Chamanismo y espiritualidad en la era de internet

In 1946, in an effort to prevent a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and avoid the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries, the United States proposed that all materials usable for nuclear weapons be placed under international control. The Soviet Union, which was not yet a nuclear weapons state, rejected the proposal, known as the Baruch Plan. Fearing that growing interest in nuclear energy would lead nuclear technology to spread uncontrollably, the United States in 1953 launched the Atoms for Peace program. Under the program, the United States offered to share nuclear technology for peaceful purposes with friendly states. U.S. inspections would ensure that transferred items were not diverted for nuclear weapon

programs. A new organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), was established in 1957 to take over the inspections. By this time, the Soviet Union had initiated a similar program for its allies, also relying on IAEA inspections.

A -Non-Proliferation Treaty

During the 1960s, as concerns grew that nuclear weapons were continuing to proliferate and as the U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms race accelerated,

negotiations began on a global treaty to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. These negotiations resulted in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The treaty was opened for ratification in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.The treaty establishes two classes of states:

states are those that had conducted nuclear tests before January 1, 1967— the United States, Soviet Union (now Russia), Britain, France, and China. All other countries are nonnuclear weapon states for the purposes of the treaty. 1 -Terms of the Treaty

Under the treaty, the nuclear weapon states party to the agreement pledge not to transfer nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices (such as possible peaceful nuclear explosives for large-scale excavations) to any recipient or to “assist, encourage, or induce” any nonnuclear weapon state to manufacture nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices. The nuclear weapon states are not required by the treaty to give up nuclear weapons.

Nonnuclear weapon states party to the treaty pledge not to manufacture or receive nuclear weapons or any other nuclear explosive devices. To verify that they are complying with these pledges, the nonnuclear weapon states agree to accept IAEA inspections on all of their nuclear activities, an

arrangement known as “full-scope safeguards.” All parties to the treaty are prohibited from exporting nuclear equipment or materials to nonnuclear weapon states unless the exported items will be placed under IAEA inspection in the recipient country.

The treaty reaffirms the “inalienable right” of all parties to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with the prohibition on the development of nuclear explosives and calls on all parties to facilitate the fullest possible sharing of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

The treaty states that all parties shall undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the (U.S.-Soviet) nuclear arms race and to achieve complete and general nuclear

disarmament.

Any party may withdraw from the treaty on three months’ notice if it decides that “extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

To persuade the nonnuclear states to agree to the treaty, the nuclear states indicated that they would not use nuclear weapons in an attack on a

nonnuclear state unless the state was allied with a nuclear power. However, this pledge was informal and not part of the treaty itself. Since then, Britain and the United States have stated that they might respond with a nuclear attack against a nonnuclear state that used chemical or biological weapons.

Some observers believe that preventive war doctrines, such as those

articulated by the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush, may have the unintended effect of encouraging some nonnuclear states to develop nuclear weapons for self-protection.

2 -Treaty Limitations

The treaty currently has five nuclear weapon state members and 187

nonnuclear weapon state members. India, Israel, and Pakistan never joined the treaty, thereby reserving the legal right to develop nuclear weapons. North Korea became a party to the treaty in 1985 but renounced it in 2003, exercising its rights under the treaty’s withdrawal provisions. North Korea’s action highlighted one of the treaty’s important limitations.

The treaty’s provision affirming the right of parties to pursue the peaceful uses of nuclear energy can also be exploited by states seeking nuclear

weapons. The provision has been interpreted as permitting states to operate nuclear reactors and the facilities needed to fuel them, including enrichment and reprocessing plants, provided they are all placed under IAEA inspection. This arrangement could permit a country to stockpile highly enriched

uranium (used in some research reactors) or plutonium while under IAEA supervision and to then withdraw from the treaty on 90 days’ notice. This would leave the country with the materials needed for nuclear weapons. Some countries have expressed concern that Iran, a nonnuclear weapon state party to the NPT, is constructing a uranium enrichment plant with this strategy in mind.

B -Nuclear Suppliers Group

In the early 1970s the NPT Exporters Committee was established to implement the export control provisions of the treaty. In 1974 India

conducted a nuclear explosion that it claimed was intended to demonstrate that such explosions could be used for peaceful purposes. India’s test

explosion nevertheless underscored the dangers of further proliferation. In 1978 the principal nuclear supplier countries, including states such as France that were not then parties to the NPT, established the Nuclear Suppliers Group to better control nuclear commerce intended for peaceful purposes. In 2004 the group had 40 members and had gradually tightened the group’s common export control rules.

C -Nunn-Lugar Program

rigid controls of the Soviet internal security apparatus and began a period of social and economic turmoil, introduced a major new proliferation threat. This was the risk that portions of the massive Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal might leak to countries or terrorist organizations seeking nuclear weapons. The Soviet nuclear legacy included tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, hundreds of tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium not yet incorporated into weapons, and many thousands of scientists with expertise in the production of nuclear arms.

To address this threat, in 1991, the United States launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar Program, after the two U.S. senators who launched the initiative—Democrat Sam Nunn and Republican Richard Lugar. The program, whose budget in the United States is roughly $1 billion annually and which is being matched by similar

contributions from other leading industrialized countries, provides monetary and other assistance for Russia. This assistance is intended to help Russia improve security over nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapons material,

eliminate excess highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and employ former Soviet nuclear weapon scientists in nonmilitary research activities.

Assistance is also provided to other countries of the former Soviet Union to address similar proliferation risks within their borders.

D -Proliferation Security Initiative

In 2003 the United States launched a major new effort to address the threat of nuclear smuggling, the Proliferation Security Initiative. The initiative seeks to aggressively enforce national and international laws to seize cargoes containing equipment and material that could be used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction equipment before they can reach their intended destinations. More than 30 nations are now participating in this effort.

E -UN Resolution 1540 and Other Measures

In April 2004 the United Nations (UN) Security Council adopted Resolution 1540. The resolution requires UN members to implement effective measures to secure within their borders the know-how, equipment, and materials that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction and to adopt effective export controls. This resolution was passed because of growing concerns about terrorist acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the

revelations that a senior Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan, had sold uranium enrichment equipment to Iran, Libya, and North Korea and a

nuclear weapon design to Libya and possibly the other states.

Many other measures have helped slow proliferation. Under some military alliances, such as the U.S.-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for example, nuclear weapon states promise to extend protection to nonnuclear weapon states, making their development of independent nuclear arsenals unnecessary. Concerned nations can also direct intensive diplomatic and economic pressure—including public criticism, breaking off relations, or imposing trade embargoes—against states seeking nuclear weapons. Such efforts have led some target countries to abandon these programs. Libya’s renunciation of weapons of mass destruction in 2004 was partly the result of such efforts.

VII -PROBLEMS AND ISSUES IN NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS