Newcombe’s aforementioned stance also resurfaces Jones’ (1995) instinct that as the arts are important in providing relief and balance in a rapidly changing environment, they should be immune to the pressures of emerging technology orientated conventions. An additional thought is that we should not be overly impressed by glittering new scientific techniques, assuming that they automatically constitute art simply because they overwhelm inexpert artistic eyes (Mueller, 1983). As Reade and Johnston (1991) aver, “technology has become more automatic, more impersonal, more objective”, whilst in reaction, thinking about “art has become emotional and specifically human” (p. 21). Other views regarding the incompatibility of art concepts with those of technology include: “computer art is limited by the very nature of the tool itself” (Farrell, 1990, p. 32), and automated machines compromise creativity by overtaking imagination and cause excessive reliance on technology for stimulus (Eisner, 1972).
McFee and Degge (1977) explain the long-standing division between science and art is one of attitude: “we learn to identify with one more than the other… and are often distrustful of the other” (p. 323). For Reade et al. (1991) this ‘distrust’ reflects the belief that new technology will unavoidably “undermine the artistic process, mechanise action and produce a new and powerful elite, indifferent to the creative issues of the arts” (p. 21). According to Sherry Turkle (1997) of MIT, comparable views even arise in her faculty where some educators see computers as being useful insofar as they compensate for lack of hand drawing skills. For others, computer drawings have lower aesthetic value in that any novel solutions generated through digital technology are regarded as being sterile. Additional concerns are that students
“get lost in the multitude of options” (p. 80) in computer software, and computer simulation “not only encourages detachment from one’s work, but detachment from real life” (p. 80). Within the architecture faculty at MIT, most agree that drawing software assists in generating more precise images, but express: “a loss of attachment to their work” (p. 80). One educator put it this way:
I can lose this bit of paper in the street and if [a day later] I walk on the street and see it, I’ll know that I drew it. With a drawing that I do on the computer … I might not even know it is mine. (Parenthesis in original, p. 80)
Busby, Parrott and Olsen (2000) found similar responses in their USA study on the use of computers in basic fine art design classes. Although there were instances of high enthusiasm among some of the professors, other professors simply conceded that they did not know the computer well enough to teach their students how to use it in art courses. A particular source of concern for some fine arts professors was that computers can do too much of the work, and that students will not need traditional art classes such as composition and drawing. Likewise, that the one-of-a-kind quality of art would be diminished if an endless number of duplicates of the same piece of artwork can be printed.
Again the implication is that philosophically, computer technology and traditional arts practice part rather than coalesce because many practitioners are not able to ideologically and systematically broach the ‘technology gap’. Of interest here with respect to art teachers’
attitudes to ICT is the observation of Phelps et al. (2008) that, regardless of recent curriculum changes, less than half of the teachers interviewed during their research considered ICT as fundamental to visual arts curriculum. Many of the teachers were concerned that ICT use would undermine, rather than supplement, traditional approaches to the subject. The prevalence of this attitude within, certain preservice teacher education courses is illustrated by another Australian art educator, with reference to students who generally have not had extensive computer experience for creative activity and are disdainful of non-traditional studio practice.
For instance, one student stated: “painting a canvas is an ‘extension of my hand’ while, working with a computer is more like ‘having to work with my brain to tell the computer how to paint’”
(Litchman, 1996, p. 46). As such, the issues in art education are not just the challenges of accessing and learning to use hardware and software, but also in countering the perceptions of limiting creative activity (e.g., Hicks, 1993).
This tendency for people to accept in principle, the importance of technology in education, yet question its appropriateness in art education is also well noted by others (e.g., Mcleod, 1991;
Boughton, 1993). Again, this position reminisces the age old humanistic versus mechanical ideology and the perceived threat of technology removing creativity and aesthetic considerations as noted in the art and technology literature (e.g., Cuban, 1986; Jackson, 1968;
Kaufman, 1970; Mumford; 1952). Concisely put, new technologies are more difficult to assimilate both theoretically and practically than those of the past (e.g., Reade et al., 1991). In emphasising this point with regard to the United States context, Henry Clauser (1998) draws on the words of art critic Grace Glueck (1983) as published in the New York Times: “We’re accustomed to looking at art that addresses us in a more or less known grammar … that can be placed … in a critical - historical context” (p. 116).
In all, it seems that art and technology are often seen as mutually exclusive concepts as long observed by the computer art theorist, Jonathan Benthall (1972): “computers are to a large extent the servants of large administrative, commercial and military institutions; this fact has greatly influenced our image of them” (p. 48). In due course, Herbert Franke (1985), a prominent proponent of early computer art, comments on the continuing power of this influence on public response to the early-time artists’ use of emerging computer technology:
Even today’s applications have caused remarkable unrest in practice and theory in the contemporary art scene. The question of the possibilities of new machine-dependent techniques, of evaluating the creative elements of expression and beauty are being raised anew. (p. 167)
According to the digital artist/educator and new media theorist, Simon Penny (1995), the increasing emphasis on computers in creative disciplines reflects misguided acceptance of: the
“argument bandied about in certain circles that art practice that uses emerging technology is of value because it is future orientated by virtue of its tools, it is “progressive” (p. 53). Implicit here is that the prevailing focus on computer technology in education is seen to undermine the inherent value of promoting learning through concrete forms of studio practice.
Consequently, the associated uncertainty regarding the technology trend has a concomitant impact upon university programs where “familiar materials and methods are juxtaposed uneasily against the image-making potential of new technologies” (Boughton, 1993, p. 22).
Thus, despite the apparent allure of new technology within art education, numerous issues around its liabilities need to be explored before agreement can be achieved. In this respect, Maxine Greene’s (1995) advice rings true: “We cannot assume that there is a consensus about what is valuable and useful and what ought to be taught, despite all of the official definitions of necessary outcomes and desired goals” (p. 3).
It follows then that art educators need to develop and trust their own informed judgments about how, when and why they use digital media. This includes assuming a sense of scepticism about the unrealistic euphoria surrounding computer technology, and a spirit of open-mindedness to see beyond its liabilities and to identify its attributes for visual arts education (e.g., Walters, Hodges & Simmons, 1989). Ideally, although technology related challenges for artists and educators are great art educators will be in the position to aim for a crucial synthesis between traditional and digital art practices (e.g., Hicks, 1993).