CDI “ ASSUNTA MARCHETTI”

In this section, we shall examine cross-modality mapping to assess whether Linearity in meaning construction can be applied to this typology. For this purpose, we need to reconsider Table 6 above. Our task here is to check whether source and target modalities can be differentiated in terms of the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor (see 155). This time, however, we shall pay special attention on meaning transfer principle.

In order to explain this metaphorical mapping typology within the embodied approach to metaphor, auditory, visual, tactile, olfactory, and gustatory modalities should be classified according to the tenets of this approach. This means that we should differentiate them in terms of the following criteria:

i. In terms of Uni-directionality: Mapping across these modalities would be unidirectional because if a modality functions as source domain, it cannot take on the role of target in other metaphorical mappings, given the inherent features that are attributed to source and target domains (see pages 116,118). Indeed, as the table above shows, there is a multi-directional mapping among these modalities. For instance, auditory, visual and gustatory modalities function as source and target domains in different metaphorical mappings.

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ii. In terms of subordination-autonomy relation between source and target domains: In metaphorical mapping, source modalities are autonomous in the sense that they are semantically independent. In contrast, the phenomena which are processed as target modalities are semantically dependent on source modalities. This incongruity is obvious in the fact that the experience of source modality would be semantically autonomous whereas the modality in the target domain is semantically subordinate. That is, following the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor, target modality would be more complex and presumably another ‘bodily-experienced’ modality is required to cognitively access such modality.

iii. In terms of concrete-abstract distinction: Based on our analysis of the metaphors in the table above, the tenets of the Embodied metaphor approach do not fit this criterion. Metaphors (1) and (2) above are especially indicative of this point in that we need to view certain modalities as concrete and abstract phenomena. In contrast, there is no reason why we should believe that source and target modalities are different in terms of this criterion.

iv. In terms of chronological order: we observed how this criterion does not fit the mapping typology which draws on bodily-experienced phenomena (see page 184). That is, the mapping typology which draws on a sensory modality as source and target domain cannot be put in a chronological order.

To sum up, the metaphorical mapping typology which we have been concerned with in this chapter does not fit the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor. This situation is due mainly to three key facts. First, this type of metaphorical mapping does not follow a chronological order of occurrence among source and target domains. Second, the concrete- abstract criterion cannot account for this mapping typology as source and target domains

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are bodily experienced. Third, source and target domains cannot be differentiated in terms of dependent and autonomous domains.

Conclusion

The tenets of the embodiment theory cover a broad aspect of metaphorical mapping. However, the assumption that conceptual metaphor is instantiated in one mapping typology contradicts the data. In particular, adopting the view that all metaphorical mappings engage bodily-experienced phenomena (as source domains) and non-bodily-experienced phenomena (as target domains) raises major theoretical problems.

In this chapter, we have confirmed that while the assumptions of this approach can be applied to a certain metaphorical mapping typology (see Chapter II), the task becomes difficult when one tries to examine different mapping typologies sticking to the tenets of the theory of embodiment.

In this respect, the theory needs to be refined to be able to account for different mapping typologies. For instance, mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena has shown that most of the tenets of the embodied approach to metaphor fail to account for this typology. This refinement process requires the theory to start out with accepting that metaphorical mapping is not instantiated through a single mapping typology—namely, mapping concrete onto abstract phenomena. This is due to the fact that different metaphorical mapping typologies follow different operating mechanisms (see the following chapter).

In this chapter we have also shown that metaphorical mapping has a wider scope because it does not only engage bodily and non-bodily-experienced phenomena as source and target domains, respectively. Instead, the data indicates that metaphor operates also on

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bodily-experienced phenomena as target. Importantly, in this case, metaphorical mapping may follow different patterns and processing. In this respect, we have shown that the metaphorical mapping typology which engages two bodily-experienced phenomena substantially differentiates from other typologies.

In line with this finding, our proposed perspective –Linearity and Propositionality of metaphorical mapping—does fit the data put forward in this chapter. Recall that this perspective fits perfectly well the tenets of the theory of embodiment (see Chapter II). Since not all metaphorical mapping typologies engage non-bodily-experienced phenomena (as target domains), we hypothesized that a certain type of metaphorical mapping would show potential incongruities within the embodiment theory—namely, the mapping typology which involves bodily-experienced phenomena in its source and target domains.

Accordingly, we tested the entailments of the tenets of this theory and showed that they cannot account for this type of metaphorical mapping. This is due to the fact that the theoretical framework of Embodied metaphor is based on the general assumption that bodily-experienced and abstract phenomena are inherently source and target domains, respectively. Conversely, the data indicates that source and target domains do not prove to have inherent features to perform a by-default function in metaphorical mappings. To illustrate, so far in this chapter we have demonstrated that target domains show some of the characteristics which are believed to be inherent to source domains.

One of those common features is that source and target domains are concrete and bodily-experienced. This means that target domains are not devoid of bodily-based information that were held—within the embodied approach to metaphor—to be circumscribed to source domains, and which are believed to be the only operating features

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in metaphorical mappings. That is, within this approach, the experiential character of metaphor has been exclusively attributed to source domains.

Possibly, this notion is rooted in the fact that the analysis of conceptual metaphor has been carried out through the filter of the constitutive nature of source domains.

In contrast, since target domains in the typology we have been concerned with in this chapter are also bodily-experienced, there is no reason to believe that the features of source domains are the only operating features in metaphorical mapping. This is because in this typology both phenomena are concrete and bodily-experienced.

Taken together, these findings reveal two main entailments: first, target domains might be put at the same level as source domains in terms of their contribution to the experiential basis of metaphor. Second, metaphorical mapping also operate on bodily- experienced phenomena. In this respect, we have paid scant attention to the characteristics of target domains and their relation to source domains in terms of the “experiential basis” of conceptual metaphor. The characteristics that have been believed to be common to only source domains seem to be operating in target domains too.

Obviously, we did not intend to cover all the characteristics of target domains (see the following chapter). Rather, we only highlighted those that have been previously believed to be exclusive to source domains and which conceptual metaphor has been argued to endow conceptual metaphor with an experiential basis.

Of particular interest also is that the primitive-complex distinction does not prove reliable to assign phenomena the roles they take on in metaphorical mapping. Indeed, our analysis of the data shows that there is no cogent criterion to differentiate them because the two are shown to be grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena.

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These findings open a new direction in our investigation regarding conceptual metaphor. Namely, if the phenomena which carry out the function of target domains can fulfill the role of source domains in certain mapping typologies, then they do not have inherent features that allow them to take on the role of source or target. It is worth noting here that since our focus falls only on mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena, some of our conclusions that have been drawn here may not be applied to other instances of metaphor (see Chapter II).

Based on these findings, target domains may well fulfill a vital function in metaphorical mapping than have been previously believed. The following step is to assess whether target domains carry out the same role as source domains in the sense that they also shape metaphorical mappings. This might mean that target phenomena are not ‘passive’ as it is held within the embodiment theory.

In this chapter, we demonstrated how mapping across bodily-experienced phenomena suggests a challenge to the theory. Accordingly, the embodiment theory might need to take into account also the characteristics of target domains which may be specific to some metaphorical mapping typologies. When a given metaphorical mapping engages bodily-experienced phenomena in source and target domains, the experiential basis of conceptual metaphor may not be fully attributed to source domains.

Interestingly, once source and target domains are put at the same level in terms of their experiential character, it possible to make a hypothesis on the basis of the aforementioned findings that target domains also contribute to the embodied character of conceptual metaphor. This will lead us in the following chapter to suggest another way of looking at metaphor. That is, rather than imposing “recorded” experiences of source onto target domains, we shall hypothesize that the mapping typology wherein source and target

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domains are grounded in bodily-experienced phenomena there is interaction between such domains. In this respect, we put forward another theory–domains interaction—to deal with this type of metaphorical mapping.

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