As this thesis is intimately concerned with the inter-connect between informal civil society and sectarianism, a closer look at the extant literature on this theme is warranted. Overall, a review of the extant literature reveals that what has emerged out of the contexts in which sectarianism has been studied, is primarily concerned with regional/transnational manifestations and causes that have instigated power shifts within the region due to the increasingly distinctive marker of sectarian identities. In addition to this, very little on the domestic level connect between civil society and sectarianism is available.
This section will therefore look at several approaches and in what context has sectarianism been discussed. In a recent paper on sectarian identity politics, Helle Malmvig typified the ongoing issues surrounding the three prominent approaches to sectarianism, those being primoridalism, instrumentalism and historical sociology. The
122 Ibid.
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principal issue being is that all three approaches have a propensity to explain away sectarianism by reducing the phenomenon to factors that are exterior to sectarian identity politics itself. With that in mind, these approaches have yet to provide an explanatory focus in terms of what sectarianism means, how it becomes a source of conflict and what makes it distinct and effective compared to other identity and ideational claims.123
The primordial approach can be seen most visibly across media coverage, and has also featured within policy analysis and diplomatic circles. Primoridalism is premised on the idea that sectarianism lay at the heart of conflicts in the Middle East, with the Sunni-Shia conflict being viewed as an ancient and ongoing struggle. Sectarian identities are therefore perceived to be primary or natural and presumably played out between two clearly defined religious sects. Leaving little analysis for the study of overlapping or inter-sectarian identities, and although primordialists do acknowledge that sectarianism has varied historically, and therefore is not a constant in Middle East politics, this is largely interpreted as a type of overlay or repression that have kept latent sectarian identities under the radar.124
In contrast, instrumentalists are deeply sceptical about using a sectarian framework to explain the causes of the region’s present struggles and rivalries. Sectarian identities are primarily seen as superficial political constructs, open to manipulation and exploitation by political elites, who use sectarian fear-mongering to garner vested patron-client relationships, as gateways to mass mobilisation, or as powerful levers in regional rivalries. To understand why sectarianism has risen over the last decades, instrumentalists primarily look to the way that authoritarian states have exacerbated sectarian divisions both domestically and regionally in order to prop up their regimes and remain in power.125
Precisely because sectarianism is exacerbated by, and plays into the hands of authoritarian regimes, instrumentalists are wary that the primordialist approach may
123 Malmvig, Helle, The Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), The Gulf ’s Escalating Sectarianism, POMEPS Briefings 28, (2016), p. 9.
124 Ibid, pp. 9-10.
125 Ibid, p. 10.
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lead to dangerous political prescriptions, including that which is inclined towards solutions involving the heavy hand of the state to suppress the supposedly inevitable violence between sectarian communities.126 Moreover, instrumentalists rightly point out that the primordialist approach often neglects the multiple crosscutting divisions, alliances and overlapping identities within the so-called Sunni and Shia camps. For instance, by analysing the Saudi-Iranian rivalry as a struggle driven by sectarian motivations, it is difficult to explain the alliance between Hamas, Hezbollah, Syria and Iran, as well as the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Indeed, both Iran and Saudi Arabia have crossed the sectarian fault line when seeking regional allies.
Similarly to the logic in the domestic arena, Saudi Arabia may use sectarianism regionally to mobilise local clients in conflict zones, or as a way to discredit Iran.127 Instrumentalists importantly point to the power and politics involved in sectarian identity politics, and to the analytical and political consequences of operating with an underlying assumption of essentialist identities. However, to instrumentalists, sectarianism is precisely an “ism”, a form of ideology up for grasp alongside other ideologies in the region. The conflation of ideology and identity is however problematic for several reasons.
In contrast to the primordialist, who implicitly assumes sectarianism to be a deep structure overlaid by power, instrumentalists see material power as a deep structure that moves sectarianism. This implies that sectarianism is removed from the equation and can be instead explained away.128 Sectarianism is therefore assumed to be just another ideology cynically used by power-holders, but with this conclusion comes several discrepancies. One of which is that it does not account for sectarian identity politics having become increasingly prominent over the last decade, or what has made it become salient compared to other regional ideologies. In other words, given that instrumentalists presume sectarianism is a mere expression of continuous universal power struggles, they are less focused on the particularities of sectarian identity formations or what it means to make sectarian claims.129
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid, p. 11.
129 Ibid.
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On the other hand, advocates of the historical sociology approach who, like the instrumentalist, are still adopting a state-centric position but shifting its focus from a mechanism of the authoritarian state to arguing that it is foremost the gradual weakening of state structures, the army, the policy force and the ability to deliver protection and services that creates the conditions of possibilities for sectarianism.130 To scholars inspired by historical sociology, the rise of sectarian identity politics is thus primarily a question of sufficient strong state structures (or the lack thereof) at the domestic level, prompting communities either to seek protection with sub-state actors or regional patrons. In contrast to instrumentalists, historical sociologists do, to a certain extent, analyse these identities as different from ideologies. Sectarian identities are seen as more entrenched than mere ideology and more difficult to change or reverse once they have become established in popular discourse and practices.
However, as in the case of instrumentalists, sectarian identity itself is withdrawn from the explanation by making it a function of something else. Sectarian identifications constitute a type of fall-back position ready to be used in situations of heightened insecurity and state collapse, in which individuals or groups, out of rational self-interest, seek safety, goods, and order. However, as in the case of the instrumentalist approach, sectarianism is implicitly presumed to be a tool for self-preservation and a form of passive undercurrent available to sub-state elites when state structures collapse.131
Regarding the literature on post-colonialism, scholars such as Makdisi, notes how ta’iffiya’ or sectarianism, was a symptom of shortcomings of the relatively new Middle Eastern nation-state and operates as a countervailing force in the push for national identities to manifest. ‘Sectarianism is a neologism born in the age of nationalism to signify the antithesis of nation; its meaning is predicated on and constructed against a territorially-bounded liberal nation-state. In Lebanon, sectarianism is as modern and authentic as the nation-state. In fact, the two cannot be dissociated.’132
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid.
132 Makdisi, Usama, “Reconstructing the nation-state: The modernity of sectarianism in Lebanon”, Middle East Report, Vol 200, 1996, 24.
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It is in this respect that much of the existing scholarship surrounding sectarianism has been written in the context of post-colonialism. Observers like Makdisi, note how sectarianism within the Middle Eastern context followed on from the advent of colonial modernity, as many of the new Arab states were confronted with the issue of defining the nation, this was problematic more so as many subjects of past empires had not been accustomed to the nation-state. With the notable exception of Egypt and Iran, the new-found nations had to invent their historical legacy, with many citizens turning towards religious identity as the most discernible marker of identity. This has even proven to be the case in the secular states of the Levant, ‘Even though Lebanon is not an Islamic state, its society is a mirror image of the sectarian tension among various religious groups.’133
More recently, scholars such as Marechal and Zemni, have framed the discussions surrounding sectarian relations around the idea of transnationalism and how regional actors vying for influence utilise and play on sectarian identities in the region to their advantage, namely in the hope of establishing client states.134 Following from this, it becomes evident therefore that much of the discourse around Middle Eastern sectarianism is often in relation to Iranian and Saudi foreign policy. Arguably commencing with the advent of Pan-Islamism in the form of the 1979 Iranian revolution, much of the discussions (particularly in Middle Eastern scholarship) had initially connected sectarianism with the ‘Iranian threat’ to regional Sunni powers which was none more exemplified than in the case of the Iran-Iraq war 1980-88. However, more recently, scholarship on sectarianism (through the lens of securitisation and authoritarian survival) have also focused on government policies of some Arab Gulf states, namely Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in stoking sectarian sentiment.135 Analysts such as Hammond, for instance, note how there was a counter-Sunni mobilisation of sorts in the wake of what many had perceived as Iran exporting a revolutionary brand of Shi’ism.
133 Kumaraswamy, P R, “Who am I? The Identity Crisis in the Middle East”, MERIA, Vol 10, No 1, 2006, 64.
134 Marechal, Brigitte, and Sami Zemni. The Dynamics of Sunni-Shia Relationships: Doctrine, Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media. London: Hurst &, 2013.
135 Wehrey, Frederic M. Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2014.
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As one particular incident that remains relatively elusive in the course of sectarian relations is the Wahhabi revolt that occurred in the same year as the Iranian revolution, also recognised as the al-Sahwa or the awakening. Hammond describes how the seizure of the Grand Mosque in 1979 by a group of Wahhabi zealots inevitably brought about the making of a neo-Wahhabism (or sometimes described as neo-Salafism) akin to the puritanism of al-Wahhabiya that now expressed the political concern of Sunni Islamists in the Arab context.136
With regards to the existing discourse on sectarianism, this development was a key determining factor in the trajectory of inter-sect relations in that it set the precedent for a new wave of revolutionary Islamic activism and would create fears for the Saudi monarchy, who saw their own political fate coming under intense scrutiny following the ousting of Iran’s Shah, hence a process of religious assimilation to appease domestic Islamists was to become the appropriate course of action. Such a rationale is key to discourse on transnationalism, as this set the stage for both Iran and Saudi Arabia to exert their influence across the region, which includes the state ideologies they promote. This is particularly the case for Saudi Arabia, which has been reported by government officials and academics as having invested millions of its petrodollars into funding religious seminaries and other initiatives around the Muslim world.137
However, some of the discourse on nationalism has sought to downplay the role sectarianism has played across the region, particularly in its criticism of the claim that religion can easily counterweigh nationalist sentiment, with the popularity of Pan-Islamic thought. As Terhalle remarks, for instance, ‘Nationalism has proven capable of outweighing religion where the Shias’ loyalty to the state is concerned. From 1981-1988, Shi’i Iraqi fighters fought a remorseless war against Iran. Then, after the 1992 Gulf War, Iran remained neutral while the Iraqi Shia rose up against Saddam and were massacred. These two event illustrate the strength of nationalism. It divided Iran and Iraq decisively and is entrenched in the memories of both countries. During the war
136 Hammond, Andrew, The Islamic Utopia: The Illusion of Reform in Saudi Arabia, London: Pluto Press, (2012), 72.
137 Kamran, Tahir. "Salafi Extremism in the Punjab and Its Transnational Impact." In Communalism and Globalization in South Asia and Its Diaspora. Oxford: Routledge, 2011.
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between Iran and Iraq, the latter’s nationalism appealed more to Shia Iraqi soldiers than did Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric.’138
However, as most of the literature deals with sectarianism in regard to the transnational influence it currently occupies within the Arab world, the direct relationship between civil society and sectarianism has seldom been mentioned in any theoretical and or empirical regional literature to date. The literature that does exist in this field and mostly in the Lebanese context has argued that there is a recursive relation between sectarian elites and civil society actors. With sectarian elites aiming to pursue their political and socioeconomic interests at the expense of civil society organisations (CSOs), whereas on the other side, civil society actors instrumentalise the sectarian political system and its resources to advance their own organisational or personal advantage. These mutually reinforcing dynamics enable sectarian elites to penetrate, besiege or co-opt CSOs as well as extend their clientelist networks to CSOs that should otherwise be leading efforts to establish cross-sectarian affiliations and modes of political mobilisation or those that expressly seek to challenge the sectarian system.139
However, as opposed to looking specifically at the Lebanese context and by focusing on Kuwait and Bahrain, this thesis will seek to specifically address the under-theorised relationship between sectarianism and the role played by civil society actors, which, until now, has insufficiently been examined both across the Middle East and the Gulf in particular. This research will aim to demonstrate how political events, both domestically and throughout the region, have impacted the way in which informal political spaces conduct themselves and moreover whether they have the ability to mitigate or perpetuate sectarian sentiment as securitising/de-securitising actors.