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confronting UNTAET with other cases of intrastate conflict is that Timor Leste did not fit neatly into the pattern of failed or failing states during the 1990s. Timorese state- building at the beginning of 2000 was the product of a successful liberation struggle and there were no formal state institutions upon which to build. The bulk of the Timorese population was generally united in viewing Indonesian rule and the predatory nature of the Indonesian regime in Timor Leste as an illegitimate occupation. Indonesia’s withdrawal from the territory following the Popular Consultation in August 1999 created less complexity for post-conflict political reconstruction by resolving the most significant political factor that had underpinned the conflict. The major belligerent had been removed, which paved the way for East Timorese sovereignty.

Within Timor Leste there were fewer political players and competing agendas to negotiate when compared to other cases of intrastate conflict during the 1990s. With a handful of exceptions, Timorese elite level political divisions were framed between aspiring power holders who had supported the creation of an independent country. Moreover, as an independent state its cultural and ethnic diversity promised to be much less complicating factors at local levels than if it were to have remained an autonomous province inside Indonesia. As Alagappa might argue, the sorts of legitimacy crises that would confront those set to govern Timor Leste in the future would revolve less around the regime (the values that constitute the order itself), and more around the government (the acquisition and exercise of power focussed on specific institutions).82 For UN peacekeeping forces, as a tiny half-island territory it was much more defensible against regional incursions and cross-border threats than were larger countries. This reduced the complications for state-building and political reconstruction when compared to peacekeeping operations on the African continent or in the Balkans.

82

Muthiah Alagappa, ‘Contestation and Crisis’, in M. Alagappa (ed.), Political Legitimacy in Southeast

In September 1999 the UN was confronted with a situation that on the surface resembled cases of state-collapse and intrastate conflict during the 1990s. UNTAET was a peacekeeping mission that had been deployed rapidly in response to Indonesian state- sponsored violence.83 The resulting bloodshed led to social chaos and a humanitarian emergency that further threatened the lives of hundreds of thousands of Timorese. The Indonesian state’s governance practices prior to 1999 had also been similar to those found in countries that experienced humanitarian emergencies, intrastate conflict, or were in danger of collapsing. Until its economic crisis of 1997, Indonesia was neither weak nor anaemic: it was a strong state that had drifted towards predatory behaviour during Suharto’s presidency.84 The state was weakened following the economic crisis, but also its political and institutional systems were dominated by repressive or corrupt elites.85

83 _{On Timorese hardships during the Indonesian occupation see United States Congress, House Committee}

on Foreign Affairs, Famine Relief for East Timor: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives. Ninety-Sixth Congress. First Session. December 4, 1979 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1980); Asia Watch, Testimony of Floyd Abrams on behalf of the Asia Watch Committee, August 15, 1986. United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation (Asia Watch, 1986); Tapol, the Indonesia Human Rights Campaign, Statement on the Question of East Timor to the UN Committee of 24 (New York: August 1988); Amnesty International, East Timor: Amnesty International Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation AI Index: ASA 21/09/90 (1990); Amnesty International, East Timor: Amnesty International Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation AI Index: ASA 21/14/91 (1991); Amnesty International, East Timor: “In Accordance with the Law”, Amnesty International Statement to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonisation AI Index: ASA 21/11/92 (1992); Peter Carey, ‘A Personal Journey through East Timor’, in P. Hainsworth and S. McCloskey (eds.), The East Timor

Question: the struggle for independence from Indonesia (New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. New York,

2000), pp. 19-23; Budiardjo, Carmel, and Soei Liong, The War Against East Timor (London: Zed Books, 1984), pp. 39-40, 225-226.

84

See Gerry van Klinken, ‘Big States and Little Secessionist Movements’, in D. Kingsbury (ed.), Guns and

Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 2000), p. 157; Gary

Goodpaster, ‘Reflections on Corruption in Indonesia’, in T. Lindsey and H. Dick (eds.), Corruption in

Asia: Rethinking the Governance Paradigm (Sydney: The Federation Press, 2000), pp, 92-100; and

Planning Commission, National Development Plan (Díli: Planning Commission, Democratic Republic of East Timor, 2002), p. 40

85 _{For further discussion see Mark T. Berger, ‘Post-Cold War Indonesia and the Revenge of History: The}

Colonial Legacy, Nationalist Visions and Global Capitalism’, in M. T. Berger and T. Borer (eds.), The Rise

of East Asia: Critical Visions of the Pacific Century (London: Routledge, 1997), pp, 171-181, 187;

Schwarz (1994), pp. 137-138; Gary Goodpaster, ‘The Rule-of-law, Economic Development & Indonesia’, in T. Lindsey (ed.), Indonesia: Law and Society (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1999), pp. 22-23; Anthony L. Smith, ‘Indonesia- Transforming the Leviathan’, in J. Funston (ed.), Government and Politics in

Southeast Asia (Singapore: Zed Books, 2001), pp. 111-112; Benedict Anderson, ‘The Idea of Power in

The resulting “behavioural” legacies of both Indonesian and Portuguese rule (i.e. negative “role-modelling” for the indigenous population), a high degree of ethno- linguistic diversity among Timorese, high levels of poverty and a predominantly subsistence agricultural economy made the land and its people appear similar to other post-conflict settings; most of which had been either post-colonial or post-Soviet states. East Timorese society was also hierarchically structured with elite groups set to take control of a political system that would inevitably be left with weak institutions upon the country’s official independence. The result was that Timor Leste resembled other post- colonial countries upon their initial independence before they experienced state-failure or humanitarian emergencies. This meant that if political reconstruction in Timor Leste following 1999 was not properly managed; state-building could ultimately result in new patterns of violent internal conflict and perhaps future state-collapse.

Therefore it was possible to look upon Timor Leste as either a successful liberation struggle resurrecting an interrupted decolonisation process (i.e. state-building from scratch) or as a secessionist movement recovering from Indonesian state-failure. Both views brought with them different assumptions about the point of departure for building this new country: firstly was reconstruction after a process of state-failure (i.e. secession from Indonesia) and secondly was state-building before state-failure (i.e. decolonisation). Nevertheless, both views meant that Timor Leste was required to establish a viable governance system that could overcome the dangers associated with state-failure, intrastate conflict and humanitarian emergencies. This also meant that UNTAET’s efforts were a “test case” for how state-building framed around institutional peace- building could create an administrative and political system able to promote healthy state- societal relationships, broad-based economic development, and an inclusive democracy that could prevent future intrastate conflict or state-collapse.86

1972), pp. 65-67; and R. Liddle, Leadership and Culture in Indonesian Politics (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 17.

86

James Traube, ‘Inventing East Timor’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 4 (July/August 2000), p. 88. See also Simon Chesterman, East Timor in Transition: From Conflict Prevention to State-Building (New York: International Peace Academy, 2001), p. 4.