in said warrants their deportability under Section 37 (a) (1) and Section 37 (a) (2) in relation to Section 29(a) (17) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, for having entered the Philippines "by means of false and
misleading statements and that they were not lawfully admissible at the time of entry, not being properly documented for admission." The warrants directed any immigration office or officer of the law to bring the respondents before the Commissioner, for them to show cause, if any there be, why they should not be deported. Manuel Calacday was subsequently arrested. The others remained at large.
On 26 April 1965, the respondents filed before the respondent court a petition, docketed as Civil Case No. 60906, praying for three principal reliefs, namely: to restrain the arrest of those petitioners who have not been arrested;
to release Manuel Calacday who had been arrested; and to prohibit the deportation of all the petitioners, all upon the claim that they are Filipino citizens.
RTC granted the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings Held:
We agree with petitioning Commissioner that the court below is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of respondents Calacdays.
These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the Immigration authorities under Sections 28 and 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act (C.A. No. 613).
That jurisdiction is not tolled by a claim of Filipino citizenship, where the Commissioner or Commissioners have reliable evidence to the contrary; and said officers should be given opportunity to determine the issue of citizenship before the courts interfere in the exercise of the power of judicial review of administrative decisions.
in Miranda vs. Deportation Board, 94 Phil.
531, 533, this Court said:
While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a showing that his claim is frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259 U.S., 275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens.
[Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21, 35-36.] If such is the primary duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not. This is inherent-in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs.Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37).
It is well to note here that when the petition for certiorari and prohibition (the respondent judge considered it as such) was filed, deportation proceedings had been started against the respondents (petitioners below) but had not been completed. In view of the non-completion of the proceedings, the Board of Commissioners has not rendered as yet any decision. The respondents Calacdays, therefore, are not being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the citizenship or alienage of the respondents. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review.
It is clear from the order complained of that the court below misapprehended the import of the warrants issued by the Commissioner herein. Said warrants required the respondents to be brought to the immigration authorities, not to be deported, but "to show cause, if any
there be, why he should not be deported from the Philippines", as expressly recited therein. There was no case of
"summarily arresting and deporting" the respondents Calacdays, as unwarrantedly assumed by the court below.
The Calacdays have alluded in this Court to certain documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship. The proper procedure is for said respondents to appear before the Immigration officials and there submit these documents as evidence on their part to show cause why they should not be deported.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the writ prayed for is hereby granted, the order issued in Civil Case No. 60906 of the Court of First Instance of Manila is set aside, and the proceedings ordered discontinued. But the warrants of arrest heretofore issued by the petitioner, Immigration Commissioner, against herein respondents Calacdays are declared null and void, without prejudice to said respondents being required to furnish bonds in such reasonable sums as the Immigration Commissioners may fix, in order to guarantee their appearance at the hearings and other proceedings in their case, until final determination of their right to stay in the Philippines
PLDT v. PSC
EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO FACTS:
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305,
entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec.
Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with
the following functions and
responsibilities: 3
b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
c. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos. 1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .
h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation. 4
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City
Public Service Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON
REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS ... then and there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
ISSUE:
Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.