There is thus a vast literature on party co-operation, but this literature tends to focus on individual forms of co-operation, such as cabinet coalitions, legislative agreements or electoral pacts (Debus, 2008, Gschwend and Hooghe, 2008, Muller et al., 2008b). This extensive literature has aided our understanding of the dynamics of co-operation: we know more about how offices might be distributed, the policy-payoffs for each actor, and the potential costs and benefits that might result from bargaining.
However, we know less about the parties involved and the reasons for, and consequences of, their interaction with each other. Regarding the potential for co-operation between Labour and the Liberal Democrats, it is one thing to analyse why the two parties did not enter into
coalition following the 2010 general election, but the relationship between the two parties
6 Zac Goldsmith officially stood as an Independent, but was formerly the Conservative MP and was heavily backed by the local Conservative association.
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during the 2010 parliament was affected by decisions at the previous general election. Those decisions had an effect on the two parties’ interaction ahead of the 2015 general election, and all had an effect on their interaction in the present. A longer-term, more coherent analysis of party interaction, rather than just focusing on one-event in time, has been theorised and modelled before in the comparative literature (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, Schofield, 1993, Strøm, 1990). Analysing events, their effects, and the role of political parties within them provides an opportunity for an in-depth analysis of a single case study, which can then better inform our understanding of Labour and the Liberal Democrats.
More broadly, the purpose of research on co-operation should not be just to better understand the structures of coalitions and the payoffs of bargaining, but to also understand the
motivations of political parties and actors involved in the process, and the considerations they make about co-operation as a means of achieving their objectives. Political parties – often party elites but this depends on their organisation – have decisions to make which affect how they interact with other parties. As Michels ((1915) 1959: 130) argues, ‘different
individualities react differently to the same environment’. Such choices might depend on the potential costs and benefits that might follow a course of actions, or other organisational factors. How co-operation is understood and addressed by political parties is an important question to be answered.
The thesis thus draws from different understandings of co-operation to hopefully provide a descriptively and analytically rich framework. This raises the understandable objection that bringing together different understandings of co-operation fails to adequately understand each form of co-operation individually. Each arena of co-operation has received dedicated and specific attention in its own right (see Boston and Bullock, 2012, Fisher, 2004, Golder, 2005, Muller et al., 2008a: as examples). However, they are all forms of co-operation, and a revised approach that recognises the multi-faceted nature of co-operation can better illuminate how and why parties interact in the way they do. Many of the challenges parties face in making decisions about one form of co-operation can apply in another form as well. Indeed, parties are often choosing between a variety of potential forms of competition or co-operation. For instance, a pre-electoral pact suggests a clear signal of co-operation between two parties that strongly signals the possibility of further co-operation after an election (Golder, 2005).
Legislative co-operation does not necessarily have different incentives and obstacles to governmental co-operation (Boston and Bullock, 2012, Strøm, 1990). Together, the sheer
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diversity of co-operation and academic analysis of it suggests that a revised approach that recognises this is required.
As a starting point, it is useful to consider co-operation as a form of party interaction, alongside party competition. From Ostrogorski’s (1902) work on the British and American party systems through to more contemporary analysis of Western democracies, rational choice models of competition remain the dominant prism through which to understand party
interaction. Downs’ (1957) spatial vote-maximising models assumed that voters were rational and individualistic, and introduced an economic approach to the study of party competition along a largely left-right ideological scale. Stokes (1963) later argued that certain ‘valence’
issues could not be explained by spatial models of competition. However, the two are not entirely discrete interactions. As Schattschneider (1960: 71) argues, ‘the crucial problem in politics is the management of conflict’. Competition and co-operation provide the means of doing so.7
To understand a party’s objectives, Muller and Strøm’s (1999b) triad model of office-seeking, policy-seeking and vote-seeking is a helpful starting point. The office-seeking model argues that parties seek to maximise their control over political office: that is, governmental or sub-governmental appointments or portfolios (Leiserson, 1966, Riker, 1962). These theories were argued to give insufficient attention to policy, and policy-seeking theories thus were put forward, with their supporters arguing that political parties look to have maximum influence on public policy and achieving their policy objectives (Axelrod, 1970, De Swaan, 1973). The vote-seeking model, although now often connected with the office-seeking model, suggests that parties are vote-maximisers, and that policies are primarily the means to that goal (Downs, 1957). These three models of party behaviour, or more specifically party elite behaviour, are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Indeed, Downs recognised that a party’s policy programmes involved understanding the preferences of the electorate. Party elites may seek votes as a means of winning office or implementing policy. They could implement
7 Franzmann (2011) makes a persuasive case that competition should be used more to describe the structures and conditions in which parties interact, and that the two described types of interaction should not be competition and co-operation, but contest and co-operation. However, I argue that abiding by the most recognised terms of competition and co-operation provides the most useful platform from which to understand party interaction.
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policy to win votes to then win office. However, they can impact each other in both positive and negative ways. Just as being in office could lead to implementing vote-seeking policies, it could also generate electoral costs due to unpopularity or perceived incompetence. Each action has consequences that will affect the other.
Competition and co-operation thus provide a means for political parties to achieve these objectives. However, they remain different in their operation. Parties look to win office: to do so requires a majority or coalition potential. One competitive means of achieving this
objective would be to put candidates forward in every seat available in an election, attempting to defeat other parties in as many seats as possible to win an electorally relevant share of seats that grants them office. One co-operative means of achieving this objective would be to support another party’s candidates (and/or vice versa) in order to defeat what they see as a greater opponent(s). In light of an election, should no one party have a legislative majority, parties may need to form alliances of some sort in order to pass legislation.
The overarching objective – winning office – remains the same. The means of doing so - competition or co-operation - differ. Competition and co-operation can run alongside each other. For example, should two parties co-operate in any manner short of a merger, it necessarily follows that they will still be competing in some shape or form. Two parties joining forces in a coalition may still contest elections against each other. Two parties operating in an electoral pact in some constituencies may still compete in others, and they may not then co-operate in a coalition or legislative agreement. It is not necessarily the case, and indeed in practice very unlikely, that parties solely co-operate but not compete. Different aspects of party interaction are thus somewhat autonomous of each other (Ware, 2009).
Nonetheless, the two forms of interaction are sufficiently different to warrant analysis of their respective characteristics. Co-operation is a fundamentally different action from competition.
Co-operation might involve two parties maximising organisational resources to defeat an opponent in a constituency, or collaboration over the course of a parliament, be that in
coalition or a looser arrangement. It sets about a process of working together that, even if it is a means of satisfying office, policy and/or vote-seeking objectives, involves coordination and collaboration in a manner not necessarily witnessed in competition. In doing so, it recognises the importance of another party to achieve your objective. Co-operation might therefore be understood as the collective pursuit of compatible interests by two or more political parties, with the recognition that those interests cannot necessarily be achieved alone.
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This understanding is slightly different to that proposed by Bartolini (1999: 439), who argues that, in co-operative relationships, ‘actors may still be considered as pursuing individual interests, but they must accept at least some partial subordination of such interests to a collective, all-actors’ goal’. Co-operation need not always involve a collective interest. For example, co-operation between Labour and the Liberals predominantly rested on Labour wanting to accelerate its political development and the Liberals wanting to form a
government. There may be situations where interests remain distinct but co-operation still takes place. The crucial point is that interests are compatible.
It is proposed here that there may be multiple motives for operation. Although co-operation might involve sharing, collaboration and co-ordination, that does not make it an ideal for party elites to engage in. Political parties, whether co-operating or competing, are concerned with their own interest. In this sense, actors within political parties are rational actors: that is, they are motivated by ‘private’ desires, such as power and reputation (Laver, 1997). Co-operation, for the most part8, is the means of achieving it. It is the recognition that interests might still be distinct, but are nonetheless compatible, and might be most readily achieved by some form of co-operative action.
Parties need to take into account to what extent co-operation can help them achieve their interests and objectives, be those office, policy or vote-seeking. As argued by Koole and subsequently by Carty (Carty, 2004, Koole, 1994), how a party organises itself will shape and affect the manner of the actions that it takes (in this case, co-operation and competition between parties). Whether party elites take decisions in their own personal interest or in their party’s interest, the consequences remain. A useful way of breaking down the various
interests within a political party with regard to competition and co-operation is to think of incentives and obstacles to party co-operation. If co-operation increases a party’s coalition potential, or electorally weakens a competitor, or increases the chance of maximising votes or implementing policy, then this presents an incentive to operation. If on the other hand,
8 In some cases, co-operation could be an end in itself, i.e. to promote a less adversarial political system.
Examples of this objective, particularly in the context of British politics, are rare.
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operation has negative consequences for these considerations, it presents an obstacle. The same applies to decisions surrounding competition.
Incentives and obstacles can also apply to actors within each party. As will be argued throughout this thesis, actors within both Labour and the Liberal Democrats have faced and continue to face these decisions. Co-operation could have consequences for actors within parties. For example, a party leader could see their support within their party or the country eroded if they co-operate with another party. Party members might not countenance their party co-operating with another. Actors at every stratum of a political party make these decisions freely, and they shape the structure they are in, but it is a reciprocal process. The next section outlines the incentives and obstacles to co-operation that this thesis will consider.