• No se han encontrado resultados

Categorías de creencias y concepciones sobre las matemáticas y sobre el aprendizaje y la enseñanza

Categoría 14: ¿Cómo se valida la enseñanza? En esta categoría se encierran las unidades que se refieren a los criterios que se emplean para determinar el conocimiento matemático que debe

3.6 Categorías de creencias y concepciones sobre las matemáticas y sobre el aprendizaje y la enseñanza

Police power and power of eminent domain both involved taking. They differ in purpose.

Police power—to destroy; because the property is harmful, obnoxious, poses a risk to the public.

Power of eminent domain—only private property is the subject of taking; the purpose is to convert the private property to public use.

POLICE POWER—

It is the power of promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.

It is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.

It is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people (now common good).

(Binay vs. Domingo, 201 SCRA 508)

It has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. (Carlos Superdrug Corp. vs. DSWD, G.R. No.

166494, June 29, 2007)

Cabrera vs. Lapid, G.R. No. 129098, December 6, 2006, a careful reading of the questioned Resolution reveals that the Ombudsman dismissed petitioner’s criminal

Pa ge 3 57 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

complaint because respondents had validly resorted to the police power of the State when they effected the demolition of the illegal fishpond in question following the declaration thereof as a nuisance per se. in the words of the Ombudsman, “those who participated in the blasting of the subject fishpond were only impelled by their desire to serve the best interest of the general public; for the good and the highest good.

Requisites (Limitations):

1. Lawful subject—the interests of the public in general as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of this power.

2. Lawful means—the means employed are reasonably for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive on individuals.

“Affected with public interest”—an industry is subject to control for the public good; it has been considered as the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of police power”.

Construction: construed strictly and any doubt must be resolved against the grant.

Scope/Characteristics:

It is the most pervasive, least limitable, and the most demanding of the three powers. The justification is found in: salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property so as not to impair others).

1. It cannot be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract.

2. The taxing power may be used as an implement of police power

3. Eminent domain may be used as an implement to attain the police power objective (Association of Landowners vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).

4. In Ortigas & Co. vs. CA, G.R. No. 126102, December 4, 2000, non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power.

5. In PRC vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681, June 21, 2004, the exercise of the constitutional right of every citizen to select a profession or course of study may be regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and the general welfare of the people. This regulation assumes particular pertinence in the field of medicine,

Pa ge 3 67 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

to protect the public from the potentially dead effects of incompetence and ignorance.

In Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534, the right to bear arms is merely statutory privilege. The license to carry firearm is neither a property nor a property right.

Neither does it create a vested right. A permit to carry outside one’s residence may be revoked at any time. Even if it were a property right, it cannot be considered as absolute as to be beyond the reach of the police power.

Who may exercise police power?

The power is inherently vested in Congress. However, they may validly delegate this power to the following:

1. the President

2. administrative bodies—public and quasi-public corporations 3. the lawmaking bodies of local government units

Local government units exercise the power under the general welfare clause.

CANORECO vs. Torres, G.R. no. 127249, February 27, 1998, while police power may be delegated to the President by law, RA 6939 and PD 260, as amended, do not authorize the President or any other administrative body, to take over the internal management of a cooperative. Accordingly, Memorandum Order No. 409, issued by the President, constituting an ad hoc committee to temporarily take over and manage the affairs of CANORECO is invalid.

In MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000, there is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its council to “enact ordinance, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare” of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. Thus, MMDA may not order the opening of Neptune St. in the Bel-Air Subdivision to public traffic, as it does not possess delegated police power.

Section 11, Article X—the Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

MMDA is not a special metropolitan political subdivision.

Pa ge 3 77 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

However, in MMDA vs. Garin, G.R. No. 130230, April 15, 2005, although the law (RA 7924) does not grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses without need of any legislative enactment, the same law vests the MMDA the duty to enforce existing traffic rules and regulations. Thus, where there is a traffic law or regulation validly enacted by the legislature or those agencies to whom legislative power has been delegated, the MMDA is not precluded—and in fact is duty-bound—to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses in the exercise of its mandate of transport and traffic management, as well as the administration and implementation of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and traffic education programs.

