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CENTRO VACACIONAL BANCOSTA S. A

AVISOS CONVOCATORIAS

CENTRO VACACIONAL BANCOSTA S. A

preponderance of evidence but even by the admissions of LCDC and the spouses Ley. It maintains that its cause of action is not predicated on the improper negotiation of the letter of credit but on the breach of the terms and conditions of the trust receipt.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court sought for is the proper remedy.

HELD:

No. The Bank's petition suffers from a fatal infirmity. In particular, it contravenes the elementary rule of appellate procedure that an appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court "shall raise only questions of law." The rule is based on the nature of this Court's appellate function — this Court is not a trier of facts — and on the evidentiary weight given to the findings of fact of the trial court which have been affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals — they are conclusive on this Court. While there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court sees no reason to apply the exception and not the rule in this case.

The issue of whether or not the Bank was able to establish its cause of action by preponderant evidence is essentially a question of fact. Stated in another way, the issue which the Bank raises in this petition is whether the evidence it presented during the trial was preponderant enough to hold LCDC and the spouses Ley liable.

Even the legal rights of the Bank and the correlative legal duty of LCDC have not been sufficiently established by the Bank in view of the failure of the Bank's evidence to show the provisions and conditions that govern its legal relationship with LCDC, particularly the absence of the provisions and conditions supposedly printed at the back of the Application and Agreement for Commercial Letter of Credit. Even assuming arguendo that there was no impropriety in the negotiation of the Letter of Credit and the Bank's cause of action was simply for the collection of what it paid under said Letter of Credit, the Bank did not discharge its burden to prove every element of its cause of action against LCDC.

This failure of the Bank to present preponderant evidence that will establish the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit necessarily benefits the spouses Ley whose liability is supposed to be based on a Continuing Surety Agreement guaranteeing the liability of LCDC under the Letter of Credit.

COMPILED CASE DIGEST | DE CASTRO| ATTY. B.AMAGO IV| 2015 BAR 63 3. SOLIDBANK CORP. vs. GOYU & SONS, INC. [G.R. No. 142983. November 26, 2014.]

[Civil Procedure]

FACTS: Respondent Goyu & Sons, Inc. (GOYU), with individual respondents as guarantors, incurred various obligations to Solidbank Corporation (SOLIDBANK) in connection with the financing of GOYU’s business as exporter of solid doors. As additional security, GOYU obtained several fire insurance policies issued by respondent Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICO). On January 10, 1992 and February 11, 1992, respectively, GOYU endorsed two of these policies in favor of SOLIDBANK to answer for all the obligations incurred by GOYU to SOLIDBANK. On April 27, 1992, fire gutted one of the buildings of GOYU. GOYU filed a claim for indemnity with MICO, which was, however, denied by the latter on the ground that the insurance policies were the subject of writs of attachment issued by various courts or otherwise claimed by other creditors of GOYU. Respondent-Intervenor Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC), one of GOYU’s creditors, also filed with MICO a claim for the proceeds of GOYU’s insurance policies. MICO likewise denied RCBC’s claims.

On April 6, 1993, GOYU filed against MICO, RCBC, and two RCBC officers a complaint for specific performance and damages in the RTC of Manila. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 93-65442.

SOLIDBANK filed an action for collection of sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-62749.

In Civil Case No. 93-65442, judgment was rendered by the RTC in favor of GOYU and against MICO and RCBC. All parties filed appeals with the Court of Appeals. MICO and RCBC contested their liability, while GOYU was unsatisfied by the amounts awarded. The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated December 18, 1996, increased the amounts awarded to GOYU. The cases eventually reached the Court. On April 20, 1998, the Court rendered its decision reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals by ordering the Clerk of Court to release the amounts earned to RCBC instead of GOYU.

In Civil Case No. 92-62749, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of SOLIDBANK and against the guarantors of GOYU. The RTC ruled that the endorsements in the two insurance policies made SOLIDBANK the beneficiary in the said policies. According to the Court of Appeals, in its resolution, dated November 6, 1996, SOLIDBANK had the legal authority to withdraw the amount by virtue of the final and executor judgment rendered in its favor by the RTC. However, on June 23, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed resolution setting aside its November 6, 1996 resolution and ordering SOLIDBANK to restitute the amount withdrawn by it with interest. The Supreme Court issued a decision, dated April 20, 1998, which ordered the Clerk of Court to release the amount including interests earned to RCBC instead of GOYU. SOLIDBANK filed the petition assailing the Court’s decisions dated June 23, 1997 and April 20, 1998.

ISSUES:

5. Whether or not the Court departed from accepted and usual course of judicial proceeding in allowing RCBC to intervene in the appealed case and in admitting RCBC’s intervention despite the fact that RCBC is not a party to Civil Case No. 92-62749.

6. Whether or not SOLIDBANK has the right to withdraw from the amount in custodia legis in Civil Case No. 93-65442.

COMPILED CASE DIGEST | DE CASTRO| ATTY. B.AMAGO IV| 2015 BAR 64 .

RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

1. The Court disagrees with the postulations of SOLIDBANK. The Court cannot pass upon the conflicting rights of SOLIDBANK and RCBC with respect to the insurance proceeds as it was not a review of the decision in the merits, but is a review of merely an interlocutory order in Civil Case No. 92-62749. RCBC’s right to intervene stems from its right as a party, and now as a judgment creditor, in Civil Case No. 93-65442. Accordingly, neither the Court, nor the lower court, should receive new evidence on the conflicting rights of SOLIDBANK and RCBC with respect to the insurance proceedings. 2. SOLIDBANK has no right to withdraw from the amount in custodia legis in Civil Case No. 93-65442, not because SOLIDBANK is bound by the judgment therein (which it is not), but precisely because it is not a party in said case. The property garnished is under the sole control of the court in Civil Case No. 93-65442 for the purposes of that civil case only. This is true as long as the property remains in custodia legis in Civil Case No. 93- 65442, regardless of even whether this Court has rendered a decision in the appeal of said case. The Court have held that property attached or garnished by a court falls into the custodia legis of that court for the purposes of that civil case only. Any relief against such attachment and the execution and issuance of a writ of possession that ensued subsequently could be disposed of only in that case.

4. PP VS DADAO, SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (DECEASED), AND ALFEMIO MALOSI CASE: (G.R. 201860):

[ Evidence] FACTS:

Appellants were charged with murder. The Information stated that the accused in this case, conspired, confederated, and mutually helped each other to kill, by means of treachery, armed with guns, and bolos, a certain Pionio Yacapin. The prosecution witnesses corroborated each others claims with testimonies leading to reasonable suspicions and conclusions, that the accused shot the victim, Pionio to death.

The defense witnesses’ testimonies negated prosecution’s claims, but the RTC convicted accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin. Also, it is noted that the first witness, Police inspector Armada, that he conducted an examination for paraffin test on all four accused, yielding a negative result.

The accused elevated their case to the CA, but dismissed their appeal. The accused later on appealed to the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the eyewitness testimonies presented by the prosecution specifically the 2 stepsons and the widow of the victim are credible enough.

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