If war is the continuation of politics by other means, pace Clausewitz, then it is certainly also the case that many times foreign policy is simply that continuation of domestic politics by other means (Hudson, 2007: 125)
Foreign policy decision makers often have to face many different directions at once. Arguably, one of the most critical aspects for decision makers is how to deal with the ‘inside’ of their own community. One may even further this argument, as did Hudson, to say that the decision makers serve their own state, and ultimately are responsible for their own constituents ‘inside’, as opposed to the ‘outside’ for which they have no formal responsibility. In other words, the root of foreign policy is a domestic one, “the domestic and the foreign…literally make no sense except in relation to each other”17
(Hill, 2003: 219). On the one hand, foreign policy outcomes are heavily influenced by events that are primarily ‘domestic’. For example, during the Cultural Revolution, China was in a complete self-imposed isolation from diplomatic ties with most other sates, due to the irrational Communism rhetoric being filled in the whole country. On the other hand, foreign policy significantly impacts upon domestic politics. The latter chapters will demonstrate how easy it is for domestic-based popular nationalism to be erupted in China as a result of diplomatic frictions with Japan. Domestic politics and foreign policy thus have a mutually influential relationship. This section deals with these two interdependent dimensions and discusses the general relationship between the domestic and the foreign. Since this research focuses on foreign policy, the main attention is therefore focused on the domestic influences on foreign policy.
What does the notion of ‘domestic influences’ refer to? Here, Hill remarks that it is important to distinguish between the different ways in which the “domestic environment impinges on foreign policy” (2003: 220). For Hill, the term ‘domestic sources’ implies that the domestic sphere provides both inputs and constraints for foreign policy. However, it is arguable whether ‘inputs’ or ‘constraints’ depend on the points of view of the foreign policy decision makers. For instance, if the decision maker agrees with the lobbyist on a particular issue in foreign policy, then it can be said that a domestic lobby has successfully managed to convey the opinion across to the decision maker and has made ‘inputs’ in foreign policy decision-making. Equally, same scenario may also be interpreted as the strong domestic lobby on this particular foreign policy has put ‘constraints’ on foreign policy makers, limiting their freedom of manoeuvre and policy choices. Strong opinions of the French farmers, inhibiting any wish the French government might have to reform the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (EU), is a well-known example. Contrary to Hill’s claim, which ‘input’ and ‘constraints’ need to be specified separately (2003: 220-1), this thesis takes the position that rather than distinguish domestic ‘inputs’ from ‘constraints’, it is more important to investigate the dynamic interactions between domestic and international politics. Laura Neack nicely summarises this double-sided nature of foreign policy18:
Foreign policy is neither fish nor fowl in the study of politics, but an empirical subject matter straddling the boundary between the internal and the external spheres of a state. Such policy is conducted in complex internal and international environments; it results from coalitions of active actors and groups situated both inside and outside state
18 Hill also notes: “Foreign policy is at hinge of domestic politics and international relations” (2003:
boundaries; its substance emanates from issues of both domestic and international politics; and it involves processes of bargaining and compromise affecting the interests of both domestic and international groupings (Neack, 2003: 8-11).
The domestic-foreign paradigm in FPA makes four important assumptions. First, scholars of FPA argue that the nature of domestic influence on foreign policy is multi- dimensional; single-factor explanations rarely convince where multiple actors and levels of activity, such as decision-making, are involved. Studies of domestic influences on foreign policy cover all aspects of domestic politics, but most notably bureaucratic and organisational structures (see for example, Allison and Zelikow, 1999; Halperin, 1974; and Allison and Halperin, 1972); the media and public opinion (e.g. Craig, 1976; Risee-Kappen, 1991; Jordan and Page, 1992; Hoge, 1994; Robinson, 1999; Soroka, 2003; Frensley and Michaud, 2006; and Mor, 2006); and culture and identity in foreign policy (Hudson 1997, 1999; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Katzenstein, 1996; Schafer, 1999; Hudson and Sampson; Lapid and Kratochwil, 1996; and Nabers, 2009). Hill explains, “the internal affairs of most transnational actors are too robust to be dominated by one pressure group, or set of stake-holders” (2003: 221). Consequently, when looking into the impact of the domestic on foreign policy, one needs not only to identify multiple factors, but also to seek to answer why and how these factors impact on foreign policy.