Additional Limitations (When exercised by delegate):

a. express grant by law

b. within territorial limits (for local government units, except when exercised to protect water supply)

c. must not be contrary to law For municipal ordinance to be valid:

1. it must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. it must not be unfair or oppressive;

3. it must not be partial or discriminatory;

4. it must not prohibit, but may regulate, trade;

5. it must not be unreasonable; and

6. it must be general in application and consistent with public policy.

In City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005, the SC declared as an invalid exercise of the police power the City of Manila Ordinance No.

7783, which prohibited “the establishment or operation of businesses providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities in the Ermita-Malate area”, for being contrary to the Constitution, infringing the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws.

In Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197 (1994), solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power.

In Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs. CA, 329 SCRA 314 (2000), the issuance of business licenses and permits by a municipality or city is essentially

Pa ge 3 87 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

regulatory in nature. The authority, which devolved upon local government units, to issue or grant such licenses or permits, is essentially in the exercise of the police power of the State within the contemplation of the general welfare clause of the LGC.

The implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) is an exercise of police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. But where, to carry out such regulation, the owners are deprived of lands they own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is also taking under the power of eminent domain. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is the surrender of the title to and physical possession of the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of the farmer beneficiary. The Bill of rights provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due process of law.” The CARL was not intended to take away property without due process of law.

The exercise of power of eminent domain requires that due process be observed in the taking of private property. [Roxas and Co., vs. CA, 321 SCRA 106 (1999)]

Republic vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 141314, November 15, 2002, the regulation of rates to be charged by public utilities is founded upon the police power of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control and regulations of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When a private property is used for a public purpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good.

Submission to regulation may be withdrawn by the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as the use of the property is continued, the same is subject to public regulation.

In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power to regulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the public utility of a reasonable return on investment.

Philippine Press Institute (PPI) vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272, Section 2 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2772, which mandates newspapers of general circulation in every province or city to provide free print space of not less than ½ page as COMELEC space, was held to be invalid exercise of police power there being no showing of the existence of national emergency or imperious public necessity for the taking of print

Pa ge 3 97 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

space, nor that the resolution was the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity.

Public purpose and use has broader concept now. It now includes VICARIOUS BENEFITS that society may derive from a particular measure.

e.g. CONCERN FOR THE POOR—SC recognized this as one for public purpose and use.

POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN— also known as the power of expropriation

The power of eminent domain is the power of the State to forcibly take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.

It is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular uses to promote public welfare.

It is government’s right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use or purpose. (Moday vs. CA, 268 SCRA 586)

The ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate, not only the public, but even the private property of all citizens within the territorial sovereignty, for public purpose.

Power of Eminent Domain Destruction Due to Necessity

involves public rights

the property is converted to public use

there must be payment of just compensation

undertaken by the State

involves private rights such as self-preservation and self-defense

there is no need for the conversion to public use

no need for just compensation

may be validly undertaken even by private individuals

Pa ge 4 07 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

Object of Expropriation:

1. anything that comes under the dominion of man 2. real, personal, tangible and intangible

3. property right

4. churches and other religious properties 5. property already devoted to public use

Except: money- because compensation is also money Who may exercise?

Generally, the legislature, but also upon valid delegation to:

1. the President;

2. lawmaking bodies of LGUs;

3. administrative bodies—public and quasi-public corporations 4. Private enterprises performing public services.

In the case of Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2002, the power of eminent domain must, by enabling law, be delegated to local governments by the national legislature, and thus, can only be as broad as the real authority would want it to be. The grant of the power to local government units under RA 7160 cannot be understood as equal to the pervasive and all encompassing power vested in the legislative branch of government.

JIL School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig, G. R. No. 152230, August 9, 2005—Sec. 19, of the LGC requires the LGU to tender a prior written definite and valid offer to acquire the property before the filing of the complaint for eminent domain.

Filstream Int’l Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716—the exercise of the power of eminent domain is clearly superior to the final and executor judgment rendered by the court in an ejectment case.

