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Linguists’ interest in modality has traditionally centred on a specific grammatical system, that of the modal auxiliaries – may, will, and must. These neatly express three degrees of modality: low, median, and high. It follows that, for linguists, truth is not an ‘either–or’ matter (true or false), but a matter of degree:

She may use another name (low modality) She will use another name (median modality) She must use another name (high modality)

These three degrees of modality can of course also be expressed by related nouns – for example, certainty, probability, possibility – adjectives – for example, certain, likely, possible – and adverbs – for example, certainly, probably, maybe.

Halliday (1985) added an important dimension. He realized that modality not only allows us to choose degrees of truth, but also kinds of truth. The examples cited above are all based on the idea of probability. They represent values on a scale that runs from ‘Yes, true’ to ‘No, false’. The yardstick for this kind of truth goes something like this: the higher the probability that what-is-asserted really exists, or has really occurred, or will really occur, the higher the modality of the assertion. Another kind of truth is frequency modality. This is based on a scale that runs from ‘Yes, always’ and ‘No, never’ – or ‘Yes, everybody’ to ‘No, nobody’. Here the truth criterion goes something like this: the more often what-is-asserted happens, or the more people think or say or do it, the higher the modality of that assertion. The linguistic resources used to realize this therefore again express degrees of frequency, for example, always–often–sometimes, most–many–some, etc.

She sometimes uses another name (low frequency modality) She often uses another name (median frequency modality) She always uses another name (high frequency modality)

Halliday also distinguished between subjective modality and objective modality. In the case of subjective modality, the truth criterion goes something like this: the stronger my inner conviction about the truth of an assertion, the higher the modality of that assertion. In the case of objective modality the idea of objective truth is explic- itly expressed. Again, this does not mean that the assertion actually is objectively true, merely that it is represented as such. In both cases the assertion is preceded by a frame ending in ‘that’, for example, ‘It is a fact that (she uses another name)’ or ‘I have the impression that (she uses another name)’. In the case of subjective modality this frame has a person as the subject and uses a ‘verb of cognition’. It is these verbs which then express the degrees of modality, for example, know–believe–guess.

I have a feeling that she uses another name (low subjective modality)

I am fairly confident that she uses another name (median subjective modality) I am convinced that she uses another name (high subjective modality)

In the case of objective modality, the frame begins with ‘it is’ or ‘there is’, and it is this which explicitly expresses impersonal objectivity. The frame then uses nouns or adjectives to indicate the degree of modality, for example:

It is possible that she uses another name (low objective modality)

There is a good likelihood that she uses another name (median objective modality)

Different social groups and institutions prefer different kinds of truth. Frequency modality is preferred, for instance, in the quantitative social sciences and in administrative practices which use social science discourses – for example, opinion polls – and it is also highly regarded in journalism. Subjective modality is used in fields that are considered personal, such as romantic love, psychotherapy, art, certain kinds of religion. As objectivity is the most highly valued kind of truth in the dominant institutions of Western societies, subjective modality is often used in connection with people who have comparatively little social power, for example, women, children, consumers, patients, or, as we have seen, native peoples. In media interviews the expert is usually asked questions which seek to elicit objective modality – ‘What IS the case?’ – and the ordinary person-in-the-street is usually asked ques- tions which seek to elicit subjective modality – ‘What do you FEEL about it?’ Clearly social groups and institutions differ not only in the truth values they assign to different versions of reality, but also in the kinds of truth they use to do this. As most of us belong to more than one social group and operate within several social institu- tions, we must, for all practical purposes – and whatever we really believe – be seen to adhere to different truths in different contexts, at least if we want to be seen to belong. I can now summarize my analysis of the ‘Native American beliefs’ text more fully, in the table below. This shows up the writer’s ambivalent attitude towards Native American beliefs even more clearly – s/he makes them seem at once untrue (on a scientific level, perhaps) and true (on a more abstract, symbolic and subjective level). Clearly modality is not an either/or business. It can express complex and ambiguous attitudes that are not easy to tabulate. It also shows that modality analysis is ulti- mately an interpretation, albeit one that lays its cards on the table. In many cases the choices are not clear-cut. Should ‘sign and symbol’ be seen as ‘median’ or ‘low’ for instance? Are there really only three degrees or many more? It is also clear that there are still gaps in the theory. What kind of modality is expressed by tense, for instance? But all this does not make the idea of modality invalid. It merely shows that there is plenty of scope for further thought and further development.

What is modalized Linguistic realizations Degree of modality Kind of modality

God is the source of life and manifested in the sun

most

believe (3 times) view as

present tense (3 times) past tense (2 times) sign and symbol

high median median high low median frequency subjective subjective ? ? subjective God is a man in the sky picture as low subjective Native Americans

worship the sun

often think past tense median low low frequency subjective ?

Native Americans see the sun as a sign and symbol

The study of modality began in the philosophy of language, as a concern with the absolute, context-independent truth of assertions. Then it moved to linguistics, which, as we have seen, started to emphasize the expression of truth values, but still remained mainly concerned with the modality of representations. Halliday moved this a step further when he observed that the same modal auxiliaries can express ‘what exists’ and ‘what is allowed’. For instance, ‘may’ can express not only possibility – ‘She may be using another name’ – but also permission, or its opposite – ‘You may not use another name’ – and ‘must’ can express not only the certainty of logical truth but also the abso- luteness of a social obligation. Thus there is a close connection between degrees of representational truth and degrees of social obligation. Philosophers have recognized this as well, through their concept of ‘deontic’ logic, the logic of obligation and permis- sion (Von Wright, 1956). All this laid the foundations for the social semiotic view that modality should be thought of as central to social life. Social semiotics stresses the fact that modality ‘ultimately has its source in the agreement of a group of people’, to quote Hodge and Kress again, and that social groups and institutions define their own truths, and relate them in their own ways to the truths of others.

The linguistic resources for expressing modality clearly go well beyond the gram- matical system of modal auxiliaries. We have seen how the past tense can express that an assertion is no longer valid, whereas the present tense can give it a sense of universal and timeless truth – compare ‘nineteenth century scientists said that …’ to ‘Scientists say that …’. A further way of expressing modality, very important in jour- nalism and academic writing, is through the ‘saying verbs’ that frame quoted and reported speech: ‘Scientists have claimed that …’ clearly has lower modality value than ‘Scientists have shown that …’. As Kress and Hodge have said:

There are a large number of ways of realising modality: non-verbal and verbal, through non-deliberate features (hesitations, ums, ers, etc.) and deliberate systematic features which include fillers (sort of), adverbs (probably, quite better), modal auxiliaries (can, must), and mental process verbs (think, under- stand, feel) and intonation

(1979: 127) This has been taken up more fully as social semiotics developed (for example, Hodge and Kress, 1988). According to social semioticians modality is not restricted to language but is a multimodal concept. All means of expression have modality resources. The question of truth emerges in all of them, even if the kinds of truth they allow and the ways in which they express degrees of truth will be different.