CASO DE ÉXITO

In this chapter, I first discuss my method to empirically test my hypotheses. I then discuss my case selection process and identify the cases on which I utilize this methodology. Next, I discuss how I operationalize and measure my variables that I test in those cases and close with a preview of my case study format and flow.

As a review, my first hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the international level. Sources of these credible commitment problems include spoilers, competitors, and other international conditions. My second hypothesis suggests that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that would undermine the willingness of a state’s leadership or its winning coalition to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. Sources of these credible commitment problems include disinterest, trust, and reconciliation problems; of these, the most likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts is reconciliation problems within the former U.S. adversary. My third and fourth hypotheses suggest that the qualities of cooperation in the relationships between the United States and its former adversaries will suffer in the presence of credible commitment problems at the domestic level that would undermine the opportunity of a state’s leadership to credibly commit to strategic cooperation. Sources of these credible commitment problems include

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state capacity and political unification problems; of these, the most likely source of credible commitment problems in these contexts is political unification problems within the former U.S. adversary.

Method for Conducting Empirical Tests: A Qualitative Approach

My theory identifies several sources of credible commitment problems at the international and domestic levels that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. My theory recognizes that there is a great deal of complexity and texture in the circumstances that could influence a relationship’s qualities of cooperation over the course of an enduring relationship. All of this complexity and texture must be accounted for in my research design and conduct. In the remainder of this section, I identify my methodological approach, justify this choice, and explain my process for data collection.

The approach

My central empirical approach is qualitative—an in-depth examination of strategic cooperation behavior in a small number of cases involving the United States and war. The strategy I use is best characterized as Comparative Historical Analysis (CHA). It includes “structured and focused” controlled comparisons to guide data collection and enable systematic comparisons of the cases to gain leverage over my puzzle.82 Although I do not employ “process tracing” in the conventional sense,83

I do trace the evolution of variables over time to show how variations in sources of credible commitment problems cause variations in qualities of cooperation and how the prospective participants do or do not

82 _{See George and Bennett 2005, 67 and George and McKeown 1985, 44-49.} 83 _{See Bennett in Brady and Collier, 2010.}

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become gradually enmeshed in a relationship with higher qualities of cooperation. Taken as a whole, the cases I study demonstrate how variations in sources of credible commitment problems at both the international and domestic levels cause variations in qualities of cooperation.

The Justification

The obvious rationale for choosing this approach is that there are relatively few cases in my universe (less than 20) which makes a large-N study impractical. But beyond that, the evolutions of the variables in these cases are big, contextual, textured, transpire over long periods of time, and are driven in part by strategic behavior at the highest levels of a state. It is important to capture the nuances of these evolutions to better understand the dynamics of strategic cooperation outcomes, and the qualitative CHA method accommodates this aim nicely.

To be more specific, strategic cooperation decisions are made by state leaders and the best way to assess my hypotheses with high confidence and within the scope of this study is to assess each variable and how those variables influence policymaker decisions regarding cooperation with their former adversary.84 We need a deep understanding of decision making processes to do this.

Temporal effects are also important. If one was to ask if there was a commitment problem based on disinterest in the cooperative arrangement between the United States and Germany after World War II, the answer could be either yes or no depending on where one looks in that variable’s evolution process. Immediately after World War II, the United States

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wanted to abandon Europe—it was disinterested in an intense form of strategic cooperation that we might now call an ideal strategic partnership. But as events unfolded, the U.S. position changed—disinterest ceased to be a problem within a few years of the war’s end. Further, interest is not irreversible, and had it changed, that would have suggested that the qualities of cooperation would have suffered. It is important to understand how a variable unfolds in relation to the others across time and how this dynamic influences strategic cooperation choices.

Equifinality, or “many alternative causal paths to the same outcome,” is a key consideration for this study.85 There are numerous ways that prospective participants could resolve credible commitment problems to improve their relationship’s qualities of cooperation. For example, there are many ways to promote reconciliation. This could be a byproduct of unquestionably just action, such as when a prospective participant removes a vile, coup-born government and restores a country‘s legitimate government with the overwhelming consent of the domestic community (e.g., perhaps U.S. action in Grenada, 1983). Reconciliation could also be promoted by a prospective participant’s “hero moments,” such as the Berlin Airlift or natural disaster relief. This might also be done through prolonged confidence-building measures in conjunction with a cooperative government that promotes a new official narrative to reorient the public’s identity of a prospective participant from foe to non-foe or friend. Similarly, there are numerous paths on which a credible commitment problem might originate, surface, and, in turn, undermine a relationship’s qualities of cooperation. A reconciliation problem might develop when a prospective participant initiates what many believe is an unjust war. Even if the war is

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perceived to be just, the postwar treatment of the defeated population might be perceived as unjust and create a reconciliation problem. A reconciliation problem could also preexist from centuries past and change little as a result of a more current conflict.

