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For the past two centuries and first fifteen years of the sixteenth century the major power in the heartland of Islam was Mamluk sultanate (Slave8 dynasty). These imported slaves (al-mamalik al-Julban) used to be, after their training and education, the major source of army personnel. During the last years of Mamluk rule in Egypt, they took the form of unruly flock. Ibn Iyas notes their frequent demand for increasing expenses and allowances. The incidence of looting markets and ransacking shops by them that adversely affected the economy was also common. (Ibn Iyas, Vol. 4, p. 235, 95, 311, 357, 368-369, 400, 427-28, 484, 486).

During the Mamluk rule, due to strategic position of their sultanate, all the important governments of the time exchanged their embassies. Ibn Iyas (Vol. 4, pp. 268-69) notes that within a month about twenty envoys were received by Qansawh, for example, ambassadors of Iran, Turkey, India, France, Morocco, Venice, etc. Of course, Portuguese were never at good terms with Egyptian government. With the spirit of crusades, they attacked Egyptian interest in Mediterranean Sea, Red Sea and in and around Arabian Sea. Sultan Qansawh sent many expeditions to check their piracy and nuisance. In 1508, at the request of Mahmud Shah, Sultan of Gujarat, he sent an expedition to help him fight Portuguese who had established their hegemony in the Indian Sea and established their trading Center at Hormuz and stopped trade goods reaching Egypt. In the year 918/1512, the Mamluk amir Hasan was defeated by Portuguese in the Indian sea (Ibn Iyas, 4: p. 286). After the murder of Gujarat king Mahmud Shah in 918/1512, his successor Muzaffar shah sent his envoy to Egypt to get permission of sovereignty from the Abbasid caliph (ibid., p. 287).

Qansawh was always afraid of ambitions of Isma‛il Shah. In the year 916/1510 a group of people were arrested who were carrying letter from Isma‛il Shah to some European Kings asking them to help him against Egyptian Sultan. He suggested them to come through sea; he would be attacking through land (Ibn Iyas, 4: 191). In 917/1511 the hajj from Syria was cancelled because of Isma`il Sufi’s terror (Ibn Tulun, p. 291). In 917/1511 Isma‛il Shah defeated Uzbek King and sent his head to Qansawh as gift. (Ibn Iyas, 4:219). This was a clear threat to him. People of Egypt replied this war gift with their poetic contribution. Hundreds of poets presented their creative poetry. Ibn Iyas gives a selection of it (ibid, pp. 222-27).

Before Salim attacked and broke the power of Shah Isma‛il, the latter had already 'joined the rank of the Portuguese and indicated to an embassy headed by one Ruy Gomez that he was willing to attack Mecca' (Stripling, p. 35).

On the other hand, Qansawh had very good relations with the father of Salim, the Ottoman Sultan Bayazid II. They exchanged embassies and gifts. Bayazid helped the Mamluk Sultan with warships, weapons and

other materials in his war against Portuguese (Ibn Iyas, 4: 184, 201). When the former died, Qansawh wept and mourned and performed funeral prayer in absentia (ibid, pp. 269-70). Relations between the two governments strained after succession of Salim who wanted that Qansawh should be openly on his side in his war against Isma‛il Shah but the Mamluk Sultan adopted the policy of wait and watch (ibid, p. 376). It is also reported that he had secret dealings with the Iranian King (Ibn Tulun, 1998, p. 333). This made Salim furious. Moreover, some of the defectors informed Salim about the unjust treatment of the subject at the hands of Qansawh, excessive taxation, worsening economy, weak army, and moral decay (Ibn Iyas, p. 471). Salim was convinced that it was right time to take over Egypt and Syria. Had Salim not broken the increasing power of Isma‛il Shah on the one hand and captured the worsening government of Mamluks on the other, the history of the heartland of Islam must have been very different – one can easily imagine in the light of events that were taking place at that time.

To Armajani (1970, p. 157), ‘Islam owes a great deal to these soldiers and it is difficult to imagine what would have happened to the faith, had the Turks not appeared on the scene’. In earlier centuries ‘the Saljuq Turks saved Abbasids from Shi`a Fatimids and the Christian Crusaders’. The Ottoman Turks stopped the European onslaught after fall of Spain and checked the ambitions of Isma‛il Shah of Iran. 'They were first to establish Islam in Asia Minor and it was they who advanced the banner of Islam as far as the gates of Vienna'.

Ottomans played very important role in European politics. ‘The French-Ottoman alliance became an integral part of the European state system and a factor in the balance of power. … ‘Support for France and the Protestants, as well as for other anti-Hapsburg elements, such as Muslims and Jews from Spain, was cornerstone of Ottoman policy in Europe at this time’ (Itzkowitz, 1980, p. 34). ‘In 1552, there were even joint French and Turkish operations against Spanish ports, which receive a passing mention in some but not all of the Ottoman histories’ (Lewis, 1982, p. 45).

As the Iranian rulers were opposed to Ottoman Sultans, their diplomacy generally reflected this antagonism. ‘The Safavids separated

Iran from the rest of Muslim world and courted the friendship of Europe’ (Armajani, p. 172). The aim to destroy Ottoman power provided a common platform to Europe and Safawid Iran. Politically motivated, Shah Abbas brought the Armenian Christians to Isfahan and gave them commercial and religions privileges. While Portuguese, English, Dutch and Russian merchants carried business in Iran all over the time, merchants of Ottoman Empire could do it during peace periods only. There was also economic justification for Safawid's preferential treatment of Europeans because trade routes to Europe had shifted from Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope bypassing the overland trade of the Levant. There was exchange of embassies between Safawids and Governments of many European countries, all of them trying to win support against Ottoman rulers (ibid., pp. 172-75).

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