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Periodization difficulties hardly crumble away with the development of the great classical societies, but they begin to take on different contours. Evidence improves; regional variety, though still great, diminishes a bit particularly in key parts of Africa, Asia and Europe; patterns of exchange and balance among major societies begin to provide the markers that permit more coherent analysis.

CLASSICAL PERIOD

What was happening, at least by 500 BCE, was the development of some new parallelisms among major areas in Asia, southern Europe and North Africa, based on the use of iron tools and weapons and the related opportunities for expanded regional zones of operation. The emergence of more regular and identifiable interregional trading connections, among the same areas, allows much clearer analysis of this aspect of world history periodization. Even as major regions were defining very different sets of characteristics, world history patterns were becoming clearer, which in turn allows for meaningful and extensive use of periodization techniques.

The classical period echoes, to be sure, some of the earlier issues. The classical societies hardly embraced the whole world, which limits the coverage of classical periodization. Large stretches of northern Europe and much of sub-Saharan Africa moved according to different dynamics, where key themes involve the spread of agriculture or new movements of peoples, as in the great Bantu migrations or the arrival of Slavic peoples in new sections of east central Europe. The Americas, also, followed unconnected patterns (the Olmec period and then the early Mayans, in the case of Central America) that again are interesting and important but that do not fit a periodization scheme based on the patterns of the classical societies.

The fact that, even for the major societies, the classical period begins without major trans-regional events or signals (though the impact of the Indo-Europeans on India and also the Middle East

and southern Europe counts for something), adds more than the usual transitional complexity to this aspect of analysis. The end of the period is more definable, with the common involvement with new challenges of invasion, societal decline, and disease – but, just to remind us all that world history is hardly conveniently packaged, the developments involved extend over three or four centuries, with different specific chronologies in each region.

The length of the classical period is also a challenge. Separate sub-periods may be identified for each region, depending on the amount of time available for detail. The movement from Zhou to Han dynasty, and related institutional and cultural change, is hardly a simple progression; Indian history is marked by several separate intervals, including the Mauryan and then, later, the Gupta dynasties; the distinctive Persian dynamic has already been noted. In the Mediterranean, the passage from Greece through Hellenism to Rome involves significant shifts in geographical base and focus, as well as important changes in characteristics. In strictly Western history this long period is conventionally broken up into the two or three chunks (Greece, Rome, and sometimes a separate inter- mediate pause for Hellenism), but most world historians shy away from this level of detailed treatment. Nevertheless, the challenge of internal change during the period is quite real, and not just for the Mediterranean.

POST-CLASSICAL

Coherence arguably improves in the post-classical centuries, despite the expansion in the number and range of societies to be covered. It’s still true that key parts of the world are not embraced by the themes of the post-classical era, but the expansion of the civilization form in northern Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia and Japan reduces the scope of this problem. A bit of debate attends the date chosen to launch the period. Some world histories start the period up in 500, to capture developments in China, Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire, including the expansion of Buddhism and Christianity, while others urge 600 and the rise of Islam, which undeniably becomes a central theme. There’s far more transitional complexity at the end of the period, once Arab preeminence begins to yield and the new roles for China, the Mongol period, and

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innovations in Western Europe must be taken into account. Finally, some world historians urge a division of the post-classical period, around 1000 CE, mainly to capture the importance of the patterns of trans-regional exchange that were in full operation by this point. The lack of convenient political definitions for the post-classical period overall, despite important political changes in individual societies, might be seen as an analytical trouble spot as well.

The issues of the post-classical period do not overshadow the fact that the period can be defined by major themes, which in turn differ from the major themes of the classical period and from which the themes of the early modern period (though linked to post- classical developments) will differ in turn. The ability to use chan- ging regional dynamisms and power relationships and above all shifts in exchange patterns as core elements in periodization discus- sions shines through clearly.

EARLY MODERN

The greatest conventional challenge of the early modern period is the fact that it corresponds so closely with standard periodization in Western history, capturing the full flowering of the Renaissance and running through the Enlightenment, which deepens the danger of seeing the period excessively in Western terms. The challenge can be met, but it requires explicit effort. Some world historians have been concerned about the convenience date 1450 as the period’s launch, arguing that the early 1500s would be better in highlighting the facts that the inclusion of the Americas was underway and that the importance of the Ottoman Empire was confirmed and extended by a victory over an Egyptian army (defeat of the Mamluks, 1517). Chinese historians have long pointed out that the 1450 date doesn’t coincide with Chinese periodization, which more commonly would look to the establishment of the new Ming dynasty in the later fourteenth century. But while this kind of messiness can be noted– specific regional dynamics routinely differ from world his- tory periodization choices – it hardly requires a different choice of date. Indeed, the Chinese decision in 1439 to halt its great trading expeditions adds to the importance of the mid-fifteenth century as the beginning of a major new world history transition which would include novel Western, Russian, and Ottoman activities as well.

