Caso II Los límites evitables del Derecho Tsachila

From the tentative description of expression as figurative possession Goodman firstly developed the concept of exemplification which furnished a mode of reference that involves the symbol possessing that which it symbolises. This possession-plus-reference preserves the sense of intimate, non-arbitrary association of a sample and what it stands for. Possession was defined as correct denotation by a label and the reference of a sample is to a label which correctly denotes it. Secondly he defined his use of metaphor as the correct denotation by a transferred label, correctness being conceded in a non-arbitrary way. Transference is from a home realm to an alien realm involving the transgression of established limits of use, but through such transgression a different but applicable syntactic apparatus is made available which provides a potentially fruitful new organisation of the alien realm. Thus metaphor is taken strictly as a novel assertion of possession and is not logically but only temporally distinct from assertions of literal possession. Both literal and metaphorical possession are a function of the correct denotation by a label within a schema and both assert actual possession.

Exemplification is reference by a sample to one of its properties, or rather to a label that correctly denotes it. Since there are these two ways of possessing a property (or being correctly denoted) there are also two species of exemplification, literal and metaphorical. Goodman thinks that metaphorical exemplification is a serviceable formulation of the concept of expression in the arts and elsewhere.

What is expressed is metaphorically exemplified. What expresses sadness is metaphorically sad. And what is metaphorically sad is actually but not literally sad, i.e. comes under a transferred application of some label co- extensive with 'sad' (1).

and more formally,

...if a expresses b then: (1) a possesses or is denoted by b; (2) this possession or denotation is metaphorical; and (3) a refers to b (2).

By making actual possession, whether literal or metaphorical, a matter of labels he is able to define the expressive symbol as both referring and possessing. Thus the expressive content is emancipated from speculation that might give rise to limiting or mystical or obscure assertions of origin, whilst the immediacy of the expressive symbol is retained. Nothing can be more immediate or intimately connected with a symbol it seems, than properties it actually possesses.

It is important to realise how thorough this emancipation is. The emphasis on what is expressed being the property of the expressive object frees it, as does Langer's account, from the assumption that expression necessarily involves self-expression. What the artist was feeling or wishing to communicate at the time of making a picture is not necessarily related to what the picture actually expresses. Likewise what a spectator feels on looking at the picture is not necessarily related to what the picture actually refers to through metaphorical exemplification.

Just as importantly, since expression is the metaphorical exemplification of labels, any

labels can be so exemplified - not just labels related to feelings. Expression has previously been predominantly linked to the expression of emotion but Goodman's formulation sets no such limits as to what can be expressed. This is a radical departure from features of the expressivist tradition including important aspects of Suzanne Langer's account. She, we remember, whilst jettisoning self-expression as a necessary characteristic of artistic activity, assumes that what is expressed is forms of feeling.

But if any labels can be referred to, how are the correct ones identified from the apparently infinite number that can correctly denote a sample or expressive object? We know, according to Goodman, which kind of labels are referred to by identifying the symbol system in which a sample operates.

A square swatch does not usually exemplify squareness, and a picture that rapidly increases in market value does not express the property of being a gold mine. Normally a swatch exemplifies only sartorial properties while a picture literally exemplifies only pictorial properties and metaphorically exemplifies only properties that are constant relative to pictorial

properties...Only properties of the appropriate kind, metaphorically exemplified in the appropriate way, are expressed (3).

This assertion that the prior existence of a symbol system is necessary before identification of what a symbol exemplifies or expresses can take place relates to the indeterminacy noted earlier. Three points may be made here concerning indeterminacy. Firstly, the fact that exemplification required the prior existence of a symbol system does not, of itself, contribute to the particular indeterminacy of art. The identification of which symbol system is in operation is a pre-requisite of determining the reference of any character not just characters in artistic systems. Both notational and exemplificational reference require that a set of characters be correlated with a field of reference (4). Certain correlations are habitually made and so become identified as enduring systems whilst others may be ad hoc and, never being used again, are forgotten. An example of a related set of enduring systems is the correlations of pictorial characters with literal and metaphorical labels in varying ways to exemplify, represent and express. If determinate reference in art awaits the establishment of an operative symbol system it does so too in other categories of communication. This source of indeterminacy is not specific to art.

Secondly the activity of making and appreciating art works heightens our awareness of the limits of the symbol systems within which they are assumed to operate. It may be that it is a characteristic of artistic activity throughout history (it is certainly true of more recent times) not only to focus attention on these limits but also to try to extend them. This tendency imports an instability of correlation that affects determination of reference. An example from recent painting is the extension by Picasso of two-dimensional characters to correlate with the tactual three- dimensional experience of a lover's embrace (5). From recent drama Peter Handke's, Offending the Audience explicitly extends the theatrical symbol system to include the way the audience are conducted to their seats from the moment that they enter the theatre. By implication every act that then takes place both on stage and in the audience becomes a character in the system and takes part in making rich and surprising new allusions (6).

Thirdly the semantic and syntactic features of artistic systems contribute to the complex and subtle use artists make of characters and systems at their disposal to articulate thoughts, feelings, gestures and statements. It is these features which are the main source of the indeterminacy characteristic of those systems associated with artistic activity. Following his exposition of the theory of notation in chapter 4 of Languages of Art, Goodman applies it to the description of exemplificational systems including expression (7). The relation of a character to the field of reference is broadened from compliance (appropriate for denotational systems) to reference. With this adjustment the semantic properties of ambiguity, disjointness, differentiation, density and discontinuity are made applicable to exemplificational systems and can be used accurately to ascertain the formal source and extent of their determinacy or indeterminacy. Whilst each art form be it painting, sculpture, music or literature (both oral and written), may have characters with different syntactic characteristics, Goodman finds that all refer to a semantically dense set of properties or predicates. Further, the semantic density of such exemplification when added to the fact noted above that the artistic systems of exemplification are some-what unstable, means that absolute determination of reference is impossible. Consequently

...the search for accurate adjustment between symbol and symbolised calls for maximal sensitivity, and is unending.... (8)

and

...endless search is always required...to determine precisely what is exemplified or expressed (9).

If emotion is deposed by Goodman and made to take its place as one kind of content (or label) among others it is given another form of authority at this point in his theory. Feeling, he argues, is one of the most important and effective means by which the unending search described above can be successfully conducted. To feel aright points us in the right direction. It guides us towards an adequate interpretation of the sample's reference.

Whatever place this 'emotion' holds (and this is a little difficult to understand from his account in Languages of Art) it is not that of the source of expression nor its purpose. It

is precisely those functions of emotion in art that Goodman has attempted to banish through his reformulation of artistic meaning. We shall have to consider, in more detail later, what he means by 'emotion' and how he sees it operating in the realm of art.