3.4 Banca móvil en la década del 2000-2010
3.4.2 Casos de éxito en países en desarrollo
845. Discussions continued over the summer between the Iraqi Government, the IMF
and creditors on debt reduction and the terms of an IMF programme for Iraq.517
510 International Monetary Fund, 25 May 2004, Iraq – External Debt Sustainability Analysis. 511 Minute Habeshaw to Chancellor, 27 May 2004, ‘Iraq Debt: IMF Debt Sustainability Analysis’. 512 Letter Rycroft to Adams, 1 June 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Conversation with Chirac, 1 June’. 513 Paper Treasury, 7 July 2004, ‘Iraq Debt and HIPC’.
514 Sea Island Summit 2004 Communiqué, 10 June 2004, Debt Sustainability for the Poorest.
515 Présidence de la République, 10 June 2004, Sommet du G8 – Conférence de Presse de M. Jacques
CHIRAC Président de la République, a l’issue du Sommet. 516 Paper Treasury, 7 July 2004, ‘Iraq Debt and HIPC’.
The UK’s position remained that Iraq required debt reduction of at least 80 percent to deliver debt sustainability. The US and the Iraqi Government sought 95 percent, which the UK assessed would leave Iraq in a “very strong” financial position. The UK’s negotiating line, including in a bilateral meeting with the French on 1 September 2004, was to support the US position “while hinting flexibility”.
846. The IMF Board approved a US$436m Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance programme for Iraq on 29 September.518 The UK Delegation to the IMF reported that
unanimous approval had followed “tetchy” discussions, with a number of Executive Directors expressing unease at the speed of approval (the timetable had been driven by US demands and the IMF had cut back substantially on formal review processes) and whether the Iraqi Government would be able to implement the necessary policy reforms if the security situation did not improve. The IMF had commented that agreement paved the way for discussions on debt relief.
847. In early November, at the request of the Paris Club and in anticipation of an agreement on debt relief for Iraq later that month, the IMF revisited its DSA for Iraq.519
Treasury officials briefed Mr Brown that, on the basis of the new figures, debt reduction of between 75 and 85 percent was required to restore sustainability; debt reduction above 85 percent could not be justified financially. Officials also told Mr Brown that the US had now circulated a draft proposal seeking debt reduction of 89.5 percent in three phases, with a generous repayment profile. The UK supported that proposal as a negotiating position, but doubted that it could be agreed with Paris Club members.
848. A Treasury official warned Mr Brown on 12 November that the US had decided to offer Iraq additional debt relief following a Paris Club deal, writing off 100 percent of Iraq’s debt.520 If the UK did the same it would cost between £172m and £344m,
depending on the deal agreed at the Paris Club. Echoing the arguments offered in May 2004, the official advised that, while there were “political arguments” in favour of offering additional debt relief, there were also arguments against it:
•
Significantly poorer countries had not received 100 percent debt relief.•
Iraq had no track record of using savings generated by debt relief for poverty reduction.•
Providing 100 percent debt relief would set a precedent for the UK’s treatment of other countries.849. The official recommended that the UK should not offer additional debt relief to Iraq.
518 Telegram 25 UKDEL IMF/IBRD to Treasury, 30 September 2004, ‘Iraq: IMF Approves Emergency Post Conflict Assistance’.
519 Minute Habeshaw to Chancellor, 8 November 2004, ‘Iraq Debt: New Debt Sustainability Numbers’. 520 Minute Treasury [junior official] to Brown, 12 November 2004, ‘Iraq Debt: Update’.
850. The Treasury told the Inquiry that it has no record of Mr Brown responding to that
advice.521
851. Paris Club creditors agreed on 21 November to reduce Iraq’s official debt by 80 percent.522 The deal would be delivered in three stages: 30 percent immediately;
30 percent on approval of a standard IMF programme; and 20 percent on completion of the standard IMF programme. The deal would write off US$31.1bn of the US$38.9bn owed to Paris Club creditors. The Iraqi Government committed to seek comparable treatment from its non-Paris Club creditors.
852. The UK’s share of that write-off was approximately US$1.39bn,523 or £954m
(£337m in UK financial year 2004/05, £337m in UK financial year 2005/06 and £280m in UK financial year 2008/09).524 The entire amount was charged to the ECGD.
853. A Treasury briefing for Mr Brown stated that the deal represented an important success for the international community, demonstrating an ability to act together on an issue as divisive as Iraq.525
854. The Treasury told the Inquiry that the agreement followed intense negotiations between G7 officials and Ministers, including between Mr Brown, Secretary Snow and Mr Nicolas Sarkozy, the French Minister of Finance.526 The deal had been finalised in a
meeting between Secretary Snow and Mr Hans Eichel, the German Minister of Finance.
855. The Treasury told the Inquiry that it has no records of the discussions between Mr Brown and Mr Snow and Mr Sarkozy.527
856. The US wrote off 100 percent of Iraq’s debt, totalling US$4.1bn, on 17 December 2004.528
857. In November 2006, Mr Brown was asked by Dr Barham Salih, Iraqi Deputy
Prime Minister, to provide 100 percent debt relief for Iraq.529 Mr Brown responded
by highlighting the aid that the UK was already providing and his discussions with counterparts in the Gulf states and the EU on supporting Iraq.
521 Email Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 17 April 2014, ‘Further Queries Relating to Resources’.
522 Paris Club, Press Communiqué, 21 November 2004, Restructuring the Iraqi debt – Agreement between
the Paris Club and Iraq.
523 Briefing Treasury, [undated], ‘Brief: Meeting with Barham Saleh, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq’. 524 Letter Cabinet Office [junior official] to Aldred, 13 September 2011, ‘Iraq Inquiry: Request for Further Information on Funding’.
525 Briefing Treasury, [undated], ‘Brief: Meeting with Barham Saleh, Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq’. 526 Paper Treasury, 2010, ‘Iraq Briefing – Debt’.
527 Email Treasury [junior official] to Iraq Inquiry [junior official], 22 April 2014, ‘Further Queries Relating to Resources’.
528 Congressional Research Service, Report for Congress, 11 March 2005, Iraq: Debt Relief. 529 Record, [undated], ‘Chancellor’s Visit to Basra: 18/11/06’.
858. The UK did not provide additional bilateral debt relief for Iraq, beyond the
agreement reached at the Paris Club.