Secondly, in order to capture the inextricability of foreign and domestic concerns from the viewpoint of the policy maker, FPA believes that decision makers are always faced with these two sets of concerns, and that the two sets of concerns continually interact. As discussed above, foreign policy decision makers work in a dual-aspect setting, where they are seen as playing politics simultaneously on two levels, the
domestic and the international (Putnam, 1988). Therefore, foreign policy must be understood as a continuous stream of domestic inputs, no less than international. Furthermore, the notion of a stream of domestic input in foreign policy goes well beyond the image of decision makers simply juggling two balls, domestic issues and international politics. Ideational factors such as culture, values, and identity also shape the perception of the policy maker; hence, they subsequently impact foreign policy. Finally, no foreign policy can be implemented without a domestic grounding. In other words, it cannot be taken for granted that domestic support will ultimately sustain foreign policy. If the support for a foreign policy, either in domestic politics or among the general public, weakens, it will damage the political administration of the regime at the very least, and may even lead to the complete change of the domestic political landscape. The United States’ prolonged involvement in Vietnam, and Tony Blair’s recent unpopular war in Iraq proved domestically unsupported foreign policy decisions may destabilise the domestic political landscape.
Having identified the proximity of domestic actors to foreign policy decision-making positions, it is then worth observing how cohesive or fragmented each actor is. Joe Hagan (1993) has developed the variable of regime fragmentation, in which he classifies regimes according to the degree to which a regime is plagued by divisions. For example, his scale classifies as least fragmented (or most cohesive) those that are dominated by a single leader and classified as most fragmented those regimes that are a coalition of autonomous political groups with no clear dominant group. Thus, Hagan finds that the more fragmented the regime, the more constraints it faces in foreign policy (Hudson, 2007: 129). Helen Milner (1997) supports Hagan’s argument,
as she too believes that divided regimes are less likely to be able to cooperate internationally.
In addition to proximity and cohesiveness, Hudson further notes that the size of the domestic actor in question and the degree of difference in viewpoint between the domestic actor and the regime’s foreign policy are also essential factors for determining the relative influence of a domestic actor on foreign policy (2007: 129- 130). The bigger the size of domestic public opinion and the greater the difference in view point, the greater the degree of influence of domestic considerations may place over the external issue at hand. For instance, broader society may generally be located distant from the state’s foreign policy decision-making core, and public opinions may often not so homogenous. That said, the size of the general public is however enormous. Therefore, if the public generates a largely cohesive opinion, which has a great degree of difference from that of the decision-maker, over a particular foreign policy, it then becomes a powerful force that is likely to significantly affect the decision-making and/or the outcome of the policy in question. In other words, public opinion may have considerable weight over foreign policy, if it is strong and unified, despite being far away from the decision-making institution.
A final dimension to the study of the characteristics of domestic attributes to foreign policy is how active a particular foreign policy actor has been on a given foreign policy issue. Large, powerful domestic actors can be totally disinterested in a particular foreign policy (Hudson, 2007: 130). Similarly, it is perfectly conceivable that for many foreign policy decisions, the general public may remain largely disinterested hence inactive to which policy direction the regime may take. This
brings out another fundamental conceptual belief in FPA, which is that the relations between foreign policy and its determinants never remain static, and are constantly evolving through interactions over time and over different issues. Similar to the theoretical foundations of Constructivism, this thesis has taken the view that these factors, being foreign policy, domestic politics, identity or international system, are not static concepts, but mutually constituted with one another. In order to analyse this complex relationship, it is time to introduce the second of the three paradigms, namely action-reaction-interaction theory.
The domestic ‘inputs’ and ‘constrain’ to foreign policy are important to the understanding of the role of popular nationalism in shaping foreign policy decisions. Nationalistic sentiment and public opinions, this study argues, would place pressure on decision makers to adopt a tougher stance and policy, otherwise, the nationalistic public opinion, as shown in Chapter Five, could quickly turn against the state.