7. MARCO CONTEXTUAL
7.7 CAUSAS DEL COMPORTAMIENTO AGRESIVO
MEAN TO U.S. ENERGY MARKETS AND THE U.S. ECONOMY? (1998), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/kyoto/pdf/kyotobbrf.pdf.
59 See id. 60
UNFCCC website, supra note 52.
61 Id. at http://unfccc.int/documentation/decisions/items/3597.php?such=j&volltex
t=/CP.13#beg.
62
John R. Crook, U.S. Positions in International Climate Change Negotiations, 102 AM. J.INT’L L. 164, 165 (2008).
63 Id. 64
Press Release, The Whitehouse, President Obama Announces Launch of the Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (Mar. 28, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/president-obama-announces-launch-of-the- major-economies-forum-on-energy-and-climate/.
65 International Climate Change Negotiations: Restoring U.S. Leadership: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (Nov. 13, 2007) (statement of
Paula J. Dobriansky, Under Secretary for Democracy and Global Affairs) [hereinafter Dobriansky statement].
66 Id. Like Senate Resolution 98, supra note 56, this argument calls for mandatory
commitments from all of the UNFCCC member nations. The rationale given by Ms. Dobriansky is based in pragmatism rather than in structural fairness.
67 Dobriansky statement, supra note 65. 68
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, annexes I, II, June 12, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
69 UNFCCC website, supra note 52. 70
See generallyHenry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, 15 L.& POL’Y 1 (1993).
71 Id. 72
See generally Crook, supra note 62.
74 L
E TREUT ET AL.,supra note 19, at 103.
75
Kevin A. Baumert, Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime: Lessons for the Future, 38 GEO.WASH.INT’L L.REV. 365, 366, 381–82 (2006).
76
See generally Michael Weisslitz, Rethinking the Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility: Differential Versus Absolute Norms of Compliance and Contribution in the Global Climate Change Context, 13 COLO.J.ENVTL.L.&POL’Y 473 (2002).
77 Will Gerber, Defining “Developing Country” in the Second Commitment Period of the Kyoto Protocol, 31 B.C.INT’L &COMP.L.REV.327, 333 (2008).
78
Weisslitz, supra note 76 at 477–78, 484.
79 S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (as passed by Senate, July 25,1997). 80 See generally Weisslitz, supra note 76.
81
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
82 Anonymous, supra note 1.
83 Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 G
EO.L.J. 1565, 1607 (2008).
84 Shue, supra note 70, at 42. 85 Anonymous, supra note 1. 86
UNFCCC website, supra note 52.
87 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Basic Compensation for Victims of Climate Change,
155 U.PA.L.REV. 1605 (2007).
88
Posner & Sunstein, supra note 83.
89 Id. at 1593. 90 Id. at 1595. 91
Id. at 1597.
92 Posner and Sunstein note that philosophers differ in their opinions as to whether an
actor needs to be culpable in order to be liable under corrective justice. I am distinguishing corrective justice as a moral consideration which would require some degree of blame on the part of the wrongdoer. So, as I use the term, corrective justice requires a culpable state of mind. I focus on negligence as the threshold degree of culpability and not to the exclusion of reckless or purposeful states of mind.
93 This would be true under an economic paradigm of negligence, where wrongdoers fail
to justify the cost of their actions, and under a community standard paradigm of negligence, where wrongdoers fail to exercise due care.
94 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 83, at 1597.
95 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI.L.REV. 1113 (1999) [hereineafter Theory]; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern and Traditional Customary Law, 40 VA.J.INT’L L. 639 (2000) [hereinafter Understanding].
96
Theory, supra note 95, at 1170–72.
97 Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH.J.INT’L L.143, 145 (2001).
98Id.
100 Posner & Sunstein, supra note 83, at 1584. 101
Id. at 1591.
102Id. at 1586.
103 Shue, supra note 70, at 52. 104
Daniel Barstow Magraw, Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and Absolute Norms, 1 COLO.J.INT’L EVNTL.L.&POL’Y 69, 69–70 (1990).
105 S
TERN ET AL.,supra note 6, at 169.
106
ADMINISTRATION ANALYSIS, supra note 57, at 1–2.
107 Magraw, supra note 104 at 70. 108 S
TERN ET AL.,supra note 6, at vii.
109
Baumert, supra note 75, at 369.
110 Dobriansky statement, supra note 65. 111 Baumert, supra note 75, at 389. 112
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(1)(b), June 12,1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
113 The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
art. 10(a), Mar. 16, 1998, ILM 30822, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
114Id.
115Id. at art. 10(b)(i). 116
Baumert, supra note 75, at 377–78.
117 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 4(7), June 12,1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107. See also Baumert, supra note 75, at 375–77.
118
Baumert, supra note 75, at 382–83.
119 Annex I nations with economies in transition are not mandated to pick 1990 as their
target year. The important distinction here is that all Annex I nations are required to make mandatory commitments.
120 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
arts. 10, 12 & 17, Dec. 10, 1997, 2302 U.N.T.S. 148.
121
Id. at art. 12 ¶ 2.
122Id. at art. 12 ¶ 3. 123Id. at art. 12 ¶ 5(c). 124
Id. at art. 12 ¶ 5(a).
125 Baumert, supra note 75, at 386. 126Id. at 387–88.
127
Id. at 390.
128Id. at 391.
129 Id. at 393 (outlining the failed attempt of Argentina). 130
Id. at 394.
131Id. at 394–95.
132See generally Gerber, supra note 77; Weisslitz, supra note 76. 133
WORLD AGROFORESTRY CENTER & ALTERNATIVE TO SLASH-BURN, AVOIDED
DEFORESTATION WITH SUSTAINABLE BENEFITS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.asb.cgiar.org/pdfwebdocs/avoided-deforestation-with-sustainable-benefits- flyer.pdf.
134 S
135 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice [SBSTA], Working Paper: Background Paper for the Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in Developing Countries, Part I, 6 (Aug. 30–Sept. 1, 2006) [hereinafter UNFCCC Background Paper Part I].
136 Id. 137Id. at 22. 138 B
URNING SEASON (2008), available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/episodes/ burning-season/video-full-episode/1987/.
139 UNFCCC Background Paper Part I, supra note 135, at 7. 140 Infra Part VI.
141
SPETH,supra note 11, at 1.
142 UNFCCC Background Paper Part I, supra note 135, at 7. 143Id. at 6. 144 Id. 145 Id. at 5. 146Id. 147 Id. 148 Id. at 10. 149 Id. at 11. 150 Id. at 12.
151 Kyoto Protocol art. 17, Mar. 16, 1998, ILM 30822, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107. 152Id.
153
Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC, Marrakesh, Morocco, Oct. 29–Nov. 10, 2001, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Seventh Session, Part II at 57–58 [hereinafter Marrakesh Accords].
154
Seesupra Part V.B.
155 Marrakesh Accords, supra note 153, at 57–58. 156Id.
157
U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, INDEPENDENT STATISTICS AND
ANALYSIS, EMISSIONS OF GREENHOUSE GASES REPORT, Fig. 5 (2009), http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrpt/.
158
UNFCCC Background Paper Part I, supra note 135, at 9.
159See W
ORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, DEFORESTATION: THE GLOBAL ASSAULT CONTINUES, available at http://www.wri.org/publication/content/8368 (last visited Mar. 4, 2010) (citing United Nations Population Division, World Population Prospects 1950– 2050: The 1996 Revision, Annex 1: Demographic Indicators, 11–45(1997)).
160See generally Crook, supra note 62. 161
Letter from Steve Prior, Charlotte Streck & Robert O’Sullivan, Centre for International Sustainable Development Law, to COP UNFCCC (Mar. 2006), available at
http://unfcc.int/resource/docs/2006/smsn/ngo/005.pdf.
162 Id. 163Id. 164 A
RTHUR KOESTLER,THE SLEEPWALKERS:AHISTORY OF MAN’S CHANGING VISION OF THE UNIVERSE 22 (Penguin Books 1989) (1959).
166 A
NGELSEN ET AL., supra note 8, at3.
167
Id. at vii.
168 Baumert, supra note 75, at 396. 169 Id.