El caso de la Fundación Chile. Competencias del Director

G.R. NO. 133140, AUGUST 10, 1999

Facts: In 1981, a lot was registered and sold by Pedro Garcia to the Magpayo spouses. The Magpayos mortgaged the land to the Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBCom). The spouses failed to pay, hence, the mortgage was extra-judicially closed. The petition filed by PBCom for the issuance of the writ of possession was granted, however, upon service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Garcia, who was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for intervention. He alleged that he inherited the land as one of the heirs of his mother.

The lower court held that the mortgage was void but, upon appeal, CA reversed its decision.

Petitioner appealed to the SC and raised, as one of the errors, that CA decided the case based on issues not raised in the trial court nor in the appellant’s brief.

Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in resolving the issues of “ownership” and “possession”?

Held: No. PBCom’s appellate brief alleged that the trial court could not distinguish ownership from possession; that plaintiff- appellee’s possession could not ripen into ownership; that he was an intruder in bad faith and his possession is certainly not in the concept of an owner.

We stress again that the possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Pedro Garcia and his wife exercised their right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses.

On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.

Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a holder. “A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who claims to be so.” On the other hand, “one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief is right or wrong.” The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents.

CO-OWNERSHIP: ARTICLES 493 AND 494

TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 124262, October 12, 1999

Facts: Private Respondents De Castro filed an action for partition over a parcel of land which was sold, without their knowledge, by their brother Mariano in favor of Petitioner Tomas Claudio Memorial College. It is the contention of the private respondent De Castros that Mariano was only able to sell his undivided share on the lot in question but not the other co-owners’

equivalent to four-fifths (4/5) of the property. Mariano, on the other hand, raises the defense of prescription/laches.

Issue: 1) Did the sale by Mariano effectively include the entire land?

2) Was the action for partition filed by the siblings of Mariano barred by prescription?

Held: 1) No. Even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or other disposition affects only the seller’s share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only that which corresponds to his grantor’s share in the property owned in common.

2) No. In the light of the foregoing, petitioner’s defense of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, ‘no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.’ In Budlong vs. Bondoc, this

Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription.

Article 539; Rights of a Possessor

PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 124658, December 15, 1999

Facts: Private respondent Simeon Policarpio Shipyard and Shipping Corporation filed a complaint for damages and injunction against petitioner Philtrust company for the fraudulent possession of the land occupied by the former on the basis of an alias writ of execution. The writ of execution was based on a judgment previously decided that upheld the validity of foreclosure of Philtrust of the properties mortgaged by private respondents and Philtrust’s right to possess the property.

Private respondent contends that the property fraudulently possessed by Philtrust was not included in the foreclosed mortgaged property. Thus, SPSSC is anchoring its complaint for damages on the improper implementation of the alias writ of execution which as a result it was deprived of possession of the property (OCT-R-165). Petitioner, on the other hand, contends that SPSSC no longer owns the subject property because it was already foreclosed by Landbank; thus, not being the owner, Philtrust alleges that SPSSC cannot be entitled to possession.

Issue: Does private respondent SPSSC have a right to institute the complaint for damages?

Held: Since private respondent was in possession of the aforesaid land when the writ of possession was improperly implemented, it is not correct therefore to say that private respondent does not have a cause of action. It is elementary that a lawful possessor of a thing has the right to institute an action should he be disturbed in its enjoyment.

Verily, Article 539 of the Civil Code states that – “Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed therein, he shall be restored to said possession by the means established by the laws and rules of court.” The phrase “every possessor” in the article indicates that all kinds of possession, from that of the owner to that of a mere holder, except that which constitutes a crime, should be respected and protected by the means established and the laws of procedure. Consequently, private respondent having been in lawful possession of the property covered by OCT-R-165 at the time of possession was implemented, may institute an action for having been disturbed in its enjoyment.

Partition

NOCEDA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 119730, September 2, 1999

Facts: On June 1, 1981, Directo, Noceda, and Arbizo, heirs of the late Celestino Arbizo, extrajudicially settled a parcel of land known as Lot 1121. However, on August 17, 1981, another extrajudicial settlement – partition of Lot 1121 was executed: 3/5 of the said land went to Maria Arbizo while Direto and Noceda got only 1/5 each. Later, it was found out that Lot 1121 contained an area in excess of that stated in its tax declaration, which was the basis of partition.

After Directo demanded from Noceda to vacate her land on the ground that the latter fenced the entire land of the former without her consent, a complaint for the recovery of possession and ownership and rescission/annulment of donation was filed against Noceda.

Noceda claimed that the discrepancies between the two deeds of partition with respect to the area of Lot 1121 and the respective share of the parties therein indicated that they never intended any of the deeds to be the final determination of the portions of Lot 1121 allotted to them.

Issue: Should Lot 1121 be partitioned in accordance with the extra-judicial settlement dated August 17, 1981?

Held: Yes. The discrepancies between the extra-judicial settlements executed by Directo, Noceda and Maria Arbizo on June 1, 1981 and August 17, 1981 only meant that the latter was intended to supersede the former. Although in the extra-judicial settlement dated August 17, the heirs of Celestino partitioned only less than the actual land area to conform with the area declared under tax declaration, the heirs were actually occupying a bigger portion the total land area of which exceeded that of what is stated in the tax declaration.

The purpose of partition is to put an end to co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each co-owner, vesting in each a sole estate in specific property and giving to each one a right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the other. There is no co-ownership where portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically described, or that said portions are still embraced in one and the same certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or identifiable, or distinguishable, one from the other, or that dominion over each portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. A partition legally made confers upon each heir the exclusive ownership of the property adjudicated to him.

Partition; Compromise Agreement

ABARINTOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

September 30, 1999

Facts: Petitioners and private respondents are co-owners of a hacienda. The co-owners appointed petitioner Jose Garcia as administrator of the property. When private respondents, found out that the hacienda was mismanaged, they decided to manage directly the hacienda.

Subsequently, the co-owners agreed to terminate the co-ownership and divide the property among themselves. The co-owners entered into a compromise agreement to resolve the several cases for partition filed by the co-owners and such agreement was approved by the lower court.

Private respondents, however, brought an action seeking to annul the compromise agreement on the ground that it decides the action for the partition and appointment of a receiver without the benefit of trial on the merits.

Issue: Is the compromise agreement conclusive as to the civil cases filed by the co-owners.

Held: Under Article 2028 of the Civil Code, a compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.

A judicial compromise has the force of law and is conclusive between the parties. Once an agreement is stamped with approval, it becomes more than a mere contract binding the parties,

and having the sanction of the court and entered as its determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other judgment.

It is settled that every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

SUCCESSION

ART. 811; PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL