Subdominio: Bienes patrimoniales
CATEGORÍA: PATRIMONIO NATURAL Geopatrimonio/Componentes
Modern intelligence exists to serve decision-makers in making foreign and domestic policy decisions; for intelligence to do anything else is considered at best wasteful and at worst illegal.60
The idea of Roman ‘foreign policy’ is an anachronism. There are no records of a state ‘policy’ or indications of long-term forward planning.61
This is not to say that decisions were made without consideration of past practice or potential consequences based on ‘known knowns’, as a former US Secretary of Defense once put it. But decisions were
60 Lowenthal 2006: 2. Intelligence’s true function in modern decision-making is
controversial. While it is theoretically designed to provide analysis of political and security situations, thereby improving policy makers’ decisions, in reality it is often ignored or faulty. Leslau 2010.
58
usually made strictly according to a Roman understanding of the world, with little consideration for cultural differences and their own interpretative bias.62
The constantly changing Roman executive personnel and the disparate political environments of the surrounding states made it difficult to form a uniform and consistent policy. In the place of consistent long-term policy, underpinned by political theory and relatively constant domestic political ideology, reasonably immune to individual obligations and ambitions, Roman ‘foreign policy’ decision-making was, by necessity, ad hoc and reactive.
Most modern nations consider policy in terms of state self-interest and how others will understand their actions.63
The Romans paid a certain amount of attention to how their acts were interpreted by others. Fides had long been a fundamental self-defining attribute of the Roman ruling aristocracy.64
The senate of Rome spent time and effort in creating the image that the Roman state was the embodiment of fides – that is, that its actions in the international arena could be trusted and that its representatives meant what they said.65
During the period
62 Foreknowledge, that is, intelligence about foreign culture and geography prior to
engagement, was available during the mid-republic, and there was some expectation of its use. But the interpretation of this knowledge was still subject to Roman
interpretative bias. Foreknowledge will be discussed in chapter 4.
63 Modern western liberal nations place great importance on looking at actions they
take from the perspective of outsiders. Events such as the deditio of the Aetolians and the interpretations of the Gracchan agreements in Spain (discussed below) reveal what could be interpreted by non-Romans as arrogance. Instead of spending time ensuring that all parties understood what Roman terms and conditions meant, Roman forces assumed they were understood as they interpreted them. The Aetolians did not understand (or pretended not to understand) that a deditio agreement placed them entirely at Roman mercy until after the agreement was made. The Gracchan treaties put an initial end to conflict in Celtiberia in 178. However, in 153 the Belli and the Titthi began fortifying and enlarging the town of Segeda. Roman forces reacted to this, calling it a breach of the agreement: App. Hisp. 44; cf. Diod. 31.39. The
Celtiberians understood that their agreement forbade the settlement of new cities, not the fortification of an existing one. The Roman understanding was (or was alleged to be) that the Celtiberians could essentially do nothing without Roman permission, and so they sent a consular army to raze the town. MRR 1.452.
64 For more on fides see Fraenkel 1916; Heinze 1928; Hellegouarch 1963; Boyancé
1964a; Boyancé 1964b; Boyancé 1972a; Boyancé 1972b; Hampl 1973; Freyburger 1982; Freyburger 1986.
65 Diodorus Siculus refers to the public dissemination of the idea in his account of the
build up to the First Punic War, when he has Hiero reply to Roman envoys who are attempting to maintain peace that the Romans, harping on about fides as they did, should surely not attempt to defend murderous brigands, the Mamertines. ὁ δὲ Ἱέρων ἀπεκρίνατο διότι Μαμερτῖνοι Καμάριναν καὶ Γέλαν ἀναστάτους πεποιηκότες,
59
of Roman expansion, the principle became the cornerstone of Roman
interactions with external parties. There is a growing consensus that the focus on fides in this era shifted Mediterranean international relations away from endless conflict and toward a more stable system of long-term diplomacy and alliances.66
The principle of fides and a devotion to what Rome conceived to be its duty toward friends and allies was for the most part authentic. People do not make appeals to moral standards that they have no intention of keeping. Roman power and influence in the Mediterranean would have quickly evaporated if the Romans were regarded as blatant hypocrites; naked force would have succeeded in keeping Rome in control for only so long.67
The senate punished or at least called into question the perfidious actions of commanders abroad.68
But fides was interpreted through a Roman lens. Foreign interpretations of Roman actions were important, but the Romans projected others’ interpretations based on their own cultural assumptions, with little concerted effort to ensure that all parties understood them in the same manner. Rome was not alone in this of course. The shame/honour nature of ancient societies and states may account for a general self-centredness and inward-focus among all states in the Mediterranean system, Rome included. Not to push generalisation too far, but ancient peoples and states tended to be less empathetic and other-regarding than their modern counterparts.69 Μεσσήνην δὲ ἀσεβέστατα κατειληφότες, δικαίως πολιορκοῦνται, Ῥωμαῖοι δέ, θρυλλοῦντες τὸ τῆς πίστεως ὄνομα, παντελῶς οὐκ ὀφείλουσι τοὺς μιαιφόνους, μάλιστα πίστεως καταφρονήσαντας, ὑπερασπίζειν· εἰ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἀσεβεστάτων τηλικοῦτον ἐπαναιροῦνται πόλεμον, φανεροὺς ἔσεσθαι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὅτι τῆς ἰδίας πλεονεξίας πρόφασιν πορίζονται τὸν τῶν κινδυνευόντων ἔλεον, τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς Σικελίας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν: Diod. 23.1.4. For the historicity of fides and the conception of fidelis behaviour see Livy 1.24.4–5, 42.47; cf. Dion. Hal. 2.75.3; Plut. Num. 16.1; Flor. 1.2.3; Plaut. Mil. 1369, Capt. 346-349, 439-445; Enn. Ann. frs. 268– 286 S.
66 Eckstein 2008: 342-81; Madden 2008; Burton 2011: 22-3.
67 This is not to say fides was not used as a tool of propaganda, but space constraints
prevent discussion of this important topic here. See items listed in n. 64.
68 Perhaps the most famous example is the senatorial prosecution of Servius Sulpicius
Galba. His massacre of 8000 Lusitanians after disarming them in 150 resulted in an attempted prosecution in Rome. See App. Hisp. 59-61; cf. Cic. Brut. 89; Nep. Cato 3.4; Livy Per. 49; Val. Max. 8.1.2, 8.7.1, 9.6.2; Suet. Galba 3.2; MRR 1.456, 1.459.
69 Eckstein 2006 and 2008 would suggest this was due to the inescapable and tragic
pressures of the ancient international system that compelled all states toward self- centredness.
60
The inward focus of the Roman aristocracy exacerbated not only this self- centredness, but the ad hoc character of decision-making as well. The concept of Rome as an entity separate from, although connected to, other Mediterranean peoples and cultures did exist, but the competitive nature of Roman aristocratic social and political life ensured that an individual’s personal and family glory was always in tension with the community’s. This created an internally focussed aristocracy, and, on the macro level, the conception of Rome as the centre of the universe. An individual’s reputation was linked to the performance of Rome as a whole, but this could also be in tension with the ultimate personal goal, which was almost always reputation - fama.70
That an individual put personal ambition ahead of the needs of the state was presumably not true of all commanders and officials.
There are plenty of examples of commanders managing the information they provided the senate and manipulating affairs and diplomatic agreements to benefit themselves that the pursuit of private ambitions should be taken as indicative of a pervasive mentality. Appian records instances of such behaviour during the campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula. After sending communications and Celtiberian ambassadors to Rome and receiving notification that only a deditio agreement with the Belli, Titthi, and Arevaci would be acceptable, Marcellus discussed the state of affairs with the Celtiberian ambassadors. He reportedly induced the tribes to surrender, and allowed them to go free.71
He pre-emptively made arrangements contrary to the protocol of deditio
arrangements.72
Appian alleges that Marcellus was motivated by a desire to win
70 Glory and triumphs were not necessarily tied to success. A discussion of gloria is
beyond the scope of this thesis. See Harris 1979; Rosenstein 1990b; Beard 2007; Clark 2014. 71 Ὁ μὲν δὴ Λεύκολλος ὥδευεν, ὁ δὲ Μάρκελλος τόν τε πόλεμον προεῖπε τοῖς Κελτίβηρσι, καὶ τὰ ὅμηρα αἰτοῦσιν ἀπέδωκεν. τὸν δ᾿ ἐν Ῥώμῃ τοὺς λόγους διαθέμενον ὑπὲρ τῶν Κελτιβήρων ἰδίᾳ πρὸς αὑτὸν ἀνακαλέσας ἐπὶ πολὺ διέτριβεν· ὑπὲρ ὅτου δὴ καὶ ὑπωπτεύετο μὲν καὶ τότε, μᾶλλον δ᾿ ἐπιστώθη τοῖς ὕστερον γενομένοις, ὅτι αὐτοὺς ἀνέπειθεν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κατὰ σφᾶς ἐπιτρέψαι, ἐπειγόμενος ἄρα πρὸ τοῦ Λευκόλλου τὸν πόλεμον καταλυθῆναι: App. Hisp. 50; cf. Livy Per. 48.
72 App. Hisp. 49-50. The literature on deditio is vast. See for instance Dahlheim 1968: 52-
67; Richardson 2000; Auliard 2006b; Auliard 2006a; Burton 2009; Burton 2011: 114-22; Sanz 2015.
61
the glory of ending the war rather than leave it up to a successor.73
Licinius Lucullus, upon discovering that his consular army would not gain victory over these Celtiberian tribes, set out to find new avenues for glory. He attacked the Vaccaei and Cantabri unprovoked.74
Appian says these acts were motivated by greed and a hunger for glory. The reality was undoubtedly more complicated.75
As mentioned above, prior to taking command in the Third Macedonian War, Aemilius Paullus sent an embassy to investigate both the Roman and
Macedonian armies in the winter of 169/8.76
The report, as presented in Livy, is vague and filled with half-truths and unverifiable statements that were designed to represent his predecessors as incompetent.77
Such manipulation was all part of Paullus’ build-up to a glorious campaign that would end a war that most
regarded as having gone on long enough, either through Roman incompetence or reliance on rumours. As if to highlight his deception, Paullus warned the people in a contio not to trust rumour or armchair generals.78
Seeking glory was an important facet the Roman aristocratic lifestyle and self-identity. But it tended to work against any urge toward long-term planning based on objectively
developed intelligence. Realistically, the actions of individuals were often
unproductive and inefficient. It was also deeply problematic, as discussed above,
73 ἐβούλετο γὰρ ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὸν πόλεμον ἐκλυθῆναι, δόξαν οἱ χρηστὴν καὶ ἀπὸ
τοῦδε νομίζων ἔσεσθαι: App. Hisp. 49.
74 App. Hisp. 51.
75 To take a later example, Pompey ordered Quintus Caecilius Metellus to stop his
attacks against the pirates when he held the provincia of Crete in 67. Pompey evidently desired to rid the Mediterranean of pirates himself. To further his aims, and to
counter the possibility that Caecilius might refuse to acquiesce, Pompey sent Lucius Octavius to bolster the pirate resistance. While subject to criticism, this action was tolerated. Plut. Pomp. 29.4-6; Dio 36.19.1-2.
76 Livy 44.18.1-5. Paullus also delayed his report to the senate regarding the war until
the envoys returned with suspicious claims about their misadventures. He alleged they only landed at Brundisium, after having been blown back twice to Dyrrachium. There is no feasible way for Paullus to have known this. Livy 44.19.1-3.
77 Livy 44.20.
78 The envoys claimed that the army was led through risky dangerous paths; that the
army had reached Pieria, which was held by Perseus; that the two armies were separated by only the Elpeüs River, but that neither side offered battle. Winter was afflicting the campaign, and supplies were running out. The navy was underfed and undersupplied, and that if the legate Appius Claudius had sufficient forces he could have distracted Perseus, but was instead in grave danger. Aspects of the report were valid, but were exaggerated and unexplained. Livy’s report is part of an ongoing theme throughout books 44-45 on reliable information versus rumours, and of competent and incompetent generalship.
62
that systemic logistical difficulties forced the senate to rely on these glory-seeking individuals for information, be it of a diplomatic or military nature. The effect of the competitive nature of the Roman aristocracy had the potential to be
disastrous in circumstances where accurate intelligence was crucial.
Competition, however, was necessary for the Roman republican system to continue. The relationship between competition and the system was symbiotic: a fear of autocracy ensured opportunities for the consolidation of power were restricted; the opportunity to attain a limited number of high offices led to competition. It is easy to see how the desire for a limited number of honours, dangled before everybody in the upper echelons of society, could create a volatile system. Checks and balances had to be introduced in order to control unbridled ambition. 79
These could of course be manipulated, though ‘[n]o oligarchy could survive if its members refused to abide by the rules’.80
There had to be a consensus about the rules of conduct and how far these rules could be stretched. Popular consent revealed itself in appeals to abstract virtues and concrete legal sanctions.81
Glory was important to an individual, but one way to gain this glory was to ignore (or pretend to ignore) what would obviously be in one’s own self-interest, and instead do something to benefit the res publica as a whole.82
A system where personal reputation and state success were intertwined ensured mere personal ambition did not overcome all other motivations. Existing checks controlled the system well in terms of internal politics. These checks left intelligence open to manipulation. The senate required transfers of information from officials and commanders in the field; diplomatic
commissioners required additional information from the senate about how to proceed. Picking and choosing what to say, how to say it, and whom to say it to was a behaviour that individuals could control, thereby manipulating the circumstances to their own advantage without significantly affecting how the system functioned.
79 Checks against ambition and the concentration of power were legal and traditional.
They developed in response to problems as they occurred. See Astin 1958; Beck 2005; Bergk 2011. For more about the restrictions on the consulship see Lintott 1999.
80 Syme 1939: 57-8.
81 Hölkeskamp 2010: 98-106.
82 Polybius discusses the personal reputation gained in placing oneself in personal
63
The primary consequence for intelligence in this system was a lack of specialisation or development of expertise. Competition and a pseudo-
egalitarian idea that any member of the senatorial class could attain high office detracted from the development of permanent positions.83
Specialisation would ruin the competitive system that was predicated on the notion that positions were open to everyone if they proved themselves, and it would violate the principle of annuality, the annual rotation of magistrates into and out of office — a vital hedge against tyranny. This is one of the most difficult problems for scholars of ancient intelligence to grapple with, as mentioned above. The implicit assumption is that good intelligence cannot occur without a devoted intelligence service. Modern intelligence studies suggest that only with an
intelligence service can strategic surprise be avoided, that long-term expertise can be gained, that policy can be aided, and that secrecy can be maintained.84
These assumptions are strongly linked to modern conceptions and presumptions about intelligence’s principal functions in modern states.
The Romans of the mid-republic were so far from even thinking about a bureaucratic service devoted to intelligence that they did not even value or exploit individual expertise in specific foreign policy areas. To expect otherwise is to fail to appreciate the nature of Roman politics, society, and mentality. There is no evidence to suggest that officials were regularly chosen because of their previous experience of or interest in particular foreign peoples.85
Rather, the choice to send ambassadors who had failed previously, or who were considered incompetent disproves the belief that foreign policy expertise was valued or affected policy choices in Rome. This is a natural extension of the Roman wariness of autocracy. Specialisation increases the risk that power could be concentrated in the hands of certain individuals and families. Neither
83 Later developments in Roman intelligence resulted in dedicated intelligence-related
officers, such as the frumentarii. See Sinnigen 1959; Sinnigen 1961; Sinnigen 1962; Gichon 1989; Bertrand 1997.
84 Lowenthal 2006: 2.
85 Brizzi and Badian attempt to argue that in the conquest of the East, Rome used
officials who had developed ‘expertise’ in the area in order to guide policy. Badian 1958: 63-6; Brizzi 1982. Badian goes so far as to deem P. Sulpicius Galba (cos. 200) to be a ‘Macedonian expert’. The position is extensively challenged by Gruen 1984: 203- 49, who analyses extant evidence and reveals that there is little upon which to base the doctrine of Roman diplomatic experts.
64
diplomacy, intelligence, nor foreign and domestic policy benefited from experts. The failure to place value on and exploit expertise in particular foreign policy areas is not as short-sighted as it might seem. Knowledge about foreign peoples and governments was widely available and easily accessible, and at times officials with prior experience of an area (rather than expertise) could be sent to discuss matters. The consul Marcius Philippus’ assignment to the command against Perseus in 169 is a good example. Philippus was elected because of his long experience as a general (he had been consul once before, in 186), and he was chosen for the Macedonian command by lot, not because of any particular ‘expertise’.86
His social ties with the Antigonids may have influenced his selection to be an ambassador to Greece in the run-up to the war against Perseus, but in that case, a visit to Macedon was not initially on the agenda; that was a later improvisation, at Perseus’ request.87
Expertise is linked with secrecy and restricting information to a select few. As will be discussed, the control of information was important. The number of those ‘in the know’ was larger than our intelligence agencies would deem necessary. Informing the senate of affairs was only a negligibly larger security risk than informing only a select few in the senate, and in the context of Rome’s competitive and fluctuating system, served policy makers better than intense secrecy.
The avoidance of expertise was not pathological or self-defeating, of course. There were occasions where command was prorogued beyond the traditional campaigning season. This was done occasionally in the mid-republic and for pragmatic reasons rather than out of an appreciation for specialism or expertise. If the latter were the main concern, then magistrates who served in their youth as soldiers and lower officials in one region would be assigned to the same region as much as possible in future commands. This did not occur. As
86 Livy 43.12.1, 43.15.3; Polyb. 28.1.9. Marcius Philippus had previously headed an