RP vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620—services were considered embraced in the concept of property subject to taking under the power of eminent domain. Republic, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, may require the telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and that of the PLDT, as the needs of government service may require, subject to the payment of just compensation to be determined by the court.

Pa ge 4 17 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

Where Expropriation Suit Is Filed:

In the Regional Trial Court—because it is incapable of pecuniary estimation

Requisites:

1.

Necessity—when exercised by:

a. Congress—it is a political question; (Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640)

b. Delegate—the determination of whether there is a genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiceable question (Republic vs. La Orden de Po.

Benedictinos, 1 SCRA 649).

The RTC has the power to inquire to the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it (Bardillon vs. Brgy. Masili of Calamba, Laguna, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003).

Lagcao vs. Judge Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13, 2004—there was no showing at all why petitioners’ property was singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the particular choice or selection. The ordinance stated no reason for the choice of petitioners’ property as the site of a socialized housing project.

2.

Private property—all private property capable of ownership may be expropriated except money and choses in action; may include services.

(Republic vs. PLDT, 26 SCRA 620)

In City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil. 349, a cemetery open to the public was already in public use and no part of the ground could be taken for other public uses under a general authority. The City of Manila was without authority to expropriate the property. (The Congress itself should expropriate or there must be special grant.)

3.

Taking— there is taking when:

a. The owner is actually deprived or dispossessed of his property;

b. There is practical destruction or material impairment of the value of the property;

c. The owner is deprived of the ordinary use of his property;

Pa ge 4 27 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

d. The owner is deprived of jurisdiction, supervision and control of his property.

Requisites for a valid taking: (EMADO)

a. The expropriator must enter a private property;

b. Entry must be for more than a momentary period;

c. Entry must be under warrant or color of authority;

d. Property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or injuriously affected;

e. Utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of beneficial enjoyment of the property.

(Republic vs. Castelvi, 58 SCRA 336)

The taking of private property may include the impairment of the use of the property for which it was intended. In US vs. Causby, 328 US 256, the flight of planes from a nearby military airport over plaintiff’s property below the navigable airspace resulting in the ruin of plaintiff’s chicken farm was considered compensable taking. So also were low landing and take-off flights which made nearby residential area unlivable (Griggs vs. Allegheny County, 369 US 84). This is taking in the constitutional sense.

Avenida, Rizal used to be the commercial center of Manila. However, when the Light Railway Transit (LRT) was built, the commercial value of Avenida was greatly diminished. The shops and stores had to close. The owners of these establishments suffered losses because of the operation of the LRT along Avenida, Rizal. Are they entitled to be paid just compensation?

No. SC held that the kind of injury or loss that one must suffer that will justify the payment of just compensation must be a special kind of injury or loss as in the case of Causby. If the injury or loss that one suffered is one which he suffered together with the rest of the community, his only compensation in such a case is the altruistic feeling that somehow he is able to contribute to the common good.

CANORECO vs. CA, G.R. No. 109338, November 20, 2000, The owner of the property cut the electric lines alleging that it impaired him of the use of his property. The SC held that the property owner was not justified in cutting the electric lines. His property becomes the servient estate subject to the encumbrance, and the acquisition of an easement of right of way filed by an electric power company for the construction of transmission lines falls within the purview of the power of eminent domain. However,

Pa ge 4 37 /1 2/ 20 08 ¥s ay

since there was an impairment of the use of the property, he is entitled to the payment of just compensation.

The establishment of an easement is a form of compensable taking. In NAPOCOR vs. Sps. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, January 18, 1991, the owner of the land was awarded full compensation against the NAPOCOR’s argument that the owners were not totally deprived of the use of the land and could still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires. The Court said: “the right of way easement perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays

The establishment of an easement is a form of compensable taking. In NAPOCOR vs. Sps. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 60077, January 18, 1991, the owner of the land was awarded full compensation against the NAPOCOR’s argument that the owners were not totally deprived of the use of the land and could still plant the same crops as long as they did not come into contact with the wires. The Court said: “the right of way easement perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed through the transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays