Centros Juveniles en nuestro país

The January 12, 2010 earthquake in Haiti was among the deadliest natural disasters in recent history, causing more than 200,000 deaths and the near total destruction of a national capital and its vital government infrastructure. Under the leadership of Secretary Clinton and USAID Administrator Shah, State and USAID led an unprecedented response involving multiple federal agencies that delivered humanitarian assistance to hundreds of thousands of Haitians and is supporting the Haiti’s national reconstruction plan.

During the immediate response, a total of 830 civilian experts from across the U.S. government augmented the American Embassy in Port-au-Prince, while the Defense Department and U.S. Coast Guard provided some 20,000 troops and invaluable logistical capabilities to support criti- cal humanitarian efforts. State and USAID engaged Haitian leaders about critical logistical is- sues, such as control of the airport for relief flights, and to organize an internationally supported coordinating body—the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission—that is ensuring Haitian leadership in recovery efforts. The U.S. also helped ignite the largest SMS-based fundraising effort in his- tory, while the March 31, 2010 Donor Conference raised an unprecedented $7 billion from more than 50 nations, NGOs, and multilateral organizations.

From this experience USAID and State have gleaned valuable lessons:

f _{Establish recovery and reconstruction authorities:} There is an immediate need fol-

lowing disaster for the affected nation to lead recovery and reconstruction, including co- ordinating the many donors who respond when need is great. In Haiti, for example, the State Department engaged Haitian leaders and the international community to establish a recovery and reconstruction authority to oversee and coordinate these activities.

f _{Build humanitarian response capacity:} USAID’s Office of Foreign Disaster As-

sistance’s (OFDA) Disaster Assistance Response Teams provide invaluable informa- tion and expertise, and OFDA will be strengthened to respond to future humanitarian disasters.

f _{Expand and institutionalize use of crisis response technology:} SMS fundraising

and crisis mapping efforts dramatically increased the speed and effectiveness of the response from remote corners of the world to the streets of Port-au-Prince. These tools should be honed and institutionalized within the crisis response tool kit.

f _{Grow the U.S. ranks of reconstruction experts:} Port-au-Prince’s near total destruc-

tion highlighted the need for USAID to build its in-house expertise in sectors such as infrastructure, transport, housing, land tenure, water and sanitation, and electricity.

f _{Improve the international system of humanitarian response:} We do not have the

resources to address every humanitarian crisis unilaterally. The United Nations, other countries, and NGOs bring critical capabilities to bear, and we must enhance our com- mitment to building and working with the international humanitarian system.

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partment of Homeland Security can help countries develop their capacity to control their borders against smuggling and illicit traf- ficking while facilitating the free flow of legitimate commerce, and protect their ports, airports, online networks, and other infra- structure. The Department of Health and Human Services can help stop the spread of disease that all too often accompanies conflict and contribute to build- ing sustainable health systems. The Department of Agriculture can help ensure food security and promote rural economic development. The Department of Energy can help establish the energy infrastructure necessary for recovery and economic growth. The Department of Treasury can improve financial systems and economic governance and the Department of Commerce can expand business opportunities. Together, these capabilities support the civilian power indispensable for conflict and crisis response.

The United States must move from the rhetoric of multiagency response to its reality. The Department of Defense has long recognized the need for interagency response to violent conflict. In fact, many of the Combatant Commands have representatives of more than a dozen agencies at their headquarters. While that interagency support for military responses is critical, addressing the root causes of violence requires a civilian equivalent: an integrated, interagency framework for preventing and responding to crisis and conflict that marshals all the civilian capabilities of the U.S. government. We must also ensure that the civilian component of our response is better coordinated with our military response—both when our military is actively deployed in stopping conflict and when the mission transitions to civilian leadership. To meet these needs, we will:

• Develop a new International Operational Response Framework (IORF). State and USAID will coordinate with interagency partners, through the National Security Staff led process, to develop an International Operational Response Framework that establishes the systems and procedures necessary to ensure transparent and accountable leadership structures and agency lines of

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah talk with U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Kenneth Merten ahead of a meeting with aid workers and Haiti’s President René Préval in Port- au- Prince, Haiti, on Jan. 16, 2010, just days after Haiti’s devastating 2010 earthquake.

responsibility which, when combined, will leverage and deliver the full range of U.S. international disaster, crisis, and conflict response resources. The IORF, which will incorporate the distribution of responsibility between State and USAID discussed earlier in this chapter, should be a flexible instrument that can provide procedures for organizing, planning, and operating in Washington and the field. As such, this framework and associated procedures should complement required military contingency planning processes.

In developing this new framework, State and USAID will conduct a fact-based analysis of past failures and successes in interagency response mechanisms, both international and domestic, to determine what works. The IORF will draw on applicable elements from the widely-recognized National Incident Management System utilized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency when responding to domestic disasters as well as other international mechanisms. Like its domes- tic counterparts, the IORF will govern how the U.S. government conducts crisis response by addressing coordination among agencies, ensuring flexibility and speed in our response, and providing staffing to meet urgent needs.

• Joint training and deployment of civilian responders. An essential component of an interagency civilian response to crisis and conflict is the ability to deploy cross-agency teams who understand one another’s contributions and are able to work together on the ground. We will improve the speed and effectiveness of civilian responders by:

¾ _{Reforming the Civilian Deployment Center into a joint mechanism for}

deploying all civilian responders and a one-stop shop for equipment, medical needs, and training;

¾ _{Combining the management offices at State and USAID for the Civilian}

Response Corps;

¾ _{Providing more advanced joint training for responders in a range of conflict-}

related issues;

¾ _{Augmenting Civilian Response Corps capacity to oversee projects in the field}

by enlisting staff from other agencies and increasing the number of deploy- able contract representatives within the Corps and developing more flexible contracts to shift with changing needs;

¾ _{Working with Diplomatic Security to regularize expeditionary field deploy-}

CHAPTER 4 PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO CRISIS, CONFLICT AND INSTABILITY

¾ _{Facilitating participation of local and host nation personnel in common}

missions with deployed teams as members or associates to improve the team’s effectiveness.