Finally, endogeneity, covariance, and interaction of the variables are important considerations for this study as well. Regarding endogeneity, not only do credible commitment problems cause variation in strategic cooperation results, but strategic cooperation results might cause variation in credible commitment problems, for better or worse. For instance, a pattern of successful cooperative ventures may help resolve trust issues, thereby rectifying that existing source of credible commitment problems. Conversely, a pattern of unsuccessful strategic cooperation ventures may spawn disinterest towards the relationship, thereby creating a credible commitment problem where none previously existed. Further, the actors in this story are not completely independent of each other. For instance, the winning coalition can influence a leader’s behavior towards strategic cooperation, but a leader can influence its winning coalition’s behavior towards strategic cooperation as well. Regarding covariance and interaction, the variables in this story may not always be independent of each other. In a case of extreme political unification problems, for example, we might also see an associated internal threat to regime survival (e.g., an insurgency). This could influence other variables such as disinterest. For instance, a regime might be otherwise unwilling to engage in strategic cooperation because of disinterest but, facing survival challenges caused by an insurgency, may suspend its disinterest problem at least until the threat to the regime' survival subsides.

The small-N, CHA approach allows me to thoroughly address all of these complexities and conduct controlled comparisons across cases to observe the various causal paths and

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independent causal effects of my independent variables. This approach also allows me to intensely examine the unfolding of each case over time and in sequence. In addition, it allows me to assess a wide variety of causal paths that may be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to adequately model quantitatively. It allows me to assess the myriad interdependent effects of the variables and assess the directions of their influence and causality. Plus, frankly, in my humble opinion, we learn more and could have a larger policy impact from a thicker study of this puzzle. A thicker study allows one to tease out the other unobservable implications of my theory in a way that is not possible in a large-N study, and a thicker study is more accessible to policymakers who might be encouraged to act upon its findings.

Data

I use a variety of evidence, from both primary and secondary data sources, to assess the evolution of each variable over time and how these variables affect the key decisions of policymakers who are responsible for strategic cooperation choices. Primary sources include public and private information from diaries, official government documents (e.g., actual strategic cooperation agreements), official government statements and press releases (e.g., White House and U.S. State Department communications), raw transcripts of speeches and conversations (e.g., transcripts from recordings of Saddam Hussein’s private conversations),86 survey data, interview data, and so forth. Secondary sources favor recognized subject matter experts (e.g., seasoned historiographers) as much as possible.

86 _{See “The Saddam Tapes,” Woods et al., 2011, which includes transcripts and analyses of Saddam Hussein’s} conversations that were gleaned from tapes recovered during the U.S. occupation of Iraq.

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While this technique helps to build a thick and comprehensive story of the preferences and intent behind observed actions, it is not without its challenges. For instance, primary sources include public and private statements of key actors for a given story. It can be good to “get it from the horse’s mouth,” so to speak. However, sometimes individuals misstate their preferences and intentions, intentionally (strategically) or otherwise.87 Some primary sources are widely available, and some are still classified. This can create an incomplete picture or an alternate reality. Secondary sources, particularly those from seasoned historiographers, can provide great insight into thoroughly debated topics. Secondary sources from the World War II era are abundant, thorough, and fairly stable after years of peer review. However, secondary sources are much less advanced for more recent conflicts such as those in Iraq and Afghanistan. This can create skepticism with regards to newer secondary information.

Where primary and secondary sources fall short, I turn towards the historical record, interpreting and assessing key decisions, actions, and consequences. Actions speak louder than words, as they say.

Case Selection

In this section, I clearly identify and justify my universe of cases, then present my case selections, selection criteria, and rationale.

My Universe

My universe of cases includes U.S. wars from World War II to present. I am primarily trying to explain strategic cooperation outcomes for this specific subcomponent of all

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possible strategic cooperation contexts. The U.S. wars in my universe are coincident with the Correlates of War Project’s inter-state war list, with the exception of Grenada and Panama, which I add because of their nature (a U.S. invasion followed by a regime change) and Libya, which has transpired since the last Correlates of War update. This universe of war dyads for possible postwar strategic cooperation relationships is comprised of the United States and:

From World War II (1941-1945)88—Germany, Japan, Italy, and to some extent, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, all of whom sided with the Axis.

From the Korean War (1950-1953)—North Korea, and to some extent, China and Russia.

From the Vietnam War (1965-1975)—Vietnam. From Operation Urgent Fury (1983)—Grenada. From Operation Just Cause (1989)—Panama. From the Persian Gulf War (1991)—Iraq (1991). From the War for Kosovo (1999)—Serbia.

From Operation Enduring Freedom (2001)—Afghanistan. From Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003)—Iraq (2003).

88 _{Conflict names and inclusive dates match U.S. Department of Defense data from the Defense Casualty} Analysis System where able (see https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/casualties.xhtml).

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From Operations Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector (2011)—Libya.

I focus on U.S. wars for several reasons. First, in the context of this study, the United States has the opportunity to engage in strategic cooperation more so than many other states due to its ample resources and global reach. Second, in the context of this study, the United States has an affinity for democratic institutions and cooperative relationships. The United States, more than any other nation I can think of, has engaged globally to pursue this strategic cooperation option, postwar or otherwise. In that sense, the United States has the

willingness, more so than many other states, to engage in strategic cooperation. Lastly, by focusing on U.S.-only wars, I control better for some of the variation in circumstances between cases.

I focus on the time period of World War II to present for several reasons as well. First, the world was fundamentally different during this period than it was previously. Second, the United States was fundamentally different in this period than it was previously.

The world was fundamentally different in the more recent period due to the rise of the nuclear age, and new existential threats may well have changed the calculus for the benefits of cooperative relationships (and the dangers of going it alone) for many states. Further, as Thomas Berger notes for some of the states involved in World War II and in this study, “World War II was a seminal experience as well as an apparent rupture in the development of each country’s [Japan’s, Germany’s, and Austria’s] national identity and political system.”89 The United States was fundamentally different in the more recent time period for several reasons. First, the United States fundamentally changed its foreign policy. Previous U.S.

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foreign policy was more aligned with the philosophies of President George Washington who “warned his fellow citizens against permanent alliances in the conduct of foreign affairs”90

and President Thomas Jefferson who declared “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”91

Emerging from World War II, we saw quite a different U.S. foreign policy—the United States began to embrace entangling alliances and other relationships that we might call strategic partnerships today. Second, by this time the United States had accepted its role of global hegemon. While the United States avoided its role as a hegemon in the interwar periods, by World War II it had accepted its role as a world leader and continued to engage globally. Third, and partially as a byproduct of the capacity it had built up during World War II, the United States could credibly offer protectorate status and enviable strategic cooperation benefits to nations around the globe in this timeframe.

My Case Selections, Selection Criteria, and Rationale

From my universe of cases, I do full case studies on Germany (East and West), Iraq 1991, and Iraq 2003. I do abbreviated case studies on Serbia and a counterfactual of Iraq 2003. The following explains my rationale for these choices.

I followed the case-selection philosophy of George and Bennett who argue that case selection should be guided by a well-defined research objective and an appropriate research strategy—cases should not be chosen just because they are interesting or because a lot of data exists.92 Rather, as professed by George and Bennett, I chose my cases because they are

90 _{Lake 1999, 3.}

91 _{Quoted in Lake 1999, 3.} 92 _{George and Bennett 2005, 83.}

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relevant to my research project, provide the best mix of control and variation for my research problem, and demonstrate the explanatory power of my primary variables of interest.93

In light of this philosophy, I necked down my universe of cases to a shortlist of candidates using a series of elimination criteria. I then selected the most suitable cases from that shortlist. For the first criteria, I chose to avoid cases with intractably powerful forces that overwhelm and confound other variables. For this reason, I eliminated the cases of Grenada and Panama. Although the United States invaded these states, forced regime change, and occupied these states briefly, these states are solidly in the U.S. “sphere of influence.” While the favorable variables and very cooperative relationships of these cases would support my theory, I cannot distinguish between voluntary strategic cooperation and domination—the power differentials between the United States, Grenada, and Panama, coupled with their extremely close geographic proximity, are too confounding.

Second, I eliminated the cases of wars that the United States didn’t “win.” This includes the cases of the Korean War and the Vietnam War. It is not surprising or overly informative that some of the credible commitment variables were unfavorable and that the corresponding qualities of cooperation were low or absent in these cases. By not winning, the United States was not able to resolve the issues it had with these states—they remained adversaries. Further, while the United States did not win, it was nonetheless a very strong state and not in need of support—and it had little incentive to offer a helping hand to those who refused its will. Also, the U.S. adversaries in these conflicts found themselves on the communist side of the Cold War—an international condition that made strategic cooperation untenable and

93 _{The first two case-selection criteria are from George and Bennett 2005, 83-84; the last is from Reiter 2009,} 52-56.

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overwhelmed the effects of all other variables. Counterfactually, I may not have eliminated this category of cases if there had been an example in which, for instance, the United States warred against a near-peer, did not win, suffered catastrophic losses, was left in great need, and its former adversary had spare resources with which to offer the United States a valuable strategic cooperation relationship (a “shoe on the other foot” scenario). However, there are no examples of this in my universe. In my universe, the United States, win or otherwise, emerged from conflict as a powerful, resource-rich, and self-sufficient state.

Third, I eliminated the newest cases which are not yet ready for analysis. This includes