Not because of the party’s past use of Nazi paraphernalia, but rather because its ideology and organizational structures fulfill the criteria of what constitutes a neo- Nazi group. Nazism and by extension neo-Nazism, are variations of fascism. Both movements shared similar core values, had similar social bases and developed similar movements. The main difference between the two can be found in the Nazi emphasis on the ‘volk’, i.e. the people, versus the fascist focus on the state. But these were variations on common themes. In other words, Nazis were fascists, but simply put, Nazism placed a greater emphasis on nationalism. All variants of fascism are pan-nationalist, authoritarian, statist, and militarist movements, seeking to transcend social cleavages and cleanse the nation from internal (i.e. political dissidents) and external (i.e. those not belonging to the ‘organic’ nation) enemies.
The Golden Dawn is precisely that. It belongs to the fascist family and fulfils all the above criteria, including the emphasis Nazism places on the ‘Nation’. So, while the party itself may reject the fascist label, it nonetheless espouses all core fascist- and more specifically Nazi (principles including nationalism, paramilitarism, statism, transcence and cleansing).
The question is why has the Greek society - a society that has experienced Nazi atrocities and a military junta - granted parliamentary representation to such a group?
The answer is that the Golden Dawn has been successful and not despite its anti-systemic rhetoric. The party has increased its appeal by propounding plausible solutions to the three sets of crises - economic, political and ideological - that have culminated in an overall crisis of democracy in Greece. Much of the party's success can be attributed to its strategic choice to tap into the widespread disillusionment of the Greek people by offering them a 'nationalist solution', a rhetoric that emphasizes the twin fascist myths of social decadence and national rebirth as a way out of the Greek crisis. The Golden Dawn arose in Greece at a time of severe economic crisis resulting in recession, high rates of government deficit as percentage of GDP, high levels of unemployment and stern austerity measures. It makes sense to seek causal links between the Eurozone crisis and the rise of the Golden Dawn. However, it would be limited to assume that people’s grievances automatically translate into far right-wing party mobilisation. Other European countries that were also severely affected by the Eurozone crisis, including Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, Spain and Italy, did not experience a comparable rise in support for the far right. Looking to supply, the crisis in Greece also resulted in the fragmentation of the party system, allowing small parties to enter the political scene. However it is also limited to assume that political opportunities will automatically lead to the rise of far right-wing parties. While in some of the most severely affected countries noted above, the main parties were weakened, allowing for smaller parties to enter the system. It was far left-wing parties that benefitted from this and examples include the Spanish PODEMOS and the Irish Sinn Feinn. Taking party discourse into account, we could argue that the Golden Dawn has been successful because of the rhetoric it puts forward. However, National Popular Front (ELAM), the Golden Dawn’s sister party in crisis-ridden Cyprus, which has adopted a similar discourse has not enjoyed similar levels of success. Therefore, neither demand nor supply-side explanations in themselves fully capture the dynamics of far right-wing party support in Greece.
The success of the Golden Dawn must be understood precisely within this context, as dependent on the extent to which it was able to propound plausible solutions to the three sets of crises - economic, political and ideological - that befell Greece and culminated in an overall crisis of democracy to which the Golden Dawn offered a nationalist solution. We show this by drawing upon theories of fascism (Michael Mann and Roger Griffin). We argue that the nature of the Greek crisis and the fact that its economic, political and ideological dimensions challenged the Greek nation- state at its core opened a political opportunity for the Golden Dawn to present itself as the saviour of the nation and defender of the
national mission. Like fascist movements of the past, the Golden Dawn puts forward “a ‘palingenetic myth’ of populist ultra- nationalism, seeking a nation rising Phoenix-like from the ashes of an old decadent social order”28
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In line with our argument, which focuses on the interaction between demand and supply-side dynamics, in this book we combine quantitative analysis of voting behaviour with qualitative analysis of party documents in order to examine the rise of the Golden Dawn. Regarding voting behaviour, we examine individual-level data from the Hellenic Panel Component of the Voter Study of the European Election Study 2014. In our qualitative analysis, we have examined over 1500 Golden Dawn online materials uploaded on the Golden Dawn website between April 2012 and September 2014 under the sections current affairs, ideological texts, history and civilisation.
The rise of the Golden Dawn and its popular endorsement in the Greek political system raises a number of questions regarding the nature of democratic politics. It has significant policy implications. It means the rise of the Golden Dawn has been facilitated both by the particular socio-political dynamics of the crisis and the availability of existing institutional and cultural resources which have presented opportunities to the party. The ability of the Golden Dawn to operate within the confines of parliamentary politics has significantly impacted on Greek society, both directly and indirectly. Beyond shifting the policy agenda and legitimizing exclusionary and conservative policies, it has also revealed the deeply ingrained intolerance and propensity towards violence especially in a society ridden by crisis.