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Although the planned new city is not currently included within the physical geography of Amman, it is an imagined emblematic space in that it is portrayed as a space to fix Amman’s systemic problems. To understand how the new city impacts the symbolism of Amman I traced the government’s shifting discourse about the new city through their successive announcements on whether the new city will replace Amman to become the new capital26 _{or how the city will fit into the imagined map of Jordan.}

Jordan’s plan to create a new capitalcity aligns trend within the Global South of creating ‘new cities.’27 _{Van Noorloos describes this trend as a:}

26 _{Reports as to whether the new city will replace Amman as the capital of Jordan are}

contradictory and appear very preliminary. Governmental discourses shift on this issue.

27 _{The term ‘new cities’ is part of ongoing recent academic debates, which understand}

that the term ‘new cities’ is problematic as it erases what was in the space prior to the planned city and it also a marketing term used by their own promotors. Hence, a brief

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particular urban form that is often assumed to emanate from such

neoliberal urban strategies and inter-referencing: the new city. These can take the form of entirely new cities built up from scratch as

comprehensively planned self-contained enclaves in the outskirts of

existing cities…they are often iconic, themed cities, spectacular showcases in the global economy (2017, 1224).

The promotion of ‘new cities’ as the way to fix entrenched problems within existing cities is being done both from a North-South perspective and through a South- South sales pitch. Morocco has emerged as a lead advocate for establishing ‘smart’ planned cities which will attract populations from cities riddled with systematic problems driven by overpopulation and limited infrastructure. Of note Morocco is pursuing an aggressive form of urban entrepreneurship by positioning themselves as ‘new city’ experts based on two new projects: Zenata Eco-City and Benguerir Green City. However, Côté-Roy argues this leadership role is based on an imagined technical knowledge which is beyond Morocco’s actual built reality, since both cities are in the early stages of being built and it is unclear at this stage if their scopes will reach the vision of the urban planners (2018). Her skepticism of Morocco’s positioning itself as an expert on building new cities can be contextualized within the greater academic critiques of this trend.

The reality of building these ‘new cities’ has attracted other academic critics who have dubbed ‘new cities’ as ‘urban fantasies’ (Watson, 2013) and ‘speculative urbanism’ (Goldman, 2011). Further scholars critique not just the process of building new cities but the rationales which underlie these building paradigms. These ideologies have already exploration of the term ‘new cities’ seems appropriate given recent debates on what constitutes a city or how to theorize about the urban (Brenner, 2013; Scott, 2015). New cities can be seen as part of increasingly complex geographies of urbanization which challenge the urban/rural divide while also stretching our understandings of urban mega- regions as they exist outside of the currently defined urban region but seek to bring the formerly rural region into the urban lifestyle (Sassen, 2018).

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been subject to much criticism including the themes of: modernization with implicit notions of ‘slum-free’ utopias (Cirolia, 2014; Grant, 2015), master planning based on social hierarchies (Fawaz, 2014), displacement (Galonnier, 2015) and discourses of eco- cities (Caprotti, 2014) and smart cities (Kitchin, 2015). Ammanis’ reactions to the proposed new city have been also been highly skeptical, based on their own local

experiences of the overpromised but under realized neoliberal transformation of Amman including the Abdail project. Abdali was initially billed as the “new downtown” but was not seen authentically Jordanian by locals and developers dropped the use of being a “new downtown” after much backlash. Further the promised public portions of the project failed to be built and it has become an elite playground exclusive to wealthy Ammanis and tourists, quite opposite of the mixed class clientele in the historic downtown of Wast al Balad.

This skepticism is well founded based on the large number of the nearly 100 new cities which “are still dreams in the heads of their planners, and for a number of them it is very uncertain if they will ever be built or if they will remain PowerPoint cities” (van

Noorloos, 2017). Below I analyze several media announcements of this newer ‘new

Jordanian city’ to reveal how the Jordanian government's discourses about the project shift. The first announcement of “new Amman city,” by the then Prime Minister billed the new city as the country’s new capital:

Gov’t completes preliminary design for new Amman city

The government has completed a preliminary comprehensive design for the establishment of a new Amman city, which is set to be the country's new capital. We found the solution to address several pressing issues in Amman; we will create a new Amman city. This project will be offered for implementation on the basis of Build, Operate and Transfer next year. The new city will not be attached to Amman.

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The project will be constructed over five phases, new government buildings will also be available in the city.

Ghazal, 2017 Jordan Times 10/23/2017 In then-Prime Minister Mulki’s first comments on the ‘new city’ he states that the ‘new Amman city’ will be the country’s new capital and lauds it as a separate city which will solve several seemingly intractable problems in Amman. Despite this late October statement by the former Prime Minister announcing the new Jordanian capital,

government discourses around the ‘new city’ change rapidly when the Mayor disputes that the new city will become Jordan’s capital city.

A second article in November is highlighted below:

Jordan plans new city near Amman to ease overcrowding

“Jordan has announced plans to build a new city east of the capital Amman to ease overcrowding and traffic congestion. Touted as "environmentally friendly, sustainable and smart,” the new city would be built on a major highway that links Jordan to Iraq and Saudi Arabia.”

New Arab on 11/06/2017 This article states the “new city” will be a utopia of development buzzwords but it is not called the new capital. The new city aims to provide "drastic solutions to rising population density and traffic congestion" in Amman and the north-eastern city of Zarqa and would invest in "clean and renewable sources of energy and water treatment" as well as provide affordable housing. This announcement carries several of the key development buzzwords critics of ‘new cities’ have already warned about including: eco-city,

sustainable, and smart. Although the project is billed as a ‘drastic solution’ to Amman’s myriad of problems, it alleges a utopia with clean renewable energy and water which will be available in affordable housing. Based on the academic critiques of underlying

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which somehow provides affordable housing this news report is not being taken seriously by many Ammanis. Notably neither the term ‘new Amman’ nor any mention of this city becoming Jordan’s new capital are used in this article which comes just two weeks after the Prime Minister’s first statement about the city.

Comparisons to both the inauthenticity and lesser final built environment of the ‘new downtown’ Abdali project and to the government's failure to complete the bus rapid transit (BRT) project are rampant. The BRT project has been advertised for 10 years but has been beset by accusations of façade (corruption), little actual construction, and no operating buses. These very visible failures leave many Ammanis doubting that the new city will actually be built.

Another article in Roya News includes a large selection of Jordanian reactions to the proposed “New Amman” all of which express skepticism of the plan. I have

excerpted seven of the tweets and public Facebook comments below the article.

Jordanians’ best reactions to the “New Amman” project

“Only their questions intensified on Saturday, after Spokesperson of the Jordanian government, Mohammad Momani, revealed that only five people, excluding him, have been trusted with the location of the planned city, which will not be attached to the original Amman.

While we continue to wait for more details to emerge, here are the best (skeptical) reactions to the upcoming project.”

Excerpted social media reactions from the above article:

1. “Five people in Jordan know the location of the New Amman city, while the rest of the nation knows that it’s all but one big performance.”- ناﻮﮭﺸﻟا ﺪﻌﺳ

@SaadShahwan88

2. “Is Jordan really THAT big for the government to hide its location from us?”- دﻮﺠﻧا

@EnjoodElayan

3. “Don’t let the New Amman project make you forget about the imminent increase of bread and other commodities’ prices.”- ﻦﯾﺮﯿﺳ ﻮﺑأ

@jordanian_voice

4. “It’s been 10 years since they said they were going to launch the Express Bus project… those alive today won’t live to see the day the New Amman is

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built.”

هﺮﻀﺧ ﻮﺑا ﻞﯿﻠﺧ ﻲﺒھو @84wahbiabokhadr 5. “Yes, a new Amman outside Amman without the Ammanis....” -Suhad

Suhad FB

6. “Why should the planned city be named Amman?! Amman is ours as it is.”

Sana Bushnaq FB

7. “I’m 30-years-old now: will I live to see the New Amman city?”- Zaid Alfred

Dayyat @dayyat23 FB

Roya News 10/29/2017 This article highlights the popular sentiments among Ammanis that this

announcement is unlikely to produce change in their daily lives, and that it is a distraction from more pressing issues, and the city would be a threat to Ammanis. Indeed, those who think there will be a new Amman state that it would be an Amman without Ammanis. They also argue that it should have a new name, as Amman belongs to them. These reactions included not only doubts about the speed and reality of the new city, but they also question the lack of transparency about the project and who the city will belong to if it is built. A fourth article published just over a month later includes the Jordanian government's attempts to address some of the public backlash to the new city:

High tech desert utopia rises from the sands: Jordan announces new mega-city built among the dunes to overcome overcrowding in its capital

“A shiny new city is to arise from Jordan's desert over the next three decades, potentially rivaling the kingdom's capital of Amman, a rapidly growing and increasingly unwieldy metropolis of 4 million people.

This week, Amman Mayor Yousef Shawarbeh defended the rocky rollout in a meeting with business people, diplomats and representatives of the energy and environmental sectors, many of whom seemed skeptical.

'The topic hasn't been fully studied yet,' the mayor said when pressed for details. 'When we conclude the studies, we will announce plans and have clear roles for government, citizens, investors, and so on.'

Shawarbeh insisted that Amman would not be neglected as Jordan, buckling under record public debt, shifts scarce resources to the new project. 'The new city is not a new

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Amman,' he said. But it is needed, he argued, to relieve pressure on the capital."

Inge, Mail Online article published 12/08/2017 In this article we see Amman’s Mayor is attempting to deal with the public

skepticism about the ‘new city.’ Although it was initially reputed to be a new capital and labelled a New Amman, in this piece Shawarbeh is stating that the new city won’t be a New Amman and is being built only to relieve the pressures and instability of the current capital, not as a replacement. While the article notes Jordan’s planned ‘new city’ fits within the larger trend I already identified, it also cites an urban geographer, Moser who warns that Jordan should proceed cautiously with these plans as many other ‘new cities’ are encountering significant challenges. Additionally, the author notes that “This

perceived secrecy and 'top-down' approach has drawn widespread criticism.”

Few Jordanians have shown much enthusiasm, even among Amman residents who complain constantly of the city's traffic. Some suspect the new city is largely meant to benefit Jordan's powerful and their business cronies” (Inge, 2107). Given that the article is written by a British publisher instead of a local or regional newspaper the complete article takes the time to layout some of Amman’s history and also outlines contemporary urban problems which contextualize the rationale behind building a new city. Finally, a fifth article notes that the ‘new city’ will be offered to specific Jordanians before being opened up to all Jordanians.

Plots nearby ‘new city’ to be distributed to civil servants, military retirees

“The government is looking into a project to distribute plots of lands to civil servants and military retirees in areas adjacent to the new city that the government is planning to build in Amman, a government official said on Monday. The plots of lands, located close to the new city that scheduled to be built in Amman’s Al Madouna area, will “either be distributed for free or in exchange for nominal fees in line with specific conditions”, the official told The Jordan Times over the phone on Monday.

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chance to own appropriate houses… The idea is also to reduce the pressure on Amman,” the official said, noting that “the details of the plan to distribute lands will be announced this year”.

The new city is planned to be a “smart and sustainable city that will be equipped with all the needed infrastructure and services, adopting a long-term urban planning system with a vision that leaves the door open for further future development”, according to the government, which stressed that it will be financed and implemented in cooperation with the public and private sectors.”

Jordan Times, 4/9/18. Again, the key buzzwords of the ‘new city’ - “smart” and “sustainable” - are featured in this announcement by the government. However, a new twist on the trend emerges within the Jordanian context. Notably, members of the security forces are being given the opportunity to either receive free land or to buy land at low prices where the new city will be built. Since the public sector is occupied almost exclusively by East Bankers from the tribes, this policy will allow the prime supporters of the regime to benefit financially from the sale of the land on which the new city will be built. This is tying the financial standing of East Bankers to this ‘new city’ in ways which they are not necessarily tied to Amman.

Amman was intentionally minimized during the process of creating the new nation of Jordan to elevate and secure the support of the local tribes.30 _{The formation of}

the idealized Bedouin elite results in Jordanians whose interests are served by not affiliating with the city of Amman. Additionally, many forced migrants are also continuing to affiliate with their sending nations. With the Government of Jordan working to maintain attachments to tribal areas through voting, and with situated

citizenship being part of the national imagined mapping of belonging to Jordan, Ammanis are only recently beginning to claim their heritage of being Ammani, nearly 100 years

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after the rebirth of the city.31 _{It is yet to be seen how the growing population of young}

people now identifying as Ammanis would be impacted by the demotion of Amman to the status of a secondary city. While the history of Amman includes state actions to make it an extraterritorial space of exclusion, the intensification of geopolitical pressures on Jordan’s borders after the Arab Spring and the aging of refugee’s expectations to return ‘home’ are coalescing and potentially creating space for Amman and Ammanis to claim greater belonging to Jordan. Although rural areas are still seen as the most loyal to the regime, it is no longer in the best interest of the regime to foster an entire city of disaffected citizens as loyal Ammanis are much less threatening than any Jordanians supporting DAESH.

Echoing Jordan’s movement away from subjects and towards young

entrepreneurial neoliberal citizens via a hodgepodge of actors including INGO’s, Royal NGO’s, Transnational Corporations, and a survival strategy of the Government of Jordan instead of a top down state led effort like in the Arab Gulf (Jones, 2017) the effort to create a ‘new city’ is also a being done in a decentralized manner. A similar potpourri of actors underlies the government's strategy to build a ‘new city’ instead of it being an organized state led effort specifically to delegitimize new Ammanis. Thus, my discourse analysis of recent newspaper articles about the proposed ‘new city’ is part of the potential future cultural mapping of Amman. However, in the context of young people claiming Ammaniness I am now raising the question of what happens to those with newly formed Ammani identities if Amman is replaced by a more advanced primary Jordanian city.

In particular, since plots of land are being sold to those working for the security

31 _{In Chapter 7, I argue that an emerging Ammani identity is a key generational}

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services, the hypothetical new city is being envisioned as another place where links to tribal roots outside of the new city will once again be beneficial. By creating the ‘new city’ as a place of belonging for native Jordanians before it is even built, Amman’s positioning as a place of situated citizenship is still being reinforced. This is occurring as young Ammanis contest the diminished place of Amman in the imagined social hierarchy of the country. If citizens of the ‘new city’ are able to identify with the ‘new city’ instead of needing to remain tied primarily to their tribal districts it is unclear how non-tribal Jordanians will also be able to belong to the new city.