Recently, a social scientist/historian, Jack Goldstone, has raised a new kind of issue about the early modern period. He sees these centuries as the beginning of the end for pre-modern, or agri- cultural patterns. Goldstone even wonders if world history period- ization as a whole could be rethought: a new and longer ancient or pre-modern period would capture the heart of the agricultural experience, from the early civilizations in 3500 BCE onward to the end of the post-classical period. Then the next chunk of time, from the end of the post-classical all the way to 1900, would be grouped as the “late pre-modern.” Obviously this alternative is partly a matter of labeling. But it also urges attention to the centuries after 1400, and not only in the West, as the seedbed for tentative inno- vations that would ultimately overturn the long-established agri- cultural patterns in politics and culture as well as the economy.

Thefinal analytical vulnerability for the early modern period (calling attention to the period’s brevity and spilling over into definitions of the long nineteenth century) is the lack of any clear marker for the period’s end. The Seven Years War (1756–63) rebalanced power relations in Europe, shifted British policies in North America and, above all, cleared the way for growing British control of India. It was a geographically extensive conflict that both revealed and promoted growing European world power. And sometime around 1750 (though the 1770s are probably a better choice) thefirst clear signs of British industrialization began a vital economic and social transition in Europe and the world. On the other hand, it wasn’t until around 1840 that Europe’s economic relationship with China really changed, to Chinese disadvantage. And there’s the whole question of how to fit in the French, Haitian and American revolutions, and the Latin American struggles for independence. The fact is that choosing an end to the early modern period and defining when new themes begin to seize center stage– crucial for defining the long nineteenth century– is a work in progress. There’s no bitter debate here, aside from Goldstone’s interesting proposal, but it would be possible for argue for a somewhat different set of periodization choices.

LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY

To date, however, world historians are in the main fairly attached to defining a separate “long 19th century,”, even though the period

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is quite short and even though many of the clearest new themes, including the full global impact of industrialization and the emer- gence of key characteristics of globalization, don’t emerge clearly until the 1850s or so.

If major emphasis rests on Europe’s growing world role and the related rise of settler societies like the United States, and the relative or absolute decline of most other areas, the long nineteenth century works well enough as a period, and the fact that it was a brief episode, with its end foreshadowed by the experiences and con- sequences of World War I, is part of the definition. This is a period shaped by power dynamics above all, and undone as the power dynamics began to change in the early twentieth century.

THE CONTEMPORARY ERA

The final potential world history period – the contemporary era still unfolding– inescapably involves different analytical issues from those surrounding other major periods because we don’t know the end of the story. Definitions of new themes are inherently more tentative, and we will return to the question of the relationship between the contemporary world and world history in a final chapter.

Some world historians, facing the twentieth century and its par- ticular complexities and uncertainties, simply accept a choppy peri- odization approach, noting the interwar decades as bookended by two major wars and embellished by the Depression, then turning to the Cold War and decolonization framework for the four decades after World War II, then talking about recent trends in a more open-ended fashion. Another group of historians, fascinated by the innovative force of globalization, downplay the first half of the twentieth century and see the 1950s as the turning point to the new era with globalization its organizing principle. There is, in sum, far less agreement about this most recent turn in world history periodization than about the issues involved in the earlier timeframes. The key point, in this final exercise, is to know what the issues are in various options and, above all, to apply analytical criteria derived from earlier periodization assessments to the contemporary experience. The guidelines are clear: look for a reduction in the force of prior themes – most obviously, the themes of the long

twentieth century – and simultaneously define new themes, including changes in power relationships and interaction patterns.

Periodization rests on decisions students and scholars make about how best to define time, and change within time. As with any set of decisions, alternatives can and should be discussed. Even if con- ventional decisions – as set forth, for example, in standard world history textbooks – seem fully acceptable, they must be examined, their bases understood. The result will spill over directly into the nurturance of appropriate habits of mind, and it will make the task of assimilating world history data – the factual materials – not only more meaningful but ultimately, by providing key highlights in advance, easier as well.

But decisions about time are only a first step in the process of understanding how world history is put together. They lead ines- capably to the need for decisions about place. Basic world history periods set forth core themes, including changes in patterns of interaction, and by definition the themes must apply to a number of different societies. The themes do not, however, predict how the societies involved will handle the changes involved. The themes, in essence, are the global part of the world history exercise; they must be combined with the local and regional. Deciding about place – about how to define and handle different regional units – is the next step in the larger exercise.

FURTHER READING

Periodization is not discussed as often as might be imagined, given its centrality to historical research and teaching, but there are some important books and articles. See Lawrence Besserman, ed., The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 1996) and Jerry H. Bentley, “Cross-Cultural Interaction and Periodization in World History,” in American Historical Review (June 1996): 749–70. See also Ross Dunn, “Periodization and Chronological Coverage in a World History Survey,” in What Americans Should Know: Western Civilization or World History? Ed., Josef W. Konvitz (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1985); and Jack Goldstone,“The Problem of the ‘Early Modern’ World,” in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 41 (1998): 249–84. On Big History, see David Christian, Maps of Time: An Introduction to Big History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004).

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