The state’s weakness discussed so far is caused by the influence of informal institutions on formal government institutions. The Moti case displayed signs of informal institutions. In this section, I examine the informal institutions and reflect on their influence on foreign policy. I start by considering the definition of informal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) defined informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004, p. 727). This intuitive understanding of informal institution has been applied to a variety of phenomena, including clans and mafias (Collins, 2002, 2003; Lauth, 2000), folkways (D. H. Fischer, 1991; Matthews, 1959; Sumner, 1906), corruption, clientelism, patrimonialism (Böröcz, 2000; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2012; Lauth, 2000; O'Donnell, 1996; Pejovich, 1999; Persson, Rothstein & Toerell, 2012; Taylor-Robinson, 2006), personal networks (Wang, 2000) and culture (Dia, 1996; Pejovich, 1999). This wide range of phenomena encompass all behaviours that are not accounted for by the written rules.
Cultural, personal and wantok networks featured prominently in the Moti affair. In this section, I unpack the key concept of culture to determine its influence on foreign policy. I highlight the ‘big man’ personality and wantok network as intrinsic parts of the Melanesian culture and society and show how they play out in the Moti affair. Culture is defined as ‘those customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation’ (Manz, Sapienza & Zingales, 2006, p. 23). It is a system of inherited conceptions that shape the patterns of thought, human behaviour and action. Cultural beliefs are an important component of culture:
Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several individuals that govern interaction—between these people, and between them, their gods, and other groups—and differ from
knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or analytically proved. In general cultural belief’s become identical and commonly known through the socialisation process by which culture is unified, maintained and communicated (Greif, 1994, p. 915).
Captain Ur’s previous statement, ‘in a high context culture like PNG, the mention of names of people that we have respect for is good enough for me to act upon their direction’ (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13), reflected a causal link between cultural belief and its influence on decision-making. His statement, ‘the mention of names of people that we have respect for’, identifies Somare with the ‘big man’, whose directions cannot be questioned.
The ‘big man’ is a type of leadership that it is closely associated with the traditional Melanesian culture and society. Its status is attained by ‘the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a person above the common herd and attract about him a coterie of loyal lesser men’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289). His power, regarded as ‘personal power’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289), is often more influential than legal–rational authority (which is further discussed in next section). The ‘big man’ is a highly influential individual that has a large group of followers, both from his clan and from other clans. In particular Melanesian tribes, the phrase ‘big man’ also denotes ‘man of importance’ or ‘man of renown’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289). In the Pacific region, two types of leadership are common: the ‘big man’ leadership systems of Melanesia and the chieftains of Polynesia. Leadership in Polynesia is inherited. Leadership in Melanesia, by contrast, is usually determined by the personal prestige of community members (Goldman, 1970; Sahlins, 1963; Sand, 2002). However, this system of leadership has limits. In parts of New Caledonia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and PNG, chiefs were hereditary over several generations (Sand, 2002, p. 290). Somare is one of the very few leaders in the region who straddles both systems. In his Karau village in the Murik Lakes of East Sepik, he is barely acknowledged as the prime minister. In this village, he carries a more important title, the chief,
like his father before him. In PNG, he is the prime minister. He is regarded as the founding ‘father of the nation’ (Chin, 2003, p. 460; Griffin, 1997, p. 77) who brought the country to independence in 1975 and became its first prime minister. In contemporary PNG society and politics, Somare is affectionately referred to as the ‘old man’, or ‘grand chief’. His face’s appearance on the PNG’s legal tender, kina (50-kina denomination), symbolises respect for the national leader. Captain Ur’s reference to Somare as the ‘old man’ (DFBI, 2007, p. 13) and ‘people that we have respect for’ (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13) demonstrated the link between Somare’s ‘big man’ personality and its influence on his followers. The acting PNGDF commander ignored Section 205 of the PNG constitution because he believed that the instruction came from a respectable person in society (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13), despite its questionable nature. This is because in Melanesian and Polynesian societies, leaders and chiefs are treated with great respect. This example revealed the influence of the ‘big man’ personality on foreign policy decision-making.
The various actors involved in the Moti affair are wantoks, which in Melanesian Pidgin means ‘one talk’, or someone who shares the same language. In practice, a wantok group is based on shared language, family or tribal relations, regional location and other forms of association (Dinnen, 1997, p. 12). Wantok more generally refers to a system of socio-economic obligation, reciprocity, status and preferential treatment that binds members of a group (Alpers, 2005, p. 34). The wantok network or system is an informal institution, in that its operation is largely based on unwritten rules that are socially shared. Understanding the wantok system as a socio-economic and political network is critical to understanding Melanesian societies and political behaviour in the country and region.
Excluding the prime minister’s chief of staff, all the key players are from the Sepik province, or the same province as the prime minister, including the chief secretary, the acting commander of the PNGDF, director general of OSCA and the two drivers (Jerry Fruanga and
Balthazar Wali), who drove Moti out of the chancellery to the airport. The prime minister’s chief of staff knew that wantoks from Sepik were specifically assigned to perform the illegal operation when he said ‘you Sepiks, you and the Chief Secretary are gelygelys’ (DFBI, 2007, p. 46). The involvement of the various actors who carried out the clandestine operation may have been involuntary, but the fact that this group of elites came from the same province as the prime minister underscored the wantok network in the Moti affair. It left the impression that wantoks were specifically selected for the purpose. The highly placed Sepik group also engaged relatives (the two drivers) to perform the operation.
The wantok label is also extended to the wider Melanesian societies who share the same cultural features and identity. This brings the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, into the picture. Somare and Sogavare are wantoks; they share the same Melanesian cultural identity. States that have identical cultures often engage in cooperative and integrative behaviour. They relate easily to each other with mutual understanding and cooperation (Cobb & Elder, 1970; Rummel, 1979). Somare and Sogavare’s behaviours and actions in getting Moti out of PNG, against Australia’s extradition request, can also be understood from the wantok network and their identity as Melanesians. They colluded to oppose Australia’s extradition request and, more generally, to influence in the region. The collusion between the two prime ministers, for instance, was manifested by the consent to use the Solomon Islands territorial airspace without prior arrangement. There was no complaint of territorial violation when the PNGDF CASA aircraft flew into the Solomon Islands airspace without permission. In international relations, when one state violates the territorial airspace of another, there is usually a diplomatic protest in the strongest terms possible against such intrusion or invasion. The Solomon Islands Government did not send a protest note to PNG against the illegal entry into its airspace. The inability to protest the violation of its territorial airspace indicated that there was a consensual agreement between the two governments for the clandestine operation.