EL ciclo Deming como punto de partida

6.5.1 Shaikh Zayid’s Leniency on the Question of Khor al-Udaid

In 1973 Shaikh Zayid sent a delegation to Dammam in Saudi Arabia with the aim of smoothing things over by stressing common interests and finding a formula that would lead to the establishing of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. Under the circumstances, he had little choice but somehow to settle Abu Dhabi’s

456 _{I. S. Winchester (Jedda), to R. McGregor (Foreign Office), ‘Saudi Arms’ Purchases and Gulf Policy’,}

22 April 1972, Enclosing ‘Extract from a Record of Conversation between HM Ambassador and Sayed Abdurrahman Mansuri, Legal Adviser to the Saudi Foreign Ministry, 17 April 1972, FCO8/1910-1911, TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 13, ed. Schofield, p. 697.

457_{Douglas-Home (Foreign Office) to (Jedda), ‘Saudi Minister of State Visit’ 29 September 1972,}

140

disputed areas with Saudi Arabia. Shaikh Zayid contacted King Faisal to arrange a meeting between the oil ministers of the UAE and Saudi Arabia in Dammam at the end of April 1973, and informed the King that he wished to settle the dispute and establish relations with Saudi Arabia. On 29 April 1973, Mana Saeed Al-Otaiba headed a UAE delegation that arrived in Dammam to discuss the boundary question with the Saudi oil minister, Zaki Yamani, who represented the Saudi delegation. The talks apparently lasted for three hours;458 however, an American Embassy official reported that the results of the talks were not known, and that furthermore, “No other Jidda Newspapers reported the talks, nor has embassy heard from other sources any results.”459 In fact, the UAE-Saudi talks in Dammam had broken down, and Foreign Office officials concluded that “[Shaikh Zayid] has no fresh proposals to offer and does not intend in the foreseeable future to table any.”460

In May 1973 Prince Fahd conveyed a message to the British Prime Minister and the Foreign Office that: “the Saudi Government had been more than disappointed at the negative attitude adopted by the Abu Dhabi delegation at the recent meetings in Dammam.”461 A few days later, Lord Denman reported that: “Prince Fahd specifically asked me to tell you and the Prime Minister of his own Government’s disappointment at this turn of events and to ask you to use your influence with Shaikh [Zayid] to achieve a settlement.”462

It is clear that as late as May 1973 the Saudis still expected Britain to wield influence on Saudi Arabia’s behalf. The reports are also interesting because they indicate that the Saudis expected Shaikh Zayid to accept their positional commitment to the Saudi terms established in 1970 without any further Saudi negotiations.

Under the circumstances, King Faisal’s remarks about Shaikh Zayid’s failure to respond to the May 1970 proposal could reasonably be interpreted as just one more facet of the

458_{Nicholas G. Thacher, Embassy Jidda (Jeddah) to Secretary of State (Washington) Saudi-Abu Dhabi}

Talks 29, April 1973, 1973JIDDA01751, available at:

www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973JIDDA01751_b.html. (Accessed 14 June 2013)

459_{Nicholas G. Thacher, Embassy Jidda, (Jeddah) to Secretary of state, (Washington) Saudi-Abu Dhabi}

Talks, 30 April 1970, 973JIDDA01770, Available at:

www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1973JIDDA01770-b.html. (Accessed 25 June, 2013)

460_{Foreign Office Minutes by P. R. H. Wright, ‘Saudi/UAE,”23, May 1973, FCO8/2129,TNA, London, in}

Arabian Boundaries, vol.14, ed. Schofield, p. 360.

461 _{Rothnie (Jedda), to (Foreign Office), 13 May 1973, FCO8/2129, TNA, London, in Arabian}

Boundaries, vol. 14, ed. Schofield, p. 354.

141

Saudi control negotiation strategy implemented by contentious tactics. In addition, King Faisal’s accusation that Shaikh Zayid had not responded effectively to King Faisal’s proposal is also interesting. According to Churchman:

Silence can emphasize a point, give opponents time to absorb a point or reflect on it, or regain the attention of distracted listeners. People are uncomfortable with silence. Failing to respond when expected may lead them to keep talking. Even if opponents do not take the bait, silence can be used to think about what they have said…they must make clear nothing new will be said till they get a response to their own statement.463

Bearing in mind Churchman’s remarks, Shaikh Zayid’s plan of not responding to Saudi demands may have been a tactic aimed at continuing negotiations or emphasising his own previous counter-proposals, rather than an attempt to avoid negotiations. Perhaps, for example, Shaikh Zayid had been trying to get the Saudis to reconsider his previous proposals of sharing sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid or sharing oil revenues from the Zararah/Shaybah oil field.464

After the breakdown in the Dammam talks, Shaikh Khalifa Al-Thani, Ruler of Qatar, agreed in December 1973 to act as an intermediary between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and during that month extensive discussions took place with Shaikh Zayid about King Faisal’s proposal (concerning Khor al-Udaid and Zararah). Shaikh Khalifa noted that: “the Saudis would not relent on the question of oil fields in the [Zararah] area or any others to the south.”465 He also informed Shaikh Zayid that King Faisal’s “take it or leave it” negotiating tactic was still in place and that if Shaikh Zayid wanted Saudi recognition of the UAE, he would have to agree to the concessions that had been demanded by King Faisal in May 1970. The Qatari Ruler played a substantial role in convincing Shaikh Zayid to cede the area west of Sabkhat al-Mattai that included Khor al-Udaid.466

It should be remembered that Qatar has common boundaries with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia around Khor al-Udaid. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Qatari-Saudi agreement of 1965 gave the Saudis the right to control Khor al-Udaid, meaning that the UAE had to realise that the Qatari-Saudi agreement of 1965 had formalised the existing

463 _{Churchman, Negotiation: Process, Tactics, Theory, p.49.}

464 _{See Chapter 5, Shaikh Zayid ‘s Negotiations Strategy and Tactics, p.120.}

465_{E. F. Henderson (Doha), to A.D. Harris, (Foreign Office), ‘Zaid/Khalifah Meeting’, 18 December 1973,}

FCO8/2129,TNA, London, in Arabian Boundaries, vol. 14, ed. Schofield, p. 387.

142

Saudi control over Khor al-Udaid. It is also important to recall that the UAE had not exercised sovereignty over Khor al-Udaid after 1965, its latest attempt to do so having been in 1958.467 In fact the refusal of the UAE and Britain to recognise the 1965 agreement did not change the reality that Saudi Arabia had obtained Khor al-Udaid under that agreement.468 The British Archive records do not provide a detailed account of Qatar’s mediation but it may be concluded, based on various circumstances, that following Shaikh Khalifa’s mediation, Shaikh Zayid decided to cede Khor al-Udaid in 1973, possibly as a result of Qatar’s efforts. Arguably, Shaikh Zayid’s ceding of territory west of Sabkhat al-Mattai, confirmed Saudi Arabia’s rights under the Qatari- Saudi agreement of 1965.

After the failed talks at Dammam, both the Saudis and the British continued by and large to portray Shaikh Zayid as an obstacle to a resolution of the dispute, which in turn continued to be a biased assessment because Shaikh Zayid had offered a significant concession to the Saudis in the west of Abu Dhabi. A more objective assessment would be that Shaikh Zayid had attempted a compromise strategy and had suggested a mediation tactic to move the negotiations towards a mutual resolution of the dispute. This is the kind of situation the literature of negotiation usually describes as producing mutual problem-solving and “win-win” negotiated outcomes469 However, the Saudis refused to compromise, instead turning to the British to pressure Shaikh Zayid into agreeing to King Faisal’s terms.