En el caso de que se implementara un impuesto al patrimonio, ¿Qué patrimonio

The analysis presented in the thesis of the Russian Federations and the Netherlands cyber and information security strategies has demonstrated some similarities, but ultimately many underlining differences in their development and approach towards the UNGGE cyber norms debate. The development of these cyber and information security strategies has remained consistent between 2007 and 2017 and explains the Russian and Dutch different ideological approaches to the UNGGE.

The approach of the Russian Federation to the cyber norms debate has been guided by its objective to reaffirm the sovereign right of states to govern and control cyberspace according to their national laws and in the name of national security. To ensure this right, the Russian Federation requires the UNGGE norms discussion to include a hardcoded adherence to the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity. Adherence to these principles is to ensure no other states has a right to interfere in the way the Russian Federation manages its cyberspace. Management of which is linked to the survival of the Russian state, which is threatened by the spread of destructive or disrupting information by criminals, terrorists, extremists, and separatists. A point of contention for the Russian Federation is that this right to control clashes with the UNGGEs inclusion and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The inclusion of these rights and freedoms has been a significant part of the Netherlands development and approach of its cyber-security strategies. The approach of the Netherlands has primarily revolved around promoting its multi-stakeholder model and adherence to existing international laws a means to resolve the insecurities from cyberspace. The Netherlands requires a consistent application of international law together with a free and open cyberspace to realise its economic and foreign policy objectives. Thus, instead of control, the Netherlands believes in cooperating with the relevant stakeholders in cyberspace to combat the threats it faces. This threat is constructed in economic and social terms. The Netherlands fears that a cyber-attack could either lead to significant economic loss or social displacement or disruption of its citizens. It is thus important for the Netherlands to have the UNGGE norms include a cyber component in order to ensure the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms online and offline.

The Russian Federation is against this inclusion as the insurance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Its inclusion would undermine the Russian states efforts to control the flow of damaging and disrupting information. For the Russian Federation, human rights and

64 fundamental freedoms are connected to the sovereign right of the Russian state to protect its citizens against destructive or disrupting flows of information. In contrast, the Netherlands especially wants the inclusion of these rights and freedoms because it fears certain states will use its control and influence over cyberspace to silence dissenting voices and violate human rights and fundamental freedoms in the process.

The resulting UNGGE reports are an ambiguous mix of these ideological positions; giving it the appearance that both sides have been taken into account. However, it is never entirely clear what is precisely meant by the norms, how they to apply, or how and to what extent they are to be enforced. The norms include references to sovereignty, non-intervention, and territorial integrity, but also the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms yet never explicitly explain which has a higher priority. This is a problem born out of a lack of explanation and definitions which subsequently limits many of the arguments made within the thesis. Arguments which are primarily based upon the different perspectives and interpretations of definitions, weaknesses in the theory of securitization, and as a result often rely on technicalities to make an argument.

As a result of these many limitations, the UNGGE discussion feels premature as it fails to address the most pressing concerns in the world appropriately. Part of the initial UNGGE discussion should have focused on defining and clarifying many of the cyber-related concepts. Now, the interpretation is left up to the states and allows for wildly different assumption to be had Russian Federation and the Netherlands. What is needed is clarity and consistency in their interpretation form an international legal perspective and not necessarily from an academic one. A significant portion of the academic literature already has devoted a lot of time theorizing on different cyber-related definitions. An international effort to construct these definitions is needed, even if it may not fall under the mandate of the UNGGE.

Nevertheless, what appears to be evident is that the UNGGE discussion does not discuss the most pressing issue both the Russian Federation and the Netherlands are concerned with; that being the status of information and data in cyberspace as a referent object. It is also the status of this information and data which connects to the ideological division on control for the sake of national security versus human rights and fundamental freedoms. It should therefore be the recommended that future research devotes to resolving this problematic connection between the topics; especially as discussing these issues does not fall under the mandate of the UNGGE. Unless the above-mentioned, and the definitional problems are resolved, it may difficult to see any significant behavior change through the creation and implementation of international cyber norms.

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