(Note: Can’t find case online and mali citation sa lahat ng nagcicite online, pati sa syllabus ni jack, pati sa SC! So…presumed facts na lang based on the doctrines I found online [34 PLJ 598]).
FACTS: Alejo SANTOS is the Secretary of National
Defense. Before an election, he was campaigning for Governor Tomas Martin, candidate of the Nacionalista Party in the Province of Bulacan. A case was filed against SANTOS for his supposed partisan political activity in violation of the Civil Service Act of 1959, which prohibits all officers and employees in the civil service, "whether in the competitive or classified, or non-competitive or unclassified service," from engaging directly or indirectly in partisan political activities or taking part in any election except to vote. Judge YATCO ruled that the Secretary of National Defense is embraced within the civil service who are prohibited to take part in partisan political activities. A preliminary injunction was issued by him restraining the secretary of National Defense to campaign. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General.
ISSUE: W/N Cabinet members/department secretaries are
covered in the Constitutional prohibition against partisan political activity. – NO!
RATIO: The ban does not extend to those officers and
employees outside of the civil service such as members of the Cabinet. The Secretary of National Defense is not embraced within the terms: "officers and employees in the civil service" (as disclosed in the proceedings in the Constitutional Convention wherein the attempt of Delegate Mumar to include the heads of executive departments within the civil service was rejected) who are prohibited to take part in partisan political activities. Cabinet Members serve at the behest and pleasure of the President. As such, their positions are essentially political. Although such campaigning is may be seen as improper (because of SANTOS’ supposed deleterious influence upon the members of the Armed Forces, who are administratively subordinated to the Secretary of National Defense, and who are often called upon by the Commission on Election to aid in the conduct of orderly and impartial elections), it is not considered as illegal. Injunction set aside.
Additional note so important reasons:
SANTOS and GOV were discussing the issues before the electorate and defending the actuations of the Administration to which he belongs
Since we have a presidential form of government set up in the Constitution and the democratic procedures established therein of determining issues, political, economic or otherwise, by election, allows political parties to submit their views and the principles and policies they stand for to the electorate for decision
P.S. The ban under the 1987 Constitution, Civil Service Law and Administrative Code of 1987 only covers officers and employees in the Civil Service.
SECTION 2
(5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.
DE LA CRUZ v. CA
Facts: Petitioners are public school teachers from schools
in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed by the DECS Secretary for participating in a mass action or illegal strike and defying the return-to-work order issued, which constitute grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty, and gross violation of the Civil Service Law.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit System Protection Board (MSPB) then to the CSC. The CSC found them guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposed upon them the reduced penalty of 6 months’ suspension. But in view of the length of time they were out of the service by the immediate implementation of the dismissal order, the CSC ordered their automatic reinstatement without back wages.
Petitioners were unhappy with the CSC decisions and filed petitions for certiorari, which the CA denied for lack of merit. Hence, they are before the SC, alleging that their only offense was to exercise their constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. They insist that the mass actions were not strikes, since there was no actual disruption of classes (since substitute teachers were appointed). They ask for exoneration or, in the alternative, award of back wages.
Issue: Whether the teachers must be exonerated or at the
very least given back wages – NO
Ratio: The SC ruled in consolidated cases that the mass
actions staged by the Metro Manila public school teachers amounted to a strike constituting a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage or absence from work, which it was their sworn duty to perform, carried out for essentially economic reasons – to protest and pressure the Govt. to correct what they perceived to be the unjust implementation of the salary standardization law, the delay in payment of fringe benefits, and the imposition of additional teaching loads and longer teaching hours. It held that for the constitutional liberty to peaceably assemble to be upheld, it must be exercised within reasonable limits. The teachers did not do so because they staged the mass protest on regular school days, abandoning their classes and refusing to go back despite being ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed of their free time – recess, after classes, weekends or holidays – to dramatize their grievances within the bounds of law, no one could have held them liable for their participation in the mass actions.
The ruling in the PMB case that the rights of free expression and assembly could not be lightly disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable here because what were pitted therein against the rights of free expression and assembly were inferior property rights, while the higher consideration involved in this case is the education of the youth, which at the very least, must be equated with the said rights.
The teachers were penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such rights were exercised. The fact that substitute teachers were appointed to partially deflect the adverse effects of the mass protests did not erase the administrative liability of petitioner for the intended consequences thereof.
SECTION 7
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
FLORES vs. DRILON & GORDON
FACTS The constitutionality of Section 13, paragraph d of
RA 7227 or the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992” appointing Olongapo City Mayor Richard Gordon as Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority is being assailed by the petitioners who are employees of the U.S. Facility, and members of Filipino Civilians Employees Association in U.S. Facilities in the Philippines, in their capacity as taxpayers. They
maintain that considering that Gordon is an elected official and the subject posts are public offices, such provision is repugnant to Section 7, paragraph 1, Article 9-B, of the Constitution which provides that: “[n]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.”
ISSUE Whether or not Sec. 13(d) violates Art. 9-B, Sec.
7(1)?
RULING YES. Sec. 7 expresses the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public services. The Appointment of the Mayor of Olongapo, an elective official, to another governmental post as Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of SBMA is precisely what the constitutional proscription seeks to prevent. The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no moment.
The contention that Sec. 94 of the Local Government Code allows the appointment of a local elective official to another post if so allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office is fallacious. No legislative act can prevail over the fundamental law of the land. Moreover, as Sec. 94 of the LGC is not the issue in the case, the Court found it unnecessary to rule on its validity. In any case, the above contention ignores the clear cut difference the clear-cut difference in the two paragraphs of Art. 9-B, sec. 7:
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public officer or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
While the second paragraph authorizes the holding of multiple offices by an appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more stringent by not providing any exception to he rule against appointments or designation of an elective official to the government post, except as are particularly recognized in the Constitution itself. The distinction being clear, the exemption allowed to appointive officials in the second paragraph cannot be allowed to be extended to elective officials who are governed by the first paragraph.
It was further argued that the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of Olongapo City Mayor. This argument however is based on a wrong premise.
Congress did not contemplate making the subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not an adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Otherwise, Congress should have used the word “ex officio” instead of appointed.
Although ineligible for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and CEO of SBMA, Gordon may however resign from his elective post to cast-off the constitutionally-attached disqualification. Otherwise, he remains Mayor of Olongapo City and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void but shall be considered valid as acts of a de facto officer. This is because an elective official, other than a senator, that is appointed to other governmental post, does not automatically forfeit his elective office.
SECTION 8
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect compensation.