CAPITULO VIII EL NUEVO PACTO
LAS COSAS NUEVAS
B. LAS CARTAS A LAS SIETE IGLESIAS DE LOS CAPÍTULOS DOS Y TRES DE APOCALIPSIS
In contrast to France and Great Britain, National Socialist Germany and fascist Italy were motivated by a revisionist agenda, which sought to revolutionize the international order. Italy considered the Eastern Mediterranean as its own sphere of influence, challenging British dominance of the region. The escalation of the conflict in Palestine after 1936 can therefore also be understood as a result of Italian aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the 1920s, Italy had sought to increase its influence in the Middle East by means of economic expansion, propaganda and eventually, military conquest. Propaganda encompassed an open, legitimate form, which can be summarized as cultural propaganda. The establishment of language schools within the framework of the Dante Aligheri Society, concert tours by Italian opera ensembles, and official state visits all belonged to this category. In 1928, the Italo-Palestine Committee was established under the aegis of the former Minister of Colonies Lanza di Scalea, to advance Italian interests.127 However, since the early 1930s, Italy had indulged in an
aggressive propaganda campaign in the Middle East, a campaign which was pro- Arabic, pro-Islamic as well as anti-British and anti-Zionist in nature. Italian propaganda invoked both geopolitical and ideological arguments, claiming a general affinity between Islam and Fascism, to justify Italy’s friendship with the Islamic world.128 These
efforts were organized and coordinated in a centralized fashion. The Ministry of Popular Culture was responsible for the operational planning, following the guidelines set out by Foreign Office. Thus, propaganda was an essential pillar in realizing Italy’s foreign policy goals.129 Two events pushed the Italians to undertake a vigorous
propaganda campaign towards the Arab and Muslim world in the 1930s. The suppression of the Libyan resistance had culminated in the forced resettlement of 100’000 inhabitants and the execution of the resistance leader, Omar Mukhtar, in 1931. Public opinion in the Arab world erupted against Italy, especially in Egypt. Italy’s attack
127 Massimiliano Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940
(Routledge, 2010), 38–40.
128 Ibid., 38.
129 Manuela Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940 (Routledge, 2006), 68.
53 on Ethiopia in 1935 provoked a similar reaction.130 The campaign involved different
operations. Radio Bari started broadcasting to the Middle East in 1934, finding a receptive audience in Palestine and Egypt. According to a British report from 1936, many Arabs found the mixture of news and entertainment appealing and the station was widely played in cafés. Its transmissions took on a sharp anti-British edge after 1935, which only lessened for a short period after the Easter Accords in April 1938.131
While radio propaganda targeted the broader Arab population, other methods were prepared to gain support among the Arab elite. This included providing money to Arab newspapers, including Shakib Arslan’s La Nation Arabe, bribing Arab intellectuals and offering assistance to the Arab nationalist movement in general, in particular its youth organizations.
During the 1930s, the Arab national movement in Palestine under the leadership of Amin al-Husseini profited greatly from its Italian ties. In spring 1933, Rome instructed the Italian Consul General in Jerusalem to establish relations with Amin Husseini and the Arab-Palestinian leadership.132 At the same time, Shakib Arslan, suffering from
financial difficulties, also chose to accept Italian bribes. For the next three to four years, he received two million Lira (about 27’000 pounds) each year for his publications. In addition, Arslan and Jabiri served as the intermediaries for Italian financial support to the Palestinian national movement under Amin al-Husseini. The effects of the agreement with Italy became immediately visible in Arslan’s propaganda outlets. Dropping his former strident criticism of Italian policies, Arslan now concentrated his venomous attacks against the two other European powers in the Middle East, France and England. In a meeting between Arslan and Mussolini in early 1934, the terms of the agreement were finalized: Italy promised to soften its policy towards the Libyan Arabs and support the Arab cause in Syria and Palestine, in particular in matters of
130 Ibid., 135–36.
131 Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940, 40–42, 53–54. 132 Ibid., 92.
54 propaganda. In exchange, the Arabs would rein in their criticism of Italian policies in North Africa.133
The effects of this alliance and Italy’s increased aspirations in the Middle East were also felt in Europe. On December 21, 1933, the Italian Institute for the Middle and Far East (Ital. Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente) under the chairmanship of Giovanni Gentile, Italy’s leading fascist philosopher, was inaugurated. One day later, on December 22, the first Conference of Oriental Students took place in Rome. It was a major cultural event, having been organized under the auspices of Fascist University Groups (Ital. Gruppi universatiri fascisti) and enjoying the attendance of about 600 students.134 Shakib Arslan assisted the Italians in organizing the conference.135
Mussolini himself graced the event with a speech, positing the resurrection of a Mediterranean nation under the leadership of fascist Italy. A common spirit and their opposition to the Western powers united both. In particular, he blamed capitalism and liberalism for the European estrangement from the East: “The Idea that Asia was inimical to Europe was formed and spread, while, in reality, it was about a particular mentality developing in certain European countries, which was incapable and indifferent to understand Asia.” The reaction in Asia against the “liberal and capitalist degeneration”, against the “lack of soul and ideal” in the West, was the same, which
motivated Fascism, he declared. “Today, with the Fascist renaissance, a foremost spiritual renaissance, Rome and the Mediterranean are about to reassume their
unifying roles. And it is for this that the new Italy – this Italy – has assembled you
here.”136The listeners greeted Mussolini’s speech with enthusiastic applause. The son
of Ihsan Jabiri, Awnallah Jabiri, who represented the Arab students at the conference,
133 Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad, 79; Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the
Middle East, 1922–1940, 55–56.
134Stefano Fabei, “Un Ponte Verso l’Oriente,” Studi Piacentini 32, no. 2002 (n.d.):
102.
135Mauro Piras, “Politica Islamica e Propaganda Fascista in Siria e Libano (1932-
1940)” (Doctoral Thesis, Universita’ degli Studi di Cagliari, 2012), 50, http://veprints.unica.it/739/.
55 served as vice president, with the Indian representative Hussein Dabish acting as president. The conference lasted until December 27 when Dabish announced the establishment of the Confederation of Oriental Students (COS) to be seated in Rome. On April 6, 1934, the Permanent Office held its first reunion. According to president Jabiri, the COS’s goals were to promote the feeling of comradeship among Asian students, to encourage Asian students to study in Europe and lastly to facilitate the rapprochement between Orient and Occident. After the conference, the COS of Oriental Students published the first issue of the monthly magazine Jeune Asie, which served as its official organ.137 The Arab-Italian alliance was however not without risks,
in particular for the Arabs.
Many Arabs and Muslims viewed Italy’s propaganda offensive with suspicion, as Italy continued its colonial politics in Libya. This conflict would quickly enter the Arab student movement in Europe. On June 6, an Arab Student Committee in Geneva published a manifesto which condemned the COS as an “Instrument in the hands of the
imperialists” and called for a boycott of everyone collaborating with the Italians.138 The
COS defended itself against this criticism by claiming that it was an apolitical body and cared simply for the interests of the students and their countries. A second conference of oriental students was held in Rome on December 28, 1934. There, it was decided to turn the COS into an umbrella organization for student groups. Jabiri was again elected as vice president to the COS with the representative for China, Suanne Liao, serving as president. At the conference, the leadership looked with optimism to the future, expressing its hope to be recognized as an official student organization by the League of Nations.139 Three Jewish students from Palestine also attended the
conference. An incident occurred when, during a discussion, an Arab student hit one of the Jewish students.140 One of the Jewish students attending was probably Eliahu
Epstein, who was later responsible for Oriental Affairs at the Political Bureau of the
137 Ibid., 104–6. 138 Ibid., 106, 114. 139 Ibid., 108–11.
140V. V. and U. F., “ORIENTE IN GENERALE,” Oriente Moderno 15, no. 2 (1935):
56 Jewish Executive.141 However, due to rising tensions with Ethiopia, resulting in the war
against Ethiopia in October 1935, the organization ceased most of its activity. The last issue of the Jeune Asie appeared in March 1935.142 According to Eliahu Epstein, the
oriental expert of the Political Bureau of the Jewish Agency, the majority of students left the group because of the war, with the remaining members being mostly Arabs. Many had ignored the organization’s character as a tool of Italian foreign policy for a long time. Among those was also Eliahu Epstein, who reported that he had taken part in the activities of the COS during his time in Rome before becoming aware of its pro- fascist character.143 The Arab-Italian alliance also proved to be controversial in
Palestine itself.
Arslan’s well-known political and personal ties to Amin al-Husseini soon become a liability for their enemies to exploit. Arslan’s partner Ihsan Jabiri was also Musa al- Alami’s father in law. This closeness of both circles turned Arslan’s friendly stance toward the Italians into an issue of intra-Palestinian politics. In 1935, the Palestinian newspaper Al Moqattan published a letter by Arslan to the Mufti, in which he spoke about the agreement with Italy and a coordinated propaganda campaign. In the letter, Arslan also revealed how he had advised the Italians on how to sell their war in Abyssinia to the Muslim World by emphasizing alleged Abyssinian actions against Muslims. This left the impression that Arslan had sold out Arab interests. Arslan disputed the letter’s authenticity. However, Munif al-Husseini’s embrace of a pro-Italian line in an article in March 1935 in his newspaper Al-Jamia al-Islamiya, the Husseini clan’s mouthpiece, seemed only to confirm the opposition’s accusations of collusion between the Italians, Arslan and the Husseini clan. Another two subsequently published letters by Arslan both added credence to the accusation of collusion with the Italians. The first appeared again in the newspaper Al-Jamia al-Islamiya in April 1935, openly calling on the Mufti to abandon the British and support an Arab-Italian alliance.
141Eliahu Epstein, “Concerning the Letter of Kahany, Infomation about the Arab
Student Association in Europe,” November 26, 1937, CZA S25/4156.
142Fabei, “Un Ponte Verso l’Oriente,” 113.
143Epstein, “Concerning the Letter of Kahany, Infomation about the Arab Student
57 The second appeared a month later in the newspaper Filastin.144 The British Foreign
Office also learnt that Ihsan Jabiri had stated in private meetings that the Italians and the Syro-Palestinian Delegation had indeed reached an agreement.145 The Italian’s
support for the Palestinian national movement encouraged an escalation of its diplomatic, propagandistic and military efforts.
Despite such controversies, Italian financial contributions to the Arab national movement were too significant to let go. In total, the Italians would expend about 150’000 pounds between 1933 and 1938. In early 1936, the Arab-Palestinian leadership under Amin Husseini prepared a plan to launch an insurgency in Palestine and topple Emir Abdullah in Transjordan, with the Italians pledging to contribute 100’000 pounds to the enterprise.146 The money was directly funneled to the Mufti
through Shakib Arslan, Ihsan Jabiri and Mariano de Angelis, the Italian Consul General in Jerusalem. Donations from Egypt, India, Iraq, but also the diaspora communities in the Americas collected by roving propagandists added to the financial base of the uprising, as discussed in Chapter Two. Ali Masud, an employee of the Italian consulate in Cairo, remitted the money collected in Egypt to the assistant manager of the Misr Bank, who would hand it out to Jamal Husseini.147 However, in 1936 the British had
become aware of these financial networks. British investigations moreover revealed that Ihsan Jabiri had embezzled 22’000 pounds from the donations. The Italians therefore advised the Arab leadership to organize the transfer of funds through an intermediary outside of Palestine. This function was assumed by Musa Alami, a
144 Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad, 78–80; Yehoshua Porath, In Search of
Arab Unity 1930-1945, Reprint edition (London, England ; Totowa, N.J: Routledge,
1986), 65–66; see also Götz Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The
Ambivalence of the German Option, 1933–1945 (Routledge, 2009), 41; Ilan Pappe,
The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty: The Husaynis, 1700-1948 (London: Saqi
Books, 2010), 298; Pappe however mistakes Shakib Arslan with his brother Adil Arslan.
145 Williams, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad, 79.
146 Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940, 89–92. 147 Pappe, The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty, 289.
58 confidant to the Mufti and the son-in-law of Jabiri. This allowed him to carry on his mission with due diligence for the duration of the entire revolt.148 Musa Alami would
play a central role in organizing AHC propaganda after World War II. The Italians also manipulated the Arab press on behalf of the Arab Revolt. They furnished articles, bribed journalists and financed newspapers in Palestine, Egypt and Syria to push them to an anti-British and pro-Italian line. In Jerusalem, the Swiss priest Alessandro Mombelli served as a liaison between the Arab journalists and the Italian government. He also provided atrocity propaganda to the Italians and to many Catholic newspapers in Europe, for which he served as their correspondent in Palestine.149 The alliance
between Italy, Arslan and the Husseini clan would hold for three years until the signing of the Easter Accords on April 16, 1938, the Mediterranean equivalent to the Munich Agreement, when Italy promised to halt its anti-British propaganda campaign in return for receiving Britain’s acquiescence to its colonial conquests.150 The cessation of Italian
support contributed to the demise of the Arab Revolt in 1939.
After National Socialism’s rise to power, several Arab leaders approached Germany, among them Amin Husseini and Abdullah I of Jordan, in the hope of securing its support. They wished to build on the traditional partnership between Imperial Germany and pan-Islam. Few others were better disposed than Arslan to provide a link between German foreign policy and Arab nationalism. Arslan had a long history with the Germans which reached back to World War I, when Germany had recruited a number of Arab propagandists. In October 1918, Oppenheim’s colleague Curt Prüfer received the assignment to provide German passports for pro-German Arabs to help them settle in Switzerland. Among them was the Syrian Shakib Arslan, a gifted networker and already then one of the preeminent pan-Muslim intellectuals and publishers.151 Arslan
continued to maintain close personal and business ties with Germany. His old friend Curt Prüfer from the days of German-Turkish brothers-in-arms was now responsible
148 Fiore, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922–1940, 95–98. 149 Ibid., 61.
150 Ibid., 53–54.
151 Donald M. McKale, Curt Prufer, German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler (Kent,
59 for Oriental Affairs at Abteilung III, the Anglo-American and Middle Eastern Division in the German Foreign Office AA (Ger. Auswärtiges Amt). Curt Prüfer harbored a deep sympathy for the pan-Arab project to unify the Arabic-speaking peoples, which he felt paralleled German history. Moreover, he shared the religious nationalists’ opinion that Islam would need to form the spiritual and legal base of such a state. Despite his personal affinities, he followed the precepts of German foreign policy in the early Hitler years, which considered the Middle East an area of minor importance and situated in the Italian sphere. Hitler was also keen to avoid provoking the English and the French during this early phase of his regime.152 German reluctance was evident in November
1934, when Arslan and Jabiri travelled to Berlin to meet up with Curt Prüfer. In the meeting, Arslan proposed an Arab-German alliance, which would be useful in a future confrontation between Germany and France. After the meeting, Prüfer recalled Germany’s disappointment with the Muslims in the First World War in his private notes. In spite of the Turkish declaration of Jihad, few Muslims had joined the German war effort. Prüfer therefore formally rejected Arslan’s offer of alliance and his request for an audience with Hitler. In an internal memorandum from November 7, 1934, he recorded that Germany could not provide the Arabs with money and arms.153 In
February 1935, Arslan and Jabiri also approached Fritz Grobba, the German ambassador in Iraq, only to be rejected again.154 Several other approaches followed.
Only when Hitler abandoned his plans for a compromise with Great Britain in 1938, did he decide to support the Arab Revolt. German Intelligence chief Wilhelm Canaris reported in June 1939 that the Mufti Amin al-Husseini had thanked him profusely for this support, by asserting that “Only through the monetary means provided by us had
it been possible for him to stage the insurgency in Palestine.”155 Although militarily
152 Ibid., 113–14.
153 Nordbruch, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon, 41–42; McKale, Curt Prufer, German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler, 114.
154 McKale, Curt Prufer, German Diplomat from the Kaiser to Hitler, 114.
155 Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina, Veröffentlichungen der Forschungsstelle
Ludwigsburg der Universität Stuttgart (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006), 61–62.
60 defeated, the Arab Revolt in Palestine had reached its political goal. With the British adoption of the White Paper in 1939, the immigration of Jews was limited to 70’000 persons. As a result, there would never be a Jewish majority in Palestine and the Balfour Declaration had essentially been voided. Moreover, the White Paper trapped hundreds of thousands of Jews wanting to escape from Europe, with the worst possible consequences.
1.5 AHC Networks in Syria and Egypt, Barudi’s Arab National Bureau and the